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EPIGRAPH

I think I can see Adult Education deriving great benefit from
the theorizing and research of ths "change theorists" now so

active. I see our technology being enriched by increased
understanding of the process of individual, institutional,
and social change, and especially of the phenomenon of
resistance to change and strategies for helping with change.

Finally I see an enlargement of the definition of the clientele
of Adult Education away from a primary focus on individuals qua
individuals toward a concern with institutions, communities,
and even larger social systems. I see us Adult Educators
becoming increasingly concerned with improving educative
quality of total environments and increasingly skillful in
planning programs that will accomplish this end.
Malcolm S. Knowles
Professor and Philosopher of Adult Education
Adult Leadership
February 1967
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INTRODUCTION
With the passage of LB-722 in 1959, the State of Nebraska
embarked on one of the most extensive and challenging adult education
programs of the past decade.

LB-722 established the Nebraska Agri-

cultural Products Industrial Utilization Research Program (Nebraska
Program) which in the course of its ambitious life undertook the
re-education, first of Nebraska's production-oriented agricultural
citizens, and then of other agricultural states and the Federal
Government.

Seen as an adult education program, the Nebraska Program

clearly represented the kind of "enlargement of the definition of the
clientele of adult education" proposed by Malcolm Knowles.

This was

adult education moving "away from a primary focus on individuals qua
individuals toward a concern also with institutions, communities and

even larger social systems."

It was education functioning within and

concerned with a total environment, an environment whose production-

oriented values, and whose success in living up to those values, had
back-fired resulting in huge and embarrassing agricultural surpluses
which depressed the market value of agricultural commodities, reducing
the agriculture worker's standard of living and his status in the eyes
of his fellow citizens.
Insofar as the Nebraska Program attempted to change values and
attitudes it also functioned as a change agent, finding itself
increasingly preoccupied with lithe phenomenon of resistance to change

and strategies for helping with change."

Resistance to change was

rooted in generations of emphasis on production and production
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research.

Supporters of the Nebraska Program were convinced that

utilization research was the solution to agriculture's problems:

the

Program's educational objective was thus a reordering of research
priorities and an attenuation of the produce-more ethic.

The admin-

istrators who undertook this education effort had a firm precedent in
the success that agricultural societies, institutes, and agencies have
had in the education of the public for agricultural production, a
success which culminated in the establishment of the nation's colleges
of agriculture:
The local and regional agricultural societies which began
appearing after the American Revolution to educate in agricultural production through printed materials, contests, fairs,
and discussion • • • were also becoming more aware of the

possibilities of enlisting government aid • • • • The societies
reached their peak in 1861 and began to wane in favor of
farmers' institutes which • • • provided direct instruction in
technological improvements in farming. • • • The establishment
of a federal Department of Agriculture and the passage of the
Land Grant Act provided federal support for colleges to teach
agriculture LProductio~.l
The size of its clientele and its role as change agent in a
total socio-economic environment were not the only things which
distinguished the Nebraska Program.

The Program was also dis tin-

guished by the fact that it was administered, not by a traditional
educational institution, but by an agency of a state government (the
Nebraska Department of Agriculture), and by the fact that it saw the
State's educational institutions as part of its clientele:
production-oriented like the state's citizens, resistant to change,

committed to maintaining the status quo vis-a-vis agricultural
research.

This view of the state's educational institutions as candi-

dates for remedial education got the Program into difficulties with
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the University of Nebraska.

In particular, the University and its

supporters in the State Legislature contended that an educational/
research program in a traditional College of Agriculture area ought
to be administered by the College of Agriculture.

There was a

heated exchange over the subject of who should administer the Program
(a state agency or the University) when LB-722 was debated in the
legislature, and partisans of the University continued to be vocal
critics of the idea of state agency education throughout the life of
the Program.
The Program's name--Nebraska Agricultural Products Industrial
Utilization Research Program--is misleading.

It sounded, not like an

educational program, but like a research and development program.

In

fact, the Nebraska Program was originally conceived as a research and
development program designed to find new uses for agricultural
products, and although Program administrators came to see the
Program's principal business as education, Nebraska citizens and
their representatives in the State Legislature never ceased to hope
tha t the Program would produce marketable produc ts.

This misunder-

standing about Program goals was to. create problems, particularly in
the area of Program evaluation:

seen as an education program

designed to change attitudes and to reorder priorities in agricultural research, the Nebraska Program was a great success; seen as a

research and development program, it was disappointing (only one
product got to the marketing stage).
Although the agricultural surpluses which gave rise to the
Nebraska Program have gradually disappeared, the educative work of
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the Program will be of interest to tho·se in the field of adult
education who are engaged in programs of similar scope, or who are

involved in education programs conducted by governmental agencies.
The Program's problems and omissions, no less than its scope and
daring, are instructive; in the

judg~ent

of this investigator, the

Nebraska Program provided an exciting laboratory for testing the
principles of adult education on a large population, and stands as a
model for programs of similar scope and intent.
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CHAPTER 1
AGRICULTURE'S PLIGHT
It has been widely held that the American democracy sprang
full-flowered from the soil, that the- family farm has provided the
backbone of the nation, and that the farmer is the guardian of the
American way of life.

This belief has acquired the force of a myth--

the agrarian myth--and the political consequences of widespread
acceptance of this myth are mammoth.

It is, for example, generally

acknowledged that the most successful "lobby" in the United States has
been the Farm Bloc.

According to C. Wright Mills in The

~

Elite:

It has been so successful that it is difficult to see it as an
independent force acting upon the several organs, especially
with the Senate, in which, due to the peculiar geographic
principie of representation, it is definitely overrepresented. l
The same has been true in most state legislatures.
Agriculture has been an American giant, not only with regard
to the political power it has wielded, but in almost every sector of
the national life.

This stature is not unmerited; American agri-

culture has advanced more in the past fifty years than in all prior
years. of United States history.2

It has kept pace with other

industries in improvements and technological developments, especially
in the production area.
Moreover, although recent years have witnessed a migration

away from the farm as a means of family livelihood, agriculture
3
employed an estimated 7.1 million farm workers in 1960 --and five

6

million in 1970, more than the transportation, public utilities, steel
and auto industries combined.

If the industries directly related to

agriculture are included in the picture, an even larger employment
figure results.
The investment in agriculture, at the beginning of the 1960's
equaled 200 billion dollars, representing 21,300 dollars per agricultural employee and 15,900 dollars per manufacturing worker.

The

figure 200 billion dollars was equal to three-fourths the value of the
assets of all corporations in the United States or three-fourths of
the market value of all corporate stocks on the New York Stock
Exchange.
Agriculture has been most familiar in its role as producer.
However, the record shows that the farmer was also a good customer.
In 1959-60 he purchased 25.5 billion dollars of the goods and services
of other producers, other industries.
Fourteen billion dollars went for the same things urban people
buy--food, clothing, furniture, appliances.
Two and one-half billion dollars went for new equipment. (As
contrasted with the primary iron and steel industry which
spent only one billion dollars in 1959 for equipment and new
plants.)
Three and one-half billion dollars went for fuel, lubricants,
and maintenance. (Thereby direc:ly aiding agriculture's
chief industrial product competitor, petroleum, which was a
heavy spender for research and development of products.)
Additional agriculture dollars purchased 320 million pounds
of rubber.4
The agriculture industry served as a creator of employment
indirectly as well as directly.5

Four of ten jobs in private

7

employment were related to agricultu·re, resulting from the ten
million people required to store, transport, process and mechandise
agricultural products and the six million jobs required to supply the
farm.

In addition, agriculture was a taxpayer, channeling into public

funds one and one-third billion dollars in farm real estate taxes,
twenty-five billion dollars in personal property taxes and one and
one-fourth billion dollars in income taxes.
American agriculture extended its influence beyond the
national boundaries.

Agriculture held the distinction of being the

world's largest exporter,. with 65 million of 321 million harvested
acres going for export; (equal to the combined cropland of Nebraska,
Iowa and Kansas).
exported.

In 1960, 4.8 billion dollars in farm products was

This power was exerted in the cause of both peace and war.

Agricultural exports relieved hunger and promoted economic growth in
newly developing areas of the world.

For example, United States

wheat made five billion loaves of bread a year in India.

Agriculture

therefore became a significant tool in dealing with nations, the goal
being stable governments through economic well-being and a full
stomach.

Agriculture entered the arena of war when the United States

bartered farm products for strategic defense materials--more than one
billion dollars worth from 1954 to 1962.
So stood the giant agriculture, where output per man hour
increased by six and one half percent per year in the 1960's, while
output in non-agricultural industry increased by only two percent per
year in the early 1960's and actually decreased during the late
1960's; where one hour of labor produced four times the food and crops
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as in 1919-1921, allowing one farm· worker to produce enough food for
himself and 25 others.

Crop production was 65 percent higher per acre

in the 1960' s.
Unfortunately for agriculture and its workers, and in the long
run for the nation and its

taxpay~rs,

bode ill rather than good.

the above trends in agriculture

Nationally, minus signs began appearing

with increasing frequency in the farmer's bookkeeping.

And it was

the little man, the small farmer who could least afford the losses,
who got hurt first and usually the worst--and he was quite numerous,
as indicated by the data below.

In 1960 agriculture with 3.7 million

independent producers had the following record:
1,638,000
617 ,000
653,000
794,000

farms or 44.2% of
farms or 16.77. of
farms or 17.7% of
farms or 21. 47. of

total
total
total
total

farms sold less than
farms sold between
farms sold beuveen
farms sold more than

$ 2,500
$ 2,500-$4,999
$ 5,000-$9,999
$10,000 6

Of those farms selling more than 10,000 dollars of products, only
102,143 farms, or two percent of the total, had sales totaling more
than 40,000 dollars.
A drop in the proportion of farm personal income from
7.17 percent to 3.86 percent of the total national personal income
was recorded between 1950 and 1960.
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During that same period, with

agricultural products going largely into food uses, the national rate
of expenditure for food as compared to total personal consumption
expenditure dropped from 30.6 percept to 26.6 percent.

This took

place even though food costs rose less since the Second World War
than most other items in the cost-of-living index:

9

All items
Rent
Medical care
All food
Farm food

-

27 .5%
45.7%
59.970
21. 2'7.
12.07.

rise
rise
rise
r~se8
rl.se

The farmer got none (no rebate) of this increase in cost for the food
he produced.

In fact, he received

1~

percent less for the farm food

"market basket" than he did in the 1940's.

This accounted for the fact

that the prices of farm grown food had risen only 12 percent although
processing and marketing costs had risen 36 percent.

9

For example,

the farmer received in 1960:
39¢ of $1 for all food
2c for the corn in a 26¢ box of cornflakes
2¢ for the wheat in a 20e loaf of bread
ge for the oranges in a 23¢ can of orange juice
27¢ fClr the cotton in a $4 shirt lO
Taxes paid by the farmers have already been noted.

The low

income tax figure as compared with the property tax figure and the
number of farm people is indicative of the farmer's diminished income.
The average small farmer netted an average of 986 dollars a year, and
of that figure 329 dollars came from non-farm sources.
meager 657 dollars from purely farm operations.

This left a

These figures

appear even more meager when compared with the non-farm population per
capita income of 2,282 dollars (including 18 dollars per person from
the agriculture industry).

The wide discrepancy in farm and non-farm

incomes can be even better seen in a comparison of average wages:

82

cents per hour for the farmer compared with an average of 2.14 dollars
per hour in food marketing and a'2.29 dollars per hour average in the
factory.

These were the statistics which briefly told a story with a

10
complicated plot and an unfortuna fe ending.
The experience of the State of Nebraska can be considered as
a case study exemplary of agriculture's problems.
of the larger picture.

Nebraska was part

Being located in the fertile Midwest, most of

Nebraska's history had been connected with the tilling of the soil.
During the first half of the 20th Century most of her citizens lived
in rural areas, gaining their livelihood from gambling with the
weather, fighting the insects and weeds, and more and more often
winning the battle until graineries filled to overflowing.

By 1970

there were still only two cities in the state, Lincoln and Omaha,
which were classed as metropolitan and, as might be anticipated, their
businesses and industries were linked to agriculture.
Lincoln and Omaha gained in population during the 1960's at the
expense of the rural areaS and the small towns.

Farmers left the land

in increasing numbers, adding themselves to the work force in the
cities.

The number of farms in Nebraska dropped from 121,000 in 1940

to 50,000 in 1970, while total acreage in these farms showed a gain
from 47,344,000 acres to 47,956,000 during the same time period.
The question arose, what had caused these individuals to move
from areas where actual tillable land had increased, where more
families might have earned a living, to the city where the farmer is
classified as "unskilled" and adds to the ranks of the unemployed?
The full answer requires consideration of many variables, all of
which contributed to the farmer's plights, and anyone of which might
have been considered its prime cause.

One of the primary factors, and
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the one which is the focus of this research, is the accumulation, at
this time, of tremendous agricultural surpluses.

It was this

so-called "surplus" of harvested farm crops which, among other
factors, had contributed to a lower income and standard of living for
the average United States farmer.

This "surplus" was in turn the

result of a number of factors, chief among which were high production
and under-utilization of farm crops.

And the answer to that

situation, as it was in the effort to increase American agricultural
production, was education--but utilization education.
Both the Democratic and Republican parties had attacked the
problem on the federal level by means other than education, but
programs of production control and restricted land usage only brought
charges of "bad planning."

A lack of ways to dispose of surplus

crops on hand brought the same charge.

Meanwhile, production

continued to outstrip utilization.
This was not the first time the nation had faced such a
problem.

Crop surpluses caused concern as early as the post-World

War I period (1920's).

In the 1950's and 1960's agriculture again

. began to feel an acute need to expand its markets or at least to halt
their gradual 10ss.11

Both periods of cost-price squeeze were

aftermaths of wars which had turned all efforts of industry and agriculture to production.

During the 1950's and early 1960's, fear of a

third world war led to further stockpiling of "grain reserves."
balance between production and consumption was upset.

The

Even though the

nation had a growing population and rising standard of living, the
farm population's income began to lose pace.

12
By 1960, Nebraska's total personal income was three-fourths of
one percent of the United States total personal income.

Total

Nebraska farm income in 1960 amounted to 2.8 percent of the
United States farm income.

The average Nebraska farm net income for

1960 was one thousand eighty-eight d?11ars.12

This situation, and

what was seen as rural opposition to progressive change, moved one of
her more renowned native sons to label Nebraska a "depressed area. ,,13
Such name-calling was unfortunate, for the farmer like every other
workman lived by the philosophy:
order to sell more.

To have more is to produce more in

The Nebraska farmer relied upon production

research and education to attain his goal of "having more."

Such

research and education gave him fertilizers, irrigation techniques,

crop hybrids, and farming methods which offset federal production
controls and caused record yields to be grown on less land.

14

The

result was that farm production consistently outran the capacity or
inclination of the nation to consume farm products, thus creating the
exact problems industry knew would afflict the nation if advertising
could not keep the nation's consumer market for manufactured goods
constantly increasing.

The Nebraska Department of Agriculture's 1960

Biennial Report stated the average agricultural worker's plight well:
The regrettable fact is that the family farm, producer of
many great Americans and moulder of the Midwestern character,
can no longer support the farm family. The spread between
farm produce prices and the cost of their production has
become un-spread and is squeezing the economic life out of the
small farm operator. Faced with the continued prospect of
dwindling income, thousands ~re selling out and taking their
chances with the towns and cities. Many are leaving the agricultural states altogether, transporting their education,
acquired talents, and personal capabilities to other areas.
The family farm is caught in change, consolidation into

13
larger, frequently huge work units employing machinery and
methods too costly for the small operator, and which
guarantee continuance of surpluses of major crops, further.

depressing the market.

is

The urban population could not ignore the situation.

Whatever

affected the farmer inevitably had its effect upon the urban
dweller.

In his move to the cities, the farmer created new problems

for an already booming urban population.

Civic leadership was called

upon to provide utilities, schools, homes, jobs, law enforcement, and
living room for a segment of the population considered "unskilled."

All this in the face of an American society which had become
primarily urban-industrialized in composition and which was beginnIng
to spawn urban dwellers, intellectuals, and political representatives who looked down upon agriculture, its workers and its
problems.

This situation was aggravated by a Supreme Court decision

ordering reapportionment of state legislatures, so long dominated by
rural influences.

The only possible hope was to convince the urban

dweller that the situation required a united attack.
possible the pendulum would swing back again someday.

It was
Perhaps a

catastrophic event could bring the nation to a greater dependence
upon the farmer again.

But, as one student of the situation

observed:
• • • it is going to be difficult to get the land out of the
hands of a few large landholders in which our farmland is
coming to rest, i f and ",hen the population wants to return
to the farm; to out-migrate from the city back to the
farm. l6
.
What to do about agriculture then?

An increase in exports

seemed unlikely as other countries became more self-sufficient and

14
such enti ties as the European Common 'Market arose.

Ye t Americans

appeared to agree that their industries, agriculture included,
should maintain a high level of efficiency and quality, therefore
legitimatizing the farmer's continued belief in a high level of
production.

The prime question forpgriculture then became:

could

agriculture develop profitable industrial markets in the national or
international sphere capable of absorbing enough of the excess farm
products to minimize, possibly even to eliminate, the need for costly
" .
""
"?17
restrlctlons,
supports an d surp I'us- d
lsposlng
opera t ions.

These

desperately~needed

industrial markets lay at the end of

a long, hard road paved with large amounts of money.

Turning raw

agricultural materials into manufactured goods required a concentrated
program of research, development, and marketing, plus acceptance by the
public and cooperation by the manufacturing industry.

Unfortunately,

the manufacturing industry had assisted in the decline of agriculture.
Most of its new products had been based on non-agricultural raw
materials.

This was a reversal of a past practice.

Industry

increased its investment in research by at least three billion a year
from 1951 to the beginning of the Nebraska Program--three percent of
its gross sales (see Figure 1).

By utilizing its big, well-

integrated units and large resources of men and money, it produced a
flood of new and improved products--fabrics, plastics, building
materials, surface coatings, drugs, detergents and chemicals.

Most of

these products had non-agricultural ral, material compositions.
was, however, not entirely industry's fault.

This

The reason that it

turned to such materials as petroleum for compositional bases was the

E:IGURE 1
15
18
INDUSTRY'S INVEST!1ENT IN RESEARCH
Total of $14.5 billion spent in 1961 or 3% of gross sales.
(Compare
$375 million spent by agriculture in 1961 or 1% of gross sales.)
Industry:

$14.5 Billion

Agriculture:

$375 Million

FIGURE 2
19
AGRICULTURE'S INVESTHENT IN RESEARCH
-Of $375 million spent in 1961 for agricultural research, 40% ~ent
for basic research and development and only 5% for utilization
research~

$148 Million
Basic Research and Development

$16-18 !1illion
Utilization Pesearch

$192 Million
Other Agricultural Research
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same reason any producer or manufacturer changes his practice, the
economy and efficiency of new materials and processes.

Agriculture,

in other words, made the mistake of placing too much emphasis on
production research and allowed industry to out-compete it in the
field of utilization research and

~evelopment.

Such segments of

industry as petroleum made good use of the three billion dollars
that industry added each year to the money set aside for research and
development of new products.

In contrast, agriculture's expen-

diture for its total research program reached only 375 million
dollars by 1961--about one percent of its gross sales.

Most of this

figure went for production research, with 130 million dollars going
for "basic" research and development and no more than 16 million dollars
to 18 million dollars going for "applied" utilization research (see
Figure 2).
It can be clearly seen that emphasis was lacking in the area of
agricultural utilization research and development.

Nor had this

imbalance gone unnoticed:
Under the surface, but potent politically, is the feeling that
too much money has gone to the industry and its research
institutions on the East and West Coasts of the United States.
The Midwest and the South, in particular, feel slighted. 20
There were rumblings in the Congress about looking into the situation.
It was evident, however, that increased allotments of federal funds for
agricultural research would not allay agriculture's problems unless
those funds Were clearly earmarked for utilization research and
educa tion.
The inpouring of government money for production and

17

development during the two world wars gave industry a good base from
which to advance its utilization research after the wars.

Agri-

culture in contrast devoted most of its energy only to production
during the wars, and to production research after.
research as was carried on by

agric~lture

Such utilization

(that is, the development of

new war materials) resulted in such discoveries as penicillen, nylon
from corn cobs, synthetic rubber, frozen fruit juice concentrates,
and wash and wear fabrics.

For some reason, agriculture failed to

exercise the foresight that experience should have engendered.

It

failed to press its advantage, to exploit its opportunity and
therefore to meet the competition industry presented in the field of
utilization research and development.
Industry had taken the competitive initiative and gained the
advantage.

With its billion dollar expenditures during past years it

had researched synthetics which had captured the natural fibers market
from cotton, wool, flax, and silk.

Industrial plastiCS, films, and

adhesives had shouldered aside heretofore agriculture-supplied
products.

Two out of three tallow and fat soaps had been replaced by

·non-degradable, petroleum-based detergents.

Agricultural oils for

cooking, painting, and lubricating were bypassed.

Two out of three

pairs of shoes were made from leather substitutes, with three out of
three a distinct possibility:
Last week !April 6, 196~ the tumultous United States marketplace was deciding the fate of a brand-new material--man-made
leather [Corfauy for shoes. And the ne," synthetic looked
like a winner for the giant E. I. Du Pont Company. The
material itself is an acknowledged triumph of sophisticated
chemistry and cost approximately $15 million to develop.
This event was followed by the Arnan Industries, Incorporated,

18
all-plastic shoe. The $700 million-a-year tanning industry
is, of course, challenging all claims of both companies. 2l
Industry, because of its high monetary rewards, was able to
attract the best scientific minds.

It was able to obtain

increasingly better results from costly programs which produced
products worth the risk and effort.

As a consequence it was able to

also hold prices stable, resulting in consumer acceptance of new
products.

In addition, an adequate, steady flow of high quality

supplies made manufacture and distribution easy within well-integrated
industry.
Industrialists attested to the efficacy of their utilization
and new product research programs.

Frank Pace, Jr., Chairman of the

,

\

General Dynamics -Corporation, was quoted as saying that almost 90
percent of his company's current products did not exist a decade ago.
According to David Sarnoff, Chairman of Radio Corporation of America,
four out of every five dollars of RCA's record 1960 sales came from
products that Were researched and developed after World War 11.

23

Agriculture, for its part, reacted sluggishly when it
awakened to its lag of six to eight years in utilization/new product
research and development.

It found, as is pointed out in the chapter

on the Nebraska Agricultural Utilization Research Program, that there
was usually a further lag of five to seven years or more before money
spent on utilization research began to show up in new developments.
It found that, even though it possessed the same raw materials and
capacity as industry, the risks of new product development were
mounting, and that industries on the decline, as was the case with

24

22

19
agricul ture, assumed grea ter risks.

It became evident tha t the

statement, "Just stop your research for a year while your competitors
. h t on--you 'II b e d ea,
d ,,25 h a d
'
.
f or t h e
keep rlg
serl0US
meanlng
production-oriented, economically sick agriculture industry which had
failed to give adequate emphasis to

~tilization

research.

Agriculture

needed massive aid and superhuman effort to even begin to compete with
companies which could devote 300 man-years of labor, 50 million
dollars for development, and two million dollars for promotion of one
new product.

26

Agriculture, in contrast, would be mightily taxed to

absorb a loss on even one of its new utilization research products,

by the failure of even one product to gain industrial and consumer
acceptance, that.is, markets which return the investment.
Before agriculture could even think about competing with
industry for markets, she had to exert herself to catch up.

Until

she did, the pendulum would continue to swing to industry's advantage.
Agriculture was only beginning to realize these facts of life of the
industrial-technological age.
problem clearly:

"Industry has done a ,,,onderful job in the field of

. utilization research.
the same

results~1I

But there were a few who saw the

Given the opportunity, agriculture can produce

27

Individuals who had foreseen the need for agricultural utilization research programs, such as those who initiated and admin-

istered Nebraska's educational and lobbying program in 1959, argued
that agriculture had all it needed to initiate and press competition.
It had the ra", materials, capacity, and potential.

Petroleum and

20
starch provide a good example of the competition between industrial
synthetics and agricultural raw materials.

Industry increasingly used

petroleum as the basic raw material for a majority of its synthetic
materials.

These materials were then converted into consumer

products, invading markets heretofore dominated by agricultural raw
materials.

Petroleum took over dominance of such fields as

detergents, plastics, explosives, adhesives, germicides, pharmaceuticals, resins, soaps, and cooling and lubricating fluids.

This

happened even though the raw materials produced by the farmer were
made of the same chemical components as most non-agricultural
materials, including petroleum.

Coal and petroleum were, after all,

plants that died and decayed long ago.
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It followed that the agri-

cultural plants now existing possessed the same characteristics and
potential as their predecessors.

There could be no other conclusion

than that research must make the difference.

If farm products could

be modified and tailored to particular needs through utilization
research, new products would mean new consumer demand and more markets

for agriculture.
The ingredient that had been lacking was the realization on
the part of agriculture that agriculture as an industry had to do
the initiating, the pressing, instead of merely trying to maintain
the markets it possessed--or those it had traditionally possessed in
the past.

Agriculture seemed concerned only ,"ith maintaining the

status quo, and deploring the loss of markets to industrial
substitutes.

In a few words, what was needed was education of the

'·5
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farm and non-farm public in the benefits of utilization and utilization research in agriculture~

Such an effort required imagination

and aggressiveness.
Except during World Wars 1, and principally II, materials from
the farm had not had intensive, systematic, utilization research
emphasis.
Because in the past food was never abundant, because manpower
had to be released from farms to run industry, because great
wars created great necessities, most research emphasis and

funds in agriculture have gone to production research. 29
The philosophy of "to produce more crops is to have more income" had
been religiously followed by the producers of agricultural raw
materials, with disposal and utilization supposedly taking care of
themselves through routine marketing procedures.
As this system began to fail, responsibility for assistance in
the disposal of agricultural products was viewed as a problem of
national scope and therefore an area of proper concern for the Federal
Government.

This was not without precedent.

The government's

subsidies (a main cause of agriculture's bad public image), purchases,
storage programs and gratis handouts of agricultural products had
increasingly made it the farmer's agent, researcher, salesman and
w~s

public relations agency.

But this

also true of industry, at least

in the area of research.

In this crucial area, much of the time the

Federal Government found itself financing both sides of the competitian:

"Much of today' s Lindus tria g research is paid for by

government.

About $3 out of every $5 of such spending is paid from

the federal treasury, even though the actual work is done by
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industry.,,30

The main problem with the Federal Government's handling

of this area of agricultural affairs lay in its continued emphasis on
production--production research and education--and a lack of emphasis
on utilization research and education.

The State of Nebraska, for

one, grew increasingly disturbed oyer this fact and began to voice its
concern:

as in "The current program of the USDA, invaluable in so

many ways, indicates an apparent reluctance to conduct applied LUtilizatiow research in areas competitive with other industries.,,31

The USDA and the colleges of agriculture had been agriculture's champions in the production research efforts of the past
years.

Within these agencies' jurisdiction were laboratories and test

plots used for agriculture's advancement.

The USDA handled additional

duties for the agriculture industry in the fields of education, information, and administration of agricultural affairs on a national and
international basis.
~acilities,

The agriculture colleges, with their campus

extension programs and experiment stations also handled

extensive education and information programs e

were beginning to be asked:

However, questions

Had these institutions had a clear

enough view of what agriculture should be doing?

Had they put effort

in the areas necessary to keep agriculture competitive with industry?
Had they kept pace in the Technological Age?

Had they responded to

change and adopted the successful methods of industry?
recognized that agriculture must be progressive?

Had they

A negative answer in

the first instance implied negative answers in the others and
perceptive individuals maintained that a negative answer must indeed
be given.
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The charge was that the USDA was not competitive and, though it
had some programs and labs in the area, its philosophy, history, and
current operations demonstrated a definite lack of utilization.
research emphasis.

The charge directed against the colleges of

agriculture was that they were

to~

conservative and were almost

totally production and production research oriented.

The loss of

markets and the building of huge surpluses were the only results to be
expected of the failure to change emphasis from production to competitive utilization and new products research as the battle was joined
with industry.

It was said that agriculture--its farmers, its

government agencies, its schools, its laboratories, its represen-

tatives--needed a push, or at least needed some kind of help to get
moving in the direction of competitive research.

The institutions and

agencies, of course, assumed a defensive stance, especially when it

was suggested that they modify their traditional emphasis.
Against this strong, long-established tide stood an increasing
number of people in agriculture led by a few far-seeing individuals.
These leaders, using their positions,their voices, and the
instrument of education which had proved so effective in production
efforts, began to press for the change of emphasis needed in the
industry of agriculture.

They began to seek legislative measures to

implement their convictions.

Such leaders faced a problem in

rallying necessary support from a loosely organized farm industry and
its population.
would not act.

But without this support, legislators could and
If the farmer himself remained unconvinced of the

results of utilization research, he would leave his representatives
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in Congress--those who controlled the large USDA research establishment--open to arguments and influence which have inevitably
resulted in inaction.

Many Congressmen from agricultural areas,

despite good intentions, had faced a Congress deadlocked by such
arguments, pulled all ways.
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In addition, both groups, farmers and

representatives, faced United States Secretaries of Agriculture whose
office traditionally resisted attempts to alter its priorities.

A few

Nebraska private citizens, various congressional representatives from
Nebraska, and fellow senators and representatives from the Midwest and
South had tried time and again to shake Congress out of its inaction
on the agricultural utilization research issue.

But lack of under-

standing by even_their own people at home hampered such a cause.
Reliance upon the Federal Government and its subsidies appeared to
have blinded an industrious people to a chief cause of its ills, and
so utilization research, which might have been a solution to agriculture's plight, remained sidelined.

It became apparent that the

first order of business was an educational, or rather are-educational,
effort operating on two fronts:

the public and the Federal

. Government (Congress and the USDA).
In other words, Congress had to be motivated to act by the
lobbying pressure of a newly informed public.
assist it in acting.

And the USDA had to

A change in emphasis could be achieved only

. 1atlon.
.
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th roug h sound f edera 1 1 egls
The Nebraska Program was an initial attempt to educate the
public and to educate and influence the Federal Government by
example.

34

The dramatic "research" program initiated by the state in

25
1959 operated to inform citizens of utilization research's promise in
the hope that they would in turn exert pressure on the federal
agencies.

But before examining the Nebraska Program in detail,

congressional action--or inaction--and USDA positions will be
examined.

It will then be

possible.~to

the appropriate perspective.

consider Nebraska's Program in

-p
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CHAPTER 2
CONGRESS, THE USDA, AND THE WELSH REPORT
An overview of the work of Congress and the United States
Department of Agriculture in the utilization research area illustrates
why the Nebraska Program was initiated.

What follows is an exami-

nation of the support utilization and utilization research received
from the nation's representatives.

Unfortunately, the progress of

this "cause" had been painfully slow in each chamber of Congress.
Both the Senate and the House had given consideration to the problem
of surplus, but neither had been able to agree that utilization
research was the means by which to alleviate the problem.

The House

Committee on Agriculture had requested a report on the history and
progress of utilization research and marketing for the past
seventy-five years, prior to 1954.
form of the Pace Report

1

The resulting information in the

was made available to state agencies,

including state departments of agriculture, for the first time in a
collected form.

This constituted the first comprehensive guide on

the progress of utilization research and development, and an index for
detecting duplication of research.
It was not until 1956 however, that Senator Capehart of
Indiana with thirty co-sponsors introduced the first utilization
research and development bill, in the 84th Congress.

Its failure to

pass later prompted him to introduce Senate Bill 724, a duplicate

p
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measure, into the first session of the'85th Congress.

Similar legis-

lation was proposed in the 84th Congress by Senator Curtis of
Nebraska (S. 2306) and Senator Johnston (S. 3697).

The House was

somewhat slower in introducing such legislation, but once started it
came up with a multitude of bills:

H. R.

1050, 4923, 6800, 6985, 8186, 8324
8325, 8326, 8428, 8539, 9192, 9366
9677 , 10099, 11508, 11610, 12384, 13305
13513, 13605. 2

All of the above bills were efforts to implement the recommendations
of a 1957 follow-on study to the

~

Report, the Welsh Report.

This

all-important study was one result of the 84th Congress's 1956
Agriculture Act.

3

The Act, known officially as Public Law 540,

contained Section 209 which Senators Carl Curtis of Nebraska and
Capehart of Indiana had managed to attach during the bill's movement
through the legislative process.

Section 209 established a

bi-partisan, five-man "President I s Commission on Increased Industrial

Uses of Agricultural Products" to deal in its own way with the farm
surplus problem.

Specifically the act requested that the commission

conduct studies of all agriculture crops and products useful or
potentially useful in industry.

It provided for the organization of

188 of the nation's leaders in agriculture, industry, and science into
18 task groups to do the actual grass roots work under the leadership
of the five-man Commission.

J. Leroy Welsh, a prominent Omaha,

Nebraska businessman--a grain dealer--was appointed as chairman.
The Commission, after approximately a year of work, submitted
an Interim Report to the 85th Congress on April 17, 1957.

This
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allowed Congress to begin considering the report before it was
completed, but in time for legislative action.
submitted to Congress on June 15, 1957.

The final report was

Two years later, as a

congressional committee debated the subject of the report, the
committee chairman would explain

~hy,

during the 22 month time period

since the report's submission, none of the recommendations had been
implemented:
Some may wonder why we are a little late getting into this
field since the Report was made in 1957. The fact was that
the Report was made during the latter weeks of the 1957
session. And during 1958, despite all of the work that was
done by numerous members of the House and Senate, this
subject is not yet off the ground • • • • Personally, I
think that is very unfortunate. It is an important subject.
In my judgment, it offers the only real outlet for American
agriculture to regain its once prominent position in the
American economy. I am very happy that at the beginning of
this session we have been able to get our wheels up and get
the hearings going. I am hopeful that before the session is
concluded that even though there are wide differences of
op~n~on as to what should or should not be done that we will
corne up with some legislation. 4
The foregoing comment could be considered an understatement,
considering the urgent need for action on a national scale and the
fact that the states had been waiting for federal leadership for many
. years.

What then did the 1957 report recommend to Congress that

caused endless debate, numerous hearings, and the loss of so much
time?

The major findings and recommendations of the final report
were not much changed from the interim report.

It outlined 106 broad

fields of utilization research and development which had been
thoroughly researched by the 18 task groups and were considered areas
where emphasis should be placed.

The tone of the report was set by
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statements on the agricultural situation and various comparisons with
industry and its synthetics.

The Commission also stated on behalf of

agriculture precisely what industrial manufacturers and advertising
men had long realized about their product markets:

5

American farmers have succeeded so well in the necessary
effort to increase efficiency that they now consistently outrun the capacity of the economy to consume what they produce.
To cope with this situation the government has resorted to
costly programs for restricting land use, controlling
production, and disposing of surpluses • • • • Can the economy
develop profitable industrial markets capable of absorbing
excess farm production?6
The report deplored government control programs which
attempted to bring the supply and demand situation back into balance,
primarily because of the cost factor.

This criticism had the support

of most Americans, as of their representatives in Congress.

In order

to eliminate the need for such costly supports, restrictions, and
surplus-disposal operations, the Commission found that four basic
needs warranted attention:

Admitting that there seemed to be little

prospect of a sufficiently large expansion of food markets in the next
decade to use all the excess, the main need seen by the Commission was
for a sharp sense at the federal level--lacking so far--or the possibilities inherent in the industrial utilization approach.
education of the public's representatives had priority.

Obviously,
Complementing

this would be an expanded program of fundamental and applied research,
the second need.

Of certain interest to educators, scholars, and

scientists was the third need, education of the public.

Money was to

be channeled into adult education programs dealing with utilization.
Some funds for this purpose would be transferred from production
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areas.

The use of fellowships, scholarships and grants was projected

to attract, train and channel scientific talent into the "neglected"
field of farm product research and development.

The fourth need was

concentrated in the competitive area of product development and
marketing, a field of high risk in

w~ich

both agriculture and

industry had experienced a multitude of failures for every success
during past years.

The Commission saw the need to provide financial

incentives during development and delicate trial periods.
The Commission professed to see its report as primarily an
educational document.

Later congressional hearing testimony by

chairman Welsh bore this out.

Its text and recommendations made the

following points, later to be utilized by the Nebraska Program and its
administrators in launching attempts for support:

(1)

The Commission

restated the generally accepted feeling on the part of the public
that the spending of a great quantity of money on education and
research meant great returns.

Commission

7

There were numerous references in the

and Nebraska ProgramS literature to the fact that each

year industry increased its investment approximately three billion
"dollars over the past year in the field of education and research and
development--three percent of its gross sales.

While agriculture,

including federal and state efforts, increased its efforts by
reinvesting only about one percent of its gross sales.
results of agricultural research were pointed out.

(2)

Past

The Commission

reported that 125 processes worked out in federal government agricultural research laboratories during the late 1940's and early
1950's were in commercial lise.

This highlighted the concrete results

'p
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that could be obtained from such efforts, but also recorded the small
number of attempts.

It was further emphasized that 300 other

processes and products awaited commercialization in 1957.

The

Commission appeared to realize, as the Nebraska administrators later
did, that researching new proces,ses and products was not the hardest
part of a utilization program.

It was the "development" part of the

program, the commercialization, the selling of processes to industry,
the selling of products to the public (development of mass markets),
that required the greater effort.

(3)

And, of importance to the

current study, education of the public and education of greater
scientific manpower in the field of utilization research was
projected.
The conclusions the Commission reached in its Report To
Congress were contained in ten specific recommendations interwoven

through the report and each backed by commentary.

Grouped together

they were:

1.

The Commission proposes as its first and most "necessary
recommendation" that the funds for industrial uses
research be increased to not less than three times the
amounts currently ($16,145,000) available; and that
additional sums be provided as herein suggested for
education programs, new crops research, trial commercializations, development, and incentives.

2.

The Commission recommends that Congress declare as a
matter of policy the obligation to foster basic research
in agricultural products and their uses, and that the
administrators, in the allotment .of funds at their
disposal, be directed to place appropriate emphasis
upon research projects having as their objective the
discovery of new basic ·knm'ledge of farm products.

3e

The Commission recommends that administrators be

authorized, in addition to using facilities of the

;;.
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{"Uni ted Sta te::l Department of Agricul ture, land-grant
educational institutions and experiment stations, to
contract also with other universities and colleges, non-

profit or profitmaking research organizations, private
corporations, and foreign institutions especially in

countries where Public Law 480 funds may not be
available.
4.

The Commission recommends. that the administrators be
given authority'to share research costs on specific
projects with private industries or with other public
research agencies where in their judgment such sharing
will bring desirable results economically and
efficiently.

5.

The Commission recommends that the administrators be
directed where appropriate to provide research grants,
student fellowships, scholarships, and similar aids
which, while accomplishing research projects, will also
increase the supply of trained scientists. These funds
should be so allocated that graduate training may be
strengthened in each of the four major agricultural
regions.

6.

The Commission strongly recommends that an adequate
annual investment in research and development for new

crops be favorably considered along with suitable
authority to the administrators of the program to provide
incentives where essential to bridge over the 'awkward'
stage of establishment.
7.

The Commission recommends that the administrators of the
industrial utilization and new crops program be
empowered to enter into appropriate contracts for
development of research results into trial commercialscale operations, and that an adequate proportion of
funds be authorized to be used for this purpose.

8.

The Commission recommends that the administrators of the
industrial utilization and new crops program be provided
with authority and funds to extend suitable incentives
to farmers or to industry where appropriate to hasten
the establishment of a new crop or of a new industrial
use, where such appear likely to lead to durable additional markets, and for rapid disposal through industrial
channels of accumulated surpluses.

9.

The Commission recommends that the creation of a nonpartisan Board with five members be made, to be appointed
by the President by and with the advice and consent of
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the Senate, one of whom shall be an Assistant Secretary
of Agriculture; the Board shall be known as the
Agricultural Research and Industrial Board.
10.

The Commission recommends that 15 percent of the annual
gross receipts from customs revenues be alloted to the
administrators of the industrial utilization and new
crops program for carrying out the proposals herein
described. Authorization should be provided whereby
such funds could be carried forward in amounts not to
exceed $150 million. Continuty of funds will greatly
improve the ability to plan and execute both research
and followup actions. 9
The above recommendations were important for two reasons.

One,

they served as guidelines for most of the legislation on agriculture
utilization thereafter sUbmitted to the 85th Congress.

Two, they were

followed to a degree by the State of Nebraska in establishing and
sustaining its demonstration program.

In addition, the body of the

report documented some of what had and had not been done in the past
by Congress, the USDA, the colleges, and other agencies and individuals in the area of agricultural utilization research.

If later

testimony and public statements by Commission members could be
believed, the Commission in its writings strove to be non-critical of
the USDA and the way it administered its research and education
programs.

However, criticism did show through in its recommendations

and in the reasons cited for the Commission's report.

The very fact

that such recommendations were necessary implied criticism of

existing practices under the guise of constructive proposals.

In

addition, the Commission Chairman, J. Leroy Welsh, at first made a
determined effort to remain uncritical of the USDA and Congress when
he was questioned before congressional committees in 1957-59.

Later
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this man, whose influence as a prominent Omaha grain dealer could be
seen in the report by the stress placed on using grain to make
alcohol, was to become more vocal as utilization legislation bogged
down in Congress.

He began using every opportunity in speeches and in

the press to point out publicly not only the virtues of agricultural
utilization research, but the express failure of Congress and the
USDA in this field.
The finished report itself, after being submitted to Congress
by Senator Carl Curtis of Nebraska, was quickly routed into committee
for consideration.

Its first airing was before the House Agriculture

Subcommittee on Research and Extension in August 1957.

The report

was read before the Subcommittee as a matter of procedure.
duly explained and some routine discussion resulted.

It was

The Welsh

Commission was directed to formulate legislation on the basis of the
report which Representatives Abernethy, Jennings, and Dixon would
introduce during the first session of the 85th Congress.

However, no

support was given by the USDA and all bills containing Welsh
Commission recommendations failed to pass.
The Welsh Report's second hearing was August 8, 1958, before
the House Committee on Agriculture, Cooley of North Carolina
presiding, during the second session of the 85th Congress.

The

hearing was called to consider Senate Bill 4100 and related House
bills.

S. 4100, introduced by Senator A. J. Ellender, Chairman of

the Senate Committee on Agriculture, was of particular importance,
for it incorporated elements from Capehart's S. 724, Curtis's
S. 2306, and Johnston's S. 3697.

It was a direct effort by the
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Senate to implement Welsh Report recommendations by putting all such
legislation into one workable package.

S. 4100 had passed the Senate

81-0 on July 29, 1958, and was reported out of the Senate
Agriculture Committee 28-0.
The hearing record showed Senat.or Capehart led the testimony by
presenting the enormous cost to the nation of buying and storing
surplus agricultural raw material from 1933 to 1959:
1933-52
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959

$7.174
329
964
1.349
1.936
3.255
4.877
6.000

billion
million
million
billion
billion
billion
billion
lO
billion

This amounted to a 25 billion dollar expenditure to buy and store
surplus in approximately 25 years.
Capehart cited the instituting of the Price Support Program by
the Democratic Party in 1938 and the introduction of the Soil Bank by
the Republicans in 1956.

He asked if the nation could not alleviate

the surplus problem by initiating a crash research program under a
Czar in the manner it did with the synthetic ru"bber effort during the
Second World War.

11

The Senator closed with the statement that there

was no need for more money in the utilization research and
development area, but a great need for increased awareness and

emphasis.

He made clear that education programs would affect

awareness, and increased

awar~ness

and emphasis would surely bring

more money and therefore more projects in the area.
The USDA had contacted Senator Ellender before the hearing
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and expressed its opposition to S. 4100.

12

. The day before the

hearing, True D. Morse, Acting Secretary of Agriculture, sent a
letter to Representative Cooley, Chairman of the House Agriculture
Committee, reiterating the USDA's opposition.l
of opposition again demonstrated why the
had advanced so slowly in Congress.

~ause

3

The USDA's statement

of utilization research

The USDA agreed wholeheartedly

with the objective of S. 4100, but could not accept the possibility
of the creation of a new organizational entity to administer an
expanded utilization research program such as the bill (and the Welsh
Report) recommended.

.',""'."-.

Instead, the Department favored Representative

Hill's bill, H.R. 13513, or Representative Dixon's bill, H.R. 13605,
both which did not provide for a separate administrative unit.
In contrast to Capehart's testimony, which called for·increased
emphasis on utilization research based on funds already available, the
USDA spoke in terms of a need for increased appropriations.

It

stressed that its facilities and personnel were ready for increased
work on utilization research, but that Congress would not appropriate
requested funds, as it had not in the 1959 Budget.

In fact, according

to the USDA its total research budget had been reduced even though the
Department had doubled its research in the five years before 1959.
The Department felt that a new agency would have the same source of
funds as the research structure within the USDA and would get only
what the USDA got, therefore it could be only as effective as the
USDA.

The USDA's. committee testimony agreed, as the Nebraska Program

would emphasize later, that the problem was the responsibility of the
Federal Government , ·that the Federal Government alone was in a

ii.

,.,.,:,,~

'.
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posi tion to provide the increased res'earch:
Utilization research is, or we believe must become, an
increasingly heavy responsibility of the federal government
through the Department of Agriculture. The federal
government is in a position to provide the concentrated
research needed. Only in recent years has this fact become
fully apparent in areas of vital importance to agriculture
and the nation • • • • Farm prod~cers, to whom the outcome is
a matter of economic life or death, must look to public
agencies. 14

But the bill which would have placed additional responsibility for
such research on the Federal Government was opposed in its entirety
by the USDA because of the Department's fear of a new agency.
occurrences prompted observers to comment:

Such

"The current program of

the USDA, invaluable as it is in so many ways, indicates an apparent
reluctance to conduct applied research in areas competitive with
other industries.,,15

The USDA had to face the further accusation

that it had initiated no bills to increase emphasis on utilization
research and therefore appeared lacking in initiative as well as
uncompetitive to the states which were looking to this public agency
for action.
Members of Congress immediately counterattacked, saying in
effect that they did not care how the program was carried out, just
that it was carried out.

In reference to the above bills, the USDA

was accused by Senator Capehart of fearing a loss of authority and
of having the Washington disease of N.M.H. (Not Made Here, in the
" accor d ance Wlt
" h Par k"lnson ; saw.
L
16
USDA) In

Most of the provisions

of S. 4100 and the other bills were stressed as being advantageous
to the USDA, i.e. authority for trial commercialization of research
products, authority to make research grants to other institutions,
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authority to initiate education programs, authority to grant
scholarships in research"
Yet the USDA continued to fight the bills, saying that a new
research agency would not be considered as a threat to the USDA's
authority, but as a duplication

o~

effort.

The Department stressed

that it would be against the principles of sound administration to
have a dual-headed arrangement with no unity of command.

Applied

research in the USDA was already in a separate unit of the Department,
the Chemistry Division, where a utilization research unit was
separately bUdgeted and directed, but whose work was coordinated with
all other departmental research through an Administrator of Research
and an Assistant Secretary of Agriculture.

Each side had good

arguments, and there the matter stood for the duration of the 85th
Congress.

No action was gained on proposed legislation.

The Welsh Report was given its last federal consideration at a
third set of hearings before the House Agriculture Subcommittee on
Research and Extension on February 18-19, March 4-5-6-11, and
April 20, 1959.
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The Subcommittee met to consider a number of

86th Congress legislative bills drawn up to implement the Welsh
Report's proposals:

H.R. 127, 309, 2380, 2718, 2720, 2766, 2803,

2880, 2881, 2970, 3070, 4167, 4168, 5234, and 5441.

The list

included two bills which ,,,ere drafted by the Welsh group:

H.R. 309

introduced by Representative Abernathy of Mississippi and H.R. 2970
introduced by Representative Brock of Nebraska.

In the Senate,

parallel legislation was being introduced by Senators Mundt of
South Dakota (S. 43), Cur tis of Nebraska (S. 74), and Johns ton,
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et. al. (S. 690).

Proponents of utilization research were giving solid support to
the Welsh Report and resulting legislation from which the agriculture
industry would gain so much.

Present to either support or refute the

Report were, from the USDA, E. L. Peterson, Assistant Secretary of
Agriculture; Dr. B. T. Shaw, a Senior USDA administrator;
Dr. E. C. Elting, Deputy Administrator of USDA's Agricultural Research
Service; and Dr. G. W. Irving, Deputy for USDA Utilization Research
(a man later to become an important contact for the Nebraska
Program's administrators); from the academic world, the Deans of eight
state university colleges of agriculture; others included
J. Leroy Welsh, interested scientists and congressmen, and representatives of industry and agricultural groups.
The USDA immediately voiced its objections to most of the
proposed legislation for the reasons it had given during past
testimony:

it remained totally opposed to the idea of any new and

independent administrative agency being set up to give utilization
research increased emphasis by being singularly responsible for this
. task (thereby taking the USDA's utilization research functions unto
itself).

The USDA continued in the opinion that it was giving due

emphasis to such research in the programs of its Agricultural Research
Service.

It asserted its qualifications for administering any

expanded utilization research program within the department's present
structure.

It felt that a new agency would unnecessarily duplicate

its work in the field and therefore reiterated its support for those
legislative bills before the subcommittee which would increase the
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emphasis on utilization research but continue to leave utilization
research responsibility in the USDA .
.The USDA did have impressive credentials for such work.

Its

Research Administration was created December 13, 1941,18 and an
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture wa.s put in charge, with the
Secretary of Agriculture having overall supervision.

l9

Utilization

research came to be centered in the USDA's Chemistry Division,which
was set up in 1889 and reached bureau rank in 1901.

The Division's

laboratories, including four regional ones throughout the nation, were
. authorized by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 and completed
in 1941. 20

But the Welsh Report pointed out that "for nearly half of

their existence these laboratories, created to further industrial
utilization, have been obliged to be diverted from such work in order
to engage in war and defense research work. ,,21

The state university

laboratories in turn emphasized production research when their work
turned to war efforts.

Criticism of the lack of utilization research

after the Second World War was stiffled by the onset of the Korean
War.

The accompanying fear of World War III also tended to increase

production research and the consequent production and storing of
large quantities of agricultural raw materials.

During the Second

World War, however, USDA laboratories had managed to develop
synthetic alcohol, penicillin, and dextron blood plasma, all using
agricultural materials.

This gave great hope for the peacetime future

of uses of agricultural products.
After World War II the Research and Marketing Act of 1946
emphasized the desire to increase utiliza tion research and granted
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USDA the authority and funds to contract with outside agencies.

It

also established an Advisory Committee of eleven men which met
quarterly.

This Committee was cited in congressional subcommittee

testimony and is important because of the resemblance the future
Nebraska Program's seven-man advisory committee would bear to it.

The

USDA committee was further augmented by twenty-five sub-advisory
committees which usually represented the groups that used the
discoveries of USDA research.

A key component which the USDA research

structure contained, and which the Nebraska Program would lack
because of its emphasis on use of research findings for educational
and lobbying purposes, was the technical liaison personnel at USDA
laboratories who.kept industry informed on research results and
brought industry's problems to the attention of the laboratories.
Of particular note is the admission by the USDA before the
congressional subcommittee that the Department's utilization research
programs didn't get going effectively until after the Korean War and
then were hampered by fear of World War III.

According to the USDA,

the year 1955 apparently marked a renaissance of utilization research
·when this type of work was put on a par with other agricultural
research within the USDA.

The Department made a case for its side of

the issue, as it had in the past.

Yet, while granting the many

points touched upon by the USDA representatives, the congressman
pressed the issue during the hearings.

The chairman of the sub-

cOmmittee recalled that "fifteen ·years ago it was the feeling on this
Hill that utilization research was not getting off the ground. 22

He

pointed out that Representative Clifford Hope, a past member of the

42
House Agricultural Committee, had collaborated with Representative
Flanagan, Chairman of the Committee, in introducing legislation
which became part of the Agricultural Research and Marketing Act of

1946 to correct this situation.

Of interest was the fact that

J. Leroy Welsh appeared before the Senate Agriculture Committee in
1945 by invitation of Senator Curtis of Nebraska to testify for
increased emphasis on utilization and utilization research.
By 1951 Representative Hope had become disappointed with the
progress of the government program he had initiated.

He began to

speak of a need for education efforts because of a lack of understanding or confidence by the public and by the federal government,
i.e. Congress and USDA, in what utilization research could do for

agriculture in the United States.

23

He urged certain research admin-

.
.
' 1 ture; 24 t 0 no aVa1. 1 ,
1strat10n
c h anges to t h e Secretary 0 f A
gr1cu
since the Secretary had just reorganized the USDA along different
lines.

Hope finally concluded that:

• it was not even the fault of the Appropriations
Committee of Congress in not giving the full funds authorized by law for the program that the effort failed, but the
fact that the intent of Congress was never' carried out with
the funds available. 25
It was evident that Hope's identification of a continuing lack of
awareness at the public and federal levels was a key point.
The disappointing developments Representative Hope saw in the
years following his 1946 legislation to stimulate utilization
research Here to continue through the 1950's.

In 1956, when the

USDA finally supported expanded utilization research, Congress
appropriated 24 million dollars for the next five years.

But by the

•

~

•.
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end of fiscal 1957 only a small part of the expanded program's
schedule for that year had been attained.

This situation directly

brought about the Welsh Report and new attempts at legislation based
on its findings.
The final congressional hea:ring on the Welsh Report in 1959
found Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Peterson disputing Hope's
contention tbat awareness and not appropriations was to blame for
unsatisfactory progress in utilization research efforts.

Various

statements by Peterson before the House Subcommittee on Research and
Extension indicated the USDA felt appropriation difficulties to be
directly responsible:
• • • in recent years the Appropriations Committees of Congress
have reported out bills, subsequently passed by Congress,
which, as the record will indicate, have increased our funds
available for this purpose [Utilization researc~ quite substantially, as measured by the funds going into this work of
some years past. I must also say, however, that the
Appropriations Committees and subsequent legislation deriving
fro!Il their activities has not in all instances included the
funds we have asked for this or other research purposes • • •
I think the need for increased funds to step up utilization
research is quite apparent • • • • The USDA was forced to cut
its dollar request for utilization research in half even after
the Bureau of the Budget had approved the increase in
1959 . • • • The request of USDA for increased funds was not
able to be accommodated in the 1959 federal budget because of
the total administration decision to attempt to contain the
gross of federal expenditures with federal revenues Lan
Eisenhower balance-the-Budget attemptJ.26
•
The Assistant Secretary then reaffirmed the USDA's position
that there was no need for new legislation, no call to separate the
field of utilization research from the USDA--especially to give it a
new agency--that "\-"hat was needed was more money to maintain the

present program of agricultural research administered jointly by the

44
USDA and the land-grant colleges.

He said nothing about not having

spent what had been appropriated by past Congresses, as Hope had
charged.

He merely continued to point to the money gap that

statistics plainly showed existed:
1940
1959

Agriculture got 40 cent~ of the Federal Research
Dollar.
Agriculture got three cents of the Federal
Research Dollar.

***

*

1957

Forty seven million dollars budgeted for Production
Research, Federal Government.
Fourteen million dollars budgeted for Utilization
Research, Federal Government.

1958

Fifty three million dollars budgeted for Production
Research, Federal Government.
Fifteen million dollars budgeted for Utilization
Research, Federal Government.

1959

Total Federal Agriculture Budget: 121,689,000
dollars.
Fifty eight million dollars budgeted for Production
Research, Federal Government.
Nineteen million dollars budgeted for Utilization
Research, Federal Government.
Five million doliars budgeted for Utilization
Research, State Governments.

(1960

Total Federal Agriculture Budget: 120,000,000
dollars.
Total public agricultural research effort, state
and federal: 234 million dollars.
Gross national product of agricultural raw material
production: 40 billion dollars,)27

Congress, through

*

co~ittee,

*

*

*

then proceeded to investigate the

effort the colleges of agriculture of the land-grant universities were
expending on utilization research.

The eight college deans who

appeared before the 1959 Subcommittee hearing gave useful testimony.
Their testimony was to be considered later by the State of Nebraska.
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It played a part in the Nebraska Program's conception and operation.
It was to cast doubt on the wisdom of a Nebraska State Senator's
later request that .the Nebraska Legislature "give the Nebraska
Program to the University of Nebraska and keep it out of politics ... 28
And on the wisdom of a campaign promise made by a former United States
Secretary of the Interior running for the Nebraska governor's office:
"If I am elected I will increase and expand the Nebraska Program,
giving more of the Program to the University of Nebraska instead of to
•
•
.
..29
QutSl'd e lTIstltutl0ns.

When United States Representative Abernethy

stated in the hearing that his bill, H.R. 2718, to be introduced in
Congress, would increase the five million dollars currently being
spent annually by the states on agricultural research in the utilization area, and that the states could and would expand their research
through the colleges of agriculture and experiment stations as
provided for in H.R. 2718,30 it would have been supposed that the
college deans would have responded positively.

Such was not quite the

case.

Testimony revealed that "land-grant colleges were only lukewarm to marketing and utilization research in the past, .. 3l and it
was "doubtful tha t the colleges' a tti tude had changed since 1957 when

•

they opposed a Congressional appropriation of twenty-five percent of
n32
university-oriented research funds for utilization research.

Under questioning by Representative Quie of Minnesota the deans
admitted that facilities for utilization research might have been made
available in their agriculture colleges, but certainly not person-
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nel.

33

Additional weight was given to 'these statements when

Herbert Voorhees, an American Farm Bureau Federation Board of
Director's member, and John Lynn, Legislative Director of the same
organization, stated under questioning that the agricultural schools
did not have the people or facilities for an expanded utilization
research program.

They were disappointed in this fact because they

felt the public should urge its high schoolers and college people into
"'
Ut1' 1
lzatl0n
researc h careers, 34.JUs t as the Welsh Report had

advocated.
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Later statements by Welsh Commission members and USDA

officials were to point out that the land-grant colleges probably
preferred to keep utilization research programs within the USDA
because the colleges felt they would get more of the research dollar
that way.

The Subcommittee members concluded that in the end, no

matter whether expanded programs were directed by the USDA or by a
separate and independent agency, there was no doubt but that each
would turn to the colleges of agriculture for assistance--just as in
the past.
The question that remained for the deans and their colleges of
agriculture was whether the colleges were changing or ever would
change their attitude toward utilization research and education.
Administrators and researchers who had. been reared in the school of
production at the colleges of agriculture would, no doubt, find it
difficult to change.

They were faced with somewhat the same situation

as when leaders of agriculture and agricultural education had established the colleges and put pressure on the schools to give agricUlture better production methods:

if those leaders now so convinced

''''''',
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Congress, the colleges faced congressional legislation which, if they
wished to stay allied with the USDA, would require them to undertake
not only a change in research emphasis, but to engage in an education
and information program through their extension and adult education
resources.

This new research

emphasi~

would entail a massive

re-education campaign designed to change the attitude and behavior of
the agricultural and non-agricultural public.

The agricultural

worker would have to be persuaded that producing more did not automatically assure him a good living; that utilization research would
be a long range "preventive" medicine applied to his income situation,
not a short-range, stop-gap measure with punitive side effects in case
of non-compliance as in past programs, i.e. the Soil Bank.

This need

for the re-education of the public was directly responsible for the
initiation of the Nebraska Program.
The testimony given during the 1959 Congressional Subcommittee
Hearing by J. Leroy Welsh
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deserves special mention, for his

appearance apparently damaged his cause more than it helped.

The more

he was questioned, the more a negative situation developed between
this advocate of utilization and congressmen who were basically
sympathetic.

Welsh approached the members of the Subcommittee with

the attitude that they were not aware of the true situation and its
seriousness.

He repeatedly talked down to his distinguished

audience, many of them gentleman farmers from the South, frequently
beginning his remarks with such statements as:
I ask you gentlemen today, do any of you know what the
problem is going to be on surplus • . • . 37

"",,.,,,

..
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I wonder how many of you know. • -.
I am sure none of you can realize.

38

39

This type of approach can be dangerous when speaking with any
individual, and it was no less so before the House Agriculture
Subcommittee on Research and Extension.
The generalizations and speculations cast about by Welsh
immediately provoked considerable comment from Representative Cooley
of North Carolina,- Chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, who
was sitting in on the Subcommittee hearing.

Democrat Cooley felt that

Republican Welsh was criticizing the Democrats for the so-called, in
Welsh's words, "failure of past agriculture programs."

Cooley felt

Welsh was implying that the price support/production control programs
of past years, initiated by a Democrat-dominated Congress, had
failed.

Cooley questioned Welsh closely about Welsh's possible

agreement with Republican Secretary of Agriculture Benson, then in
office under President Eisenhower, that the "agriculture programs of
the last 20 years had failed."

CObley felt that there was definite

evidence Benson was trying to discredit the price support/production
, control programs of the Democrats, and that Welsh was assisting.
Cooley therefore proceeded to cast all blame for the lack of utilization progress on Benson:

Benson was blamed for lack of leadership,

failure to use funds at hand, failure to accept more authority
offered by Congress, and of course for trying to discredit the then
existing agriculture programs.

'Cooley pointed out that the price

support program made 13 million dollars in the 20 years it operated
prior to 1953 and that utilization programs would have to be carried
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on along with other important programs such as price supports.

Welsh

immediately stated that he was referring to previous attempts at
ending the surplus through utilization research when he spoke of
programs failing.

Cooley was unmollified and ended the exchange by

exclaiming:
When a man CO!1les in this committee room and denounces the agriculture programs as failures, and does not know why they
failed, and does not know what we could do to improve them-and the Secretary of Agriculture tells us he does not need any
more authority--what can we do?40
It took Representative George McGovern of South Dakota (a Democrat and
friend of the soon-to-be-appointed Nebraska Director of Agriculture,
Pearle F. Finigan) to soothe feelings and to point out again that all
was evidently a misunderstanding, the two men were talking about two
different things:

Cooley was speaking of the overall agriculture

programs of the Democratic administrations, while Welsh was speaking
in terms of the utilization efforts only.
Undeterred, Welsh continued to lecture the Subcommittee in his
eagerness to present his case and advance his cause.

His attempts to

impress the group as to the "seriousness" of the situation began to

. raise more questions in the members' minds than were answered.

Things

progressed to a point where Welsh was not allowed to finish a
sentence.

In the end, although most of the Subcommittee members were

sympathetic to Welsh's cause, he did not make any friends, and it was
questionable whether utilization research did.

The Welsh Report

received less and less attention during and after subsequent Agriculture Committee and Subcommittee hearings.

Congressional bills

incorporating the report or drafted by the Welsh Commission were

•
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defeated in Congress.

The bills would usually get out of committee,

but bog down on the floor.

The reason was put very well by

Senator T. G. Abernethy of Mississippi:
When the USDA opposes something, we in committee get very
strongly divided. It is a bad situation, but that is what
happens. I am not cri ticizing ~anyone, because everyone is
sincere about his posttion. 41
When the bills went to the floor of Congress without the strong
support of a committee they usually became stalemated, and this
eventuality was a partial explanation of congressional inaction in
the utilization research area.

As a consequence, the Welsh Report

remained nothing more than a report.

Welsh would later tell of

approaching President Eisenhower in 1959 and introducing himself as
the former head of the President's Commission on Increased Industrial
Uses of Agricultural Products.
Eisenhower replied, "Oh yes!

Welsh was greatly taken aback-when
By the way, whatever happened to that

report?,,42
It was evident to observers that years of argument were
getting nowhere on the federal level.

Obviously more intense

pressure had to be brought to bear on the Congress, the USDA, and the
colleges of agriculture, and this pressure could only come from the
public.

Representatives of that public on the state level thus

initiated the educational effort necessary to awaken and inform the
public--agricultural and non-agricultural, urban and rural, state and
national.

These leaders envisioned an education program that would

exploit dramatic research results, utilize educational methods and
serve as such an outstanding example of what could be done through
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increased utilization research that the lagging public institutions
could not resist the lobby.

A program devised, initiated, financed,

and administered by the State of Nebraska is examined in detail in
the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
THE NEBRASKA PROGRAM
The Stage Is Set
As a state directly involved in one of the six most pressing
national problems, agriculture,l Nebraska faced the challenge of
attempting to find possible solutions to the agricultural surpluses
dilemma after federal government attempts at solution proved
ineffective.

The state pondered an expensive do-it-yourself effort,

then decided in view of finances to attempt instead an education
program which would move an awakened public to demand a refocusing of
federal efforts in the field of utilization research.

In doing so the

State experienced several changes in its political makeup:

the out-

lines of a true two-party state emerged, both parties came to be
represented in state leadership, an ambitious Program designed to have
national effect was initiated, and the largest department of state
government moved from a passive role to one of power.

Under the guise

of a state research effort Nebraska began an education program
designed to bring the Federal Government around to its way of
thinking.
The stage for the above events was set with the election in
1958 of Ralph G. Brooks (inaugurated January 8, 1959), the first
Democrat elected governor of Nebraska since the 1930's.

Brooks, an

educator from McCook, Nebraska, was dedicated to his state and anxious
to initiate programs which he felt would help the state and also
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advance his party's standing within the state.

This had to be done

within the mandate given him, as a Democrat, by the Republican as well
as the Democratic voters who had helped elect him.

He therefore

retained many Republican department chiefs in the state government,
while appointing the usual partisan followers in certain,key offices.
One of those appointments, made before the governor's untimely death
on September 9, 1960, was a relatively unknown individual,

Mr. Pearle F. Finigan, as Director of the Nebraska Department of
Agriculture and Inspection.
Finigan, a University of Nebraska graduate, had been a well-todo farmer all of his life except for five years with a Colorado drug
firm as treasurer and vice president.

His family had been active in

Nebraska politics as well as in the controversial National Farmers
Organization.

But as was the case of the Labor Party in Britain

before World War II and the Republican Party in the Southern United
States before 1964, a long period as the "out" party had left the
Nebraska Democratic Party with few known and tried individuals who
could be even slightly identified as members of a "shadow cabinet."
"Mr. Finigan therefore found himself in the right place at the right
time with a history of work for the victorious party behind him.
The Nebraska Legislature with whom the new governor and
director would work was elected on a nonpartisan ballot and contained
a majority of registered Republicans during the 1959-1960 time period.
In its makeup, however, was a registered Democrat, Senator Hans O.
Je,nsen of Aurora, Nebraska, destined to playa part in Nebraska
history because of his foresightedness and his chairmanship of the
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Legislature's Agriculture Committee.
The Nebraska Program:

Preliminary Maneuvering

Realizing that a group of like-minded states, or preferably the
Federal Government, was the only organization which could handle a
large-scale attack on the probletnsof agriculture--specifically the
surpluses situation--and discouraged by inaction on the part of the
states and the ineffectiveness of federal action, Ne.braska set out to
show where it thought the solution lay.

It had seen, as had the

nation, what research could do for production in the agricultural and
industrial fields.

Those who saw utilization research as the next

logical step for the application of technology to agriculture faced
the problem of how to bring the full weight of all research organizations--federal, state, university, and private--behind such
research.

The capacity for such research had been maintained

primarily in federal laboratories, but operated on a small budget in
proportion to all other research in government and industry.
Senators Jensen and Bahinsky of the Nebraska Legislature therefore
began preliminary work to initiate a Nebraska program designed to
demonstrate what could be done by the states and the Federal
Government in this field, should they choose or be forced to concentrate their efforts in this area.
Legislative Resolution 6

2

In 1957 the two senators introduced

into the Nebraska Legislature.

Although

this resolution dealt with locating a grain alcohol plant in
Nebraska, it contained the first mention of "industrial uses

H

in the

State Legislature and was a first effort to redirect federal attention
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to the utilization research field, for· it endorsed United States
Senate Bill 581

3

which dealt with such research.

The successful political effort which resulted in the Nebraska
Program began on February 2, 1959 with the introduction of
Legislative Bill 604

4

in the Nebraska Legislature.

Again

Senator Jensen was the author, with Senators Ruhnke, Otto, and
Olinger as co-introducers.

Senator Jensen stated later that he "had

had the idea for a long time" and that he "had read the Welsh Report."

5

Whether the idea was conceived first by him and then encouraged by the
Report, or the Report initiated the idea, was not clear.

In any case,

the bill asked that a four percent tax be placed on the gross amount
wagered through parimutual betting in the state, with the funds going
to an agricultural-industrial utilization research program.

Of further

note is the fact that the bill gave control of the funds and the
authority to administer the program to the Nebraska Department of
Agriculture:
Fifty percent of the Lbetting ta~ balance shall be allocated
and paid to the Department of Agriculture and Inspection to
be used for the development of additional uses or new
industrial uses for agriculture products, and for
research. • • 6
LB-604 was read to the Legislature for the first time on
February 2, 1959, then referred to the Revenue Committee.

At that

time State Senator Carpenter of Scottsbluff informed Senator Jensen
that he, Carpenter, also was drafting such a bill.

The bill,

Legislative Bill 658, was comparable in intent to LB-604, but
suggested that funds should come from property taxes and go into the
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state's General Fund--not directly to' the Department of Agriculture.
Carpenter asked Jensen to allow a combining of the two bills.

Jensen

agreed and allowed LB-604 to be postponed indefinitely in the
Revenue Committee, believing that the collection of funds was
secondary to the main purpose of the. bill and that who administered
them was also secondary as long as the main goal of an Agresearch
Program was left intact.

To Senator Jensen's dismay, the final bill

as it came from the Revenue Committee had collection of revenue
spelled out but made no mention of use of the funds for research:
The committee felt that the principle of taxing pari-mutual
betting was good (LB-604), but another bill was accepted
(LB-658) which allocated such tax money into the State
General Fund. It was the feeling of the committee that a
bill which ear-marked the proceeds would have a more
difficult time earning passage than LB-658 which provides
for the proceeds to go into the General Fund. It was also
felt that it would be harder to amend LB-604 into a workable
form than LB-658. 7
The committee advanced the bill (LB-658) to the General File,
for it felt this bill would have the best chance of passage.
All members of the committee agreed to support the bill. 8
The Nebraska Program Forms
Senator Jensen, backed by Governor Brooks, therefore entered
the legislative battle again with the. introduction of a new bill and
a call for the killing of both LB-604 and LB-658 as they returned to
the General File and the Legislature for discussion and a vote.

The

new bill, Legislative Bill 722, became the base for an effort
destined to be expanded in concept from a small-scale, bitcontribution attack on the national agriculture problem, to an
edUcation/lobbying program directed at the state and national public,
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with federal action the ultimate goal.
handled than the two previous bills.

LB-722 was more carefully
It went from the Legislature

into the Revenue Committee under the guiding hand of the Agriculture
Committee which Jensen headed.

Hammering out of the final draft of

LB-722 proceeded, with interest picking up in the state and
Legislature as time and debate proceeded in the Revenue Committee.
Jensen led the testimony, pacifying production-oriented
individuals and groups, cautioning against high expectations, subtly
urging continuity in any legislature-established program and, significantly, hinting at the.expanded national, federal government, and
public support needed:
I support continued production research, but utilization
research must be emphasized now. The University of Nebraska
has some facilities and personnel for such work, but not
enough.
A crash program with large sums of money would not necessarily
bring early results. Results of such research are slow in
coming and often unpredictable. There are no magical
results.
Meetings are needed for coordination with the rest of the
nation. Our program here in Nebraska would be but one part of
that going on in the rest of the nation. The problem is so
high and complex and the research so expensive that alone we
could do very little. But we need to do our part. By getting
a good program underway. Nebraska should be able to participate in federal funds. In addition, we must establish a
program which will have continuity. To have continuity, it
must develop strong public support. 9
The remarks forewarned of the eventual by-passing of the University
of Nebraska.

They later became by-words for Program administrators

attempting to gain public support and quiet public impatience.

And

they served as first mention of the direction the Nebraska Program
would take toward solving agriculture's problem of surpluses--the
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initiation of a combined research and education effort.

LB-722 was

to be interpreted in practice much differently than many of the

program~earlY

supporters expected.

Those whom the creators charged

with the administration of the Program soon realized that the research
effort was too small to solve the problem of agricultural surpluses.
Therefore the question of whether public support for federal
. government attention to the Program's proposed solution could be
developed and maintained became of foremost importance.

In view of

the above statement by Senator Jensen it is apparent that he at least
to a certain extent anticipated this development.
Two private citizens appeared to voice opinions in comm.ittee
debate on LB-722.

Mr. Elton Breck, Director of the Nebraska Farmers

Union, appeared in support of the bill.

In opposition came

Mr. Henry Behrens, a private citizen from Beemer, Nebraska, stating:
The money will not actually do any good or bring relief, as
it will go for salaries and miscellaneous expenses. The life
of the bill, if it is passed, should be shortened from the
suggested ten years .10
Letters arrived from numerous chambers of commerce throughout the
state supporting the bill.

A letter also was received by the Revenue

Committee from J. Leroy Welsh of Omaha, former chairman of
President Eisenhower's Commission on Industrial Uses and an ardent
advocate of increased federal help in this area.

Welsh had been

pessimistic about the bill and, though he never missed a chance to
utilize a public platform or the media to advance his cause, he
uncharacteristically declined an invitation from Senator Jensen to
appear before the committee in support of the bill, sending a letter
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instead.

He later changed his mind when it appeared that the Nebraska

Program was aimed toward his favorite targets, the education of the

'"

public and the influencing of the Federal Government to assist in
solving the problem of agricultural surpluses.

He became a firm

supporter of the effort.
There appeared at this critical moment in a capitol city
(Lincoln, Nebraska) newspaper an editorial which the field of Adult
Education would consider quite sound in its advice.

It called for

"an advisory commission to assist in administering the program" and
suggested that "more benefit might be insured i f the bill which
provides money only for research was broadened to include
'development ... ,II

Such utilization of mass media for urging adoption

of certain principles by the people's representatives was a forerunner
of the use to which the media would be put to educate and influence
the people themselves when the program began operation.

The

constructive advice offered was weakened in the editorial by the
following:
The program will demand an imaginative but sound administration. The bill places this function in"the State
Department of Agriculture. The question of who administers
the program does not seem a vital one as long as ample
provision is made for coordination with the University of
Nebraska and other public and private research agencies both
within and outside the state. 12
As it happened, LB-722 in its final reading made no mention of
"other public and private laboratories within or outside the state,"
although provision was made for coordination with the University of
Nebraska.

However, the question of who would administer the program

was to be most vital.

Determination of the direction the program
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would take and what its ultimate goals would be would lie

dir~ctly

in the hands of the program administrator, and the administrator
alone

wou~ determine

education

wo~ld

what part universities, laboratories, media and

play in the program.

full later in this chapter and in

Administration is dealt with in

Ap~endix

A.

Not one to ignore constructive advice, Senator Jensen
submitted an amendment during the May 20, 1959 Revenue Committee
hearing to set up an advisory committee and to insert the word
"development" into LB-722.

Senator Munne11y of Omaha moved the

amendment be adopted and. the motion carried.

Senator Olinger moved

that the time limit of the program be shortened from ten years to six
years.

The motion also carried.

Although the advisory committee

which was later duly created accomplished little, the "development"
aspect was to be highly utilized in the upcoming education program.
No effort of government can go forward without money.

With the

prefatory remark that "industry spends ten dollars for research and
deve lopment for everyone dollar agriculture spends," Jensen
submitted for committee discussion the following projected program
. budget:
Equipment
Eight staff personne1--1 year
Fifteen technicians--l year
Operating expenses--1 year
Temporary and part-time personnel
TOTAL

$200,000
100,000)Ed
60,000
uca to~on Un~°t
30,000
10,000

pe:s~nne1
here.

prov~s~on

$400,000

The Revenue Committee proposed to place a tax of one-tenth
mill on all property in the state except intangible property.
tax would have raised 350,000 dollars annually, or 2.1 million

Such a
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dollars during the six year duration 'of LB-722 (later shortened to
five

year~.

Jensen made it clear in legislative debate that "he

didn't care where the funds came from as long as it was specified
that they went to utilization. ,,13
Before LB-722 moved to General File, Senator Burbach added one
last amendment.
provision to

Burbach moved that the bill be amended to include a

receive any federal grants or funds if available.

motion carried.

The

LB-722 passed its committee hurdles on May 20, 1959

and went from the Revenue Committee to the General File by a vote of
five to none, two not voting.
With the realization that a Nebraska research program was
awaiting debate ,on the floor of the Legislature and had a good chance
of becoming reality, senators rushed to define what type of program
they were actually calling for.

Senators Jensen, Stryker, and

Ruhnke, realizing who in agriculture (as opposed to industry) was
primarily responsible in the utilization research field, introduced
Legislative Resolution Thirty-Nine
May 25, 1959.

14

into the Legislature on

It appeared to be aimed at establishing guidelines

for a program of state self-help, but had primarily to do with the
Federal Government.

The resolution was in two parts.

In the first

part, a committee of five was appointed from the Legislature to not
only

study the type of program needed,

but to determine the

extent to which federal-state coordination was being achieved in the
area of research on industrial uses.

In addition, the second part

of the resolution called upon Congress to establish a laboratory at
the University of Nebraska for the purpose of doing basic and applied

T
t
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utilization research.

To maintain momentum during the committee study

period, Senators Stryker, Jensen, and Ruhnke introduced a similarly
worded

r~lution on June

26, 1959, having mainly to do with a federal

o p ar t Tw0
researc h I a b oratory--as ~n

0

f Reso 1 ut~on ThO1rty- N'~ne. 15
0

Many United States Senators had already tried to introduce
resolutions similar to the above in Congress.
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Resolution Thirty-

Nine was a continuation of that effort on the state level.

As this

became more and more evident to Nebraska state senators, seven additional legislators rushed to add their names to Resolution Thirty-Nine
as co-introducers.

LB-722 was therefore gaining more assurance of

passage on the Legislature floor.
Legislative Bill 722 Establishes The Nebraska Program
LB-722, during its consideration on the floor of the Legislature in June of 1959, met with two challenges, one minor, the other
serious.

Senator Carpenter, who ·had been involved in the determi-

nation of revenue for the Program, submitted an amendment designed to
tax intangible property for research revenue.

The amendment,

submitted on June 1, 1959, was later withdrawn by Carpenter in favor
of the Revenue Committee's recommended tax of one-tenth mill on all
property except intangible property.

17

A more serious attempt to change LB-722 Came from Senator
Cooper who, agreeing with a charge

1)y

Senator Romans that "the program

should be kept out of politics," strongly advocated movement of program
administration from a political arm of the state government, the
Nebraska Department of Agriculture, to an educational branch, the
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University of Nebraska and specifically its College of Agriculture:
Mr. Coop~ moved that LB-722 be returned to Select File for
the folltwing specific amendments:
1. Amend section 1 of the bill by striking line 2 and
inserting "the University of Nebraska College of
Agriculture • • • • '1
2. Amend section-2 of the bill, lines 3 and 4 by
striking ''Department of Agriculture and Inspection" and
inserting "University of Nebraska College of
Agricul ture.
"
3. Amend the bill by striking section 3 and inserting
in lieu thereof the following:
Section 3. To aid and advise the Dean of the University
of Nebraska College of Agriculture in carrying out the
prov~s~ons of section 2 of this act, there is hereby
created an advisory committee to consist of 14 members to
consist of the Director of the Department of Agriculture
and Inspection, the Dean of the University of Nebraska
College of Agriculture, the Chairman of the Committee on
Agriculture of the Nebraska State Legislature
Let cetere7 • • • • The committee shall meet on the call of
the Dean of the University of Nebraska College of
Agriculture • • • • 18
Senators Cooper and Romans had, as had J. Leroy Welsh,
foreseen the use of any developing program as a political instrument
by state administrations.
proved correct.

The two senators and Mr. Welsh were later

In a state where campaign issues were few, the

program developed by the legislative branch was soon seized upon by
the executive branch as a political cornerstone upon which to build
an administration record.

But a majority of others in the

Legislature apparently were of another persuasion.

LB-722 survived

this most important challenge unchanged by a vote on the amendment of
twelve ayes, twenty-five nays, six not voting.

19

Program admin-

istration was therefore left in the hands of a political division of
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state government.
Governor Brooks continued to give his full weight to the bill
as it cl'e from Committee into the Legislature.

In a significant

move outside the Legislature, the Governor sent his Direc tor of
Agriculture, Pearle F. Finigan,

~o

Washington D.C., making it clear

to all that Mr. Finigan would, among other things, check into utilization on the federal level.

Finigan upon his return suggested a

literature survey of the utilization research field, legitimate
advice for a fledgling research and education effort.

These steps

suggested that the Governor and the man who would direct the program,
Finigan, were reasonably confident of LB-722"' s passage.

And in fact

LB-722 had been"picking up strength as it moved through the legislative process.

Additional senators became convinced, some of the

possibility of successful utilization research on the state level,
others of the possibility of successfully lobbying the federal
government via an "example" program.

In the Legislature life was

given to the Nebraska Program on June 10, 1959:
LEGISLATIVE BILL 722
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Voting In the Affirmative, 37:
Adams
Aufenkamp
Bowden
Bridenbaugh
Burbach
Carpenter
Cooper
Erlewine
Fenske
Fulton
Gerdes
Hollenbeck

Jensen
Klaver
Lautenschlager
Liebers
Marvel
Moulton
Munnelly
Nelson
Olinger
Orme
Otto
Peck

Russillo
Skarda
Stryker
Swanson
Syas
Tews
Thompson
Vosoba
Webb
Williams
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Voting In the Negative, 3:

,

Diers

Donner

Pizer

Romans

Not Voting, 3:
McHugh

Simmons

LB-722 was signed into law by Governor Brooks on June 11, 1959.
While LB-722 was under consideration in the Nebraska Legislature, United States Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson was
opposing United States Senate bills on agricultural utilization
research in Congress.

At the time Benson was committed to the Soil

Bank Program as a solution to the surpluses situation.

Congress was

of the same mind, for even when United States Senators Russell of
Georgia and Curtis of Nebraska tried to raise federal appropriations
for agricultural production research by twenty-five million dollars,
Congress cut the figure to four and one-half million dollars.

Others

could therefore look at the Nebraska-federal situation and say, "The
Nebraska Program looks like an example of the self-reliance that
once was known as an American trait.,,21

But those who were concerned

with the direction and goals of the Nebraska Program, while they were
. willing to take credit for self-reliance, also felt it necessary to
re-emphasize the national character of the problem:
The farm problem is a national problem requ1r1ng and deserving
national consideration and solutions. However, the people of
Nebraska have indicated, through the action of their legislative representatives, their wish to find some of their own
answers, so far as possib1e. 22
This statement accurately gave due credit to the representatives who
saw the people's needs.
purpose:

Thus Nebraska set out with a two-fold

To attempt to find some answers via the research and
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education efforts of its Program, and to demonstrate to the Federal
Government that increased utilization research as a solution to one
of the six

mo,; pressing national

problems should be given national-

level consideration.
I

The Administering Agency
A statement.was reported earlier in this chapter from a source
outside education and government suggesting that the question of who
administered the Nebraska Program was not a vital one as long as the
"w

provisions of sound and imaginative administration and coordination
were adhered to.

This view proved incorrect.

Granted, whatever the

agency, it would have had to be capable of developing into an
efficient administering unit in addition to maintaining its normal
duties.

But much more is entailed when such a program is given to a

political agency rather than to a research or educational agency.
political agency is limited to

a greater

A

extent than the other two

agencies by the necessity for its officials to please the public that
oversees its activities.

In addition, it is possible that a program

within a political agency might be used to further other, more
political goals than just those of the program.

It can be seen, then,

that placing the Nebraska Program within the Nebraska Department of
Agriculture and Inspection, a political division of state government,
made for a much more "interesting" .administration of the program than
would have occurred if the program had been given to, say, the
University of Nebraska.
Under past state administrations, until 1959, the Nebraska
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Department of Agriculture and Inspection functioned almost entirely
as a service agency with several non-agricultural functions.

In

addition, i,was a non-technological, non-educational operation.
Least of all was it involved in the research/production areas of the
. 1 ture 1n
. d ustry. 23
agr1cu

misleading.

Both its, name and its image were

The Federal Government and the University of Nebraska

handled the technological, educational, and research/production
functions, leaving the Nebraska Department as a catchall for state
government services:
Motor and Aircraft Fuel Regulation and Tax Collection .Unit
Gas and Oil Severance Tax Collection Unit
Cigarette Tax Collection Unit
Nebraska Resources Industry Attraction Unit
Chemistry Laboratory (Quality Testing Only)
Dairies and Foods, Weights and Measures Regulation Unit
Truck Ports-of-Entry Operation and Maintenance
Veterinarian Unit

Plant Industry Unit
Weed and Seed Regulation Unit
Wheat Development, Utilization and Marketing Unit
Agricultural Statistics Unit (State-Federal cooperative effort).
Approximately one-third of the Department's activities could
be called agricultural service functions, but even these were more
of an inspection or regulatory nature.

Since indirect protection of

quality and markets was the most identifiable service rendered the
citizen, it sometimes appeared that the Department was most
concerned with the urban dweller.

Such an image had brought past

accusations that the Department was actually against the farmer,
while its name implied it was established to assist agriculture.
Indeed, so much an ins trument of s ta te government had the
Department been in the past, in its inspection and tax collection
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duties, that a more accurate name ·would have been the 'Uepartment
of Inspection, Collection, and Consumer Protection."

As a direct

result of the Nebraska Program initiated by LB-722 a name change
later took'Place when the Nebraska Legislature selected "Department
of Agriculture and Economic Development" in July of 1963.
Department-University relations had not been extremely
cordial during past years.

The University resented any attempt by

a political agency to intrude into its research and education
affairs and other areas of responsibility.

For its part, the

Department, being the biggest and most powerful agency of the state
government which controlled the UniversitY,tended at times to
believe i t could influence policy in the College of Agriculture of
the University.

Events in the 1959-1967 period of the Nebraska

Program did not give evidence that this situation had changed.

The

very initiation of the Program was, in fact, partially directed at
a University "failure" to see and emphasize the "correct" agricul-

tural goals, specifically in its research and education.

The

Nebraska Department of Agriculture appeared to believe that the
public and its government should, as a consequence of their having
been educated in the correct goals of agricultural research, direct
the University to channel

gover~~ent

funds into utilization research

and educa tion.
Department relations with the national

gover~mental

followed normal lines of state-federal partnership.

level had

Most contact

was maintained by way of the United States Department of
Agriculture.

The Nebraska Department of Agriculture participated in
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federal funds through such cooperative efforts as compilation of agricultural statistics and the maintenance of crop production experiment
stations around the state.

areas of

res~nsibility,

Each government agency maintained its

guarding its dominion but never hesitating

to try to expand its sphere of

infl~ence

by attempting to bring its

partner to a concurring view on a particular subject.

In the course

of the Nebraska Program, the State went on the offensive, assuming
responsibility for "educating" the USDA and the federal government
about what it saw as a national problem, the need for increased
utilization research by agriculture.
Contrary to popular knowledge, the Nebraska Department did have
contact with foreign governments and an international public during
the period before 1959.

Most of these foreign relations were

conducted through the Nebraska Wheat Commission, a unit of the
Nebraska Department of Agriculture.

This commission, the nation's

second, established in 1955, worked closely with the Nebraska Wheat
Growers Association and the Great Plains Wheat Organization, both
private groups with extensive networks of foreign offices.

Only in

. this one instance could the department be said to have been involved
in increased utilization efforts, and then only to the extent of
increasing sales through market expansion.

But the State of

Nebraska, through its -new Program~ became even more involved in

international dealings.

Nothing could have been more advantageous

for the gaining of wide-spread public attention for the Nebraska
Program.

The Wheat Commission was in a position to exploit this

attention, for one of its purposes was education.

In addition, the
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Federal Government naturally took notice of any intercourse between
a state government and a foreign gover~nment, such notice providing

,

definite encouragement for Nebraska's work on the international
level.

However, with little pub,lic knowledge of the Nebraska
Department of Agriculture's activities except as a tax-collection
regulatory agency, the department had developed a severe negative
image, inspiring the press to comment:
What should be one of the most important departments of state
government, the Department of Agriculture, has in the past,
been pretty much a routine operation of collection and
inspection, with some attention paid to agricultural legislation before the Unicameral. 24
Past administra.tions had been content to let the department remain
an agency partially closed to agriculture.

Department directors and

personnel appeared to accept the idea that the Department was an
irritant to the public because of its collection-inspection duties,
and abided by the motto "The less the Department is known, the
better. II

The passage of LB-722 was sensed by many as the beginning of
a role in keeping with the agricultural part of its responsibili ties.
£The Director of Agricultur~ and the state administration
could meet the challenge facing Nebraska by making the job
take on stature. With Nebraska agriculture at the crossroads, the Department of Agriculture could furnish leadership in education, industrial uses of agriculture products,

and attraction of industry. This should not overlap the
areas already covered by the University of Nebraska, but
should complement and make use of the research and
educational work by the university. The time has passed
When Nebraskans should be content to let the Department of
Agriculture be merely a fiscal collection agency for many
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functions, some of which have nothing to do with agriculture. 25
There had been an earlier attempt to refocus the attention of the
Department on agric~ture.

A legislative bill in the State

Legislature's Agriculture Committee had proposed taking restaurant
inspection duties away from the department and giving them to the
Health Department.

If the bill had passed, other such shifts were

certain to follow.

Ironically the Department of Agriculture opposed

the measure on the grounds that its real functions were being taken
away:

that instead of making the department more agricultural in

emphasis, the bill would actually weaken the department "s real
responsibilities.

Yet, with the initiation of the Nebraska Program

the Nebraska Department of Agriculture assumed the role of a
government utilization research and education agency and, in doing
so, underwent a transformation that put it squarely in the field of
agricultural administration with a role similar to that of the USDA.
The new role of the Nebraska agency fitted that which the Welsh
Commission had envisioned on the federal level:
i:It would be impossib1~ to build up another series of
laboratories and enter the field for the manpower to carry
on research. We are talking about setting up an agency to
do no research but to have the power of decision, to have
the money with which to contract research with i:companies
and laboratorieif, and to use the manpower it already has. 26
Upon the passage of LB-722, a flurry of organizational
activity enveloped the Nebraska Department of Agriculture as the
agency marshalled its resources and staff to begin the as yet i11defined Program.

With no particular guidelines established by the

Legislature, efforts began to find areas that could be utilized to
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demonstrate to the watching public and to the Federal Government that
utilization research contained the potential anS'\"er to a serious

national problemG

uses," or

Whatever its later stated "discoveries," Hnew

"imp~vements"

became more than this--an

in the research area, the Program never
educativ~/lobbying

effort.

Therefore, the

Department took the Welsh Report and transformed department administrative divisions into a supporting operation for a program that
would serve as a showcase for the Report's recommendations. The
transformation of the Department was not so much physical, barring
the addition of a few personnel and changes of letterheads, as it
was an intangible occurrence which resulted from the integration of
the Program effort into the entire department.

It was not quite

attained with the "manpower it already had," but nearly so.

As the

Department transformed its image into a positive, leading agency of
state government, divisional chiefs and personnel were never allowed
to forget that supporting the Program was a primary duty, whatever
their unit's assigned duties.

And as the Program inevitably became

immersed in election campaigns, it became as important for the
department to sustain the Program for short-range political reasons
as it was to press toward the Program's long-range goals.

The

Nebraska Department of Agriculture began immediately in 1959 to
initiate action designed to produce a showcase program, an educa-

tional effort which became more far-reaching and involved than any
of its proponents dared visualize.

The implications of the Program

for a state and its citizens, for a nation and its government, and

for certain individuals increased significantly during the 1959-1967
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time period.
The Showcase
The

~st

step of the Program, the literature survey, was not

difficult since The Welsh Report served that purpose.

A second move

included the appointment ,of an advlsory committee as follows:
Pearle F. Finigan

Director of the Nebraska Department of
Agriculture; CHAIRMAN.

Dr. W. V. Lambert

Dean of the University of Nebraska
College of Agriculture. Later
replaced as Dean and committee
member by Dr. E. F. Frolik.

Maynard W. Jensen

Gentleman farmer from Aurora,
Nebraska. Son of LB-722's author,
Senator Jensen. Considered
friendly to the Brooks Administration and cooperative with the
Nebraska Department of Agriculture
and its intentions.

E. Thome Johnson

Gentleman farmer from Fremont,
Nebraska. Considered of opposite
political persuasion to the state
administration, but friendly
toward the Program and cooperative
with Department efforts.

Robert R. Rauner

Private citizen from Gurley,
Nebraska. Former member of Nebraska
Legislature and cooperative with the
Department and the Program.
Friendly toward the Brooks Administration ..

Vince E. Rossiter

Private citizen from Ha~tington,
Nebraska. Former member of the
Nebraska Legislature. Friendly
toward the Brooks Administration, the
Agriculture Department and the
Progra'm.

Although these members might appear to have been selected on a
political basis, their appointment was strongly in keeping with
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educational theory.

These men were' eager students, involved in the

effort because of their connections with agriculture and anxious
enough to see the Program work to give of their time and talents.
The

repres~tatives

on the committee reflected those sec tor s of the

public engaged by the Program:

fa!mers, legislators, urban

dwellers, educators, administrators, and researchers.

The committee

was expected to playa vital part in the Nehraska Program; however,
its proponents did not reckon with its meeting a strong and
ambitious administrator in the form of the chairman of the committee,
the newly appointed Nebraska Department of Agriculture Director, nor
did they foresee tha t the committee after some success might not
actually operate as it was designed to.
Committee members initially contributed significant
suggestions useful in setting up the education effort and also

played a small part in actual administration of the Program.
Rossiter and Jensen were sent to Chicago where they contacted
Dr. C. B. Linn of Universal Oil Products Company, Des Plaines,
Illinois, who held patents on methods, of interchanging petroleum and
grain starch molecules.

Since petroleum-based synthetics were the

chief rivals of grain starch-based goods, it was believed that
potential relief of the national farm surplus would come from utilization research discovery of areas where grain could compete with
petroleum.

After a briefing by Dr. Linn, the two committee members

went to \,[ashington D.C. to view and discuss the national government' s
research efforts with various federal officials.
The Program Advisory Committee, after a few meetings, usually

~•...

I!
f

I
r .-
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once a month, and a few trips, virtually dropped from view.

The

Nebraska Department of Agriculture Director assumed a position of
dominance through .his day-to-day handling of Program administration
details.

~lthough

the . committee was still useful as a program-

guiding sounding board, it began

~o

meet only sporadically.

Possible decisions with political implications were thrown to the

I

committee to determine reaction of the public to certain Program
moves.

What had begun as an educationally sound concept, a board

made up of Program participants began operating quite imperfectly.
In addition to the advisory committee, other sections of the
public immediately responded to the Program.

In the late 1959

period while enthusiasm for the Program's objectives as stated in
LB-722 ran high, a

gro~p

at Central City, Nebraska led by State

Senator Hans V. Larson and Mr. Thomas Moats formed the Merrick
County Agricultural and Industrial Corporation.

Its first efforts

were directed toward investigating the possibility of opening a
pilot grain alcohol processing plant in Central City.

This was

stimulated by some remarks made by Director Finigan concerning the
reopening of such a plant in populous Omaha.

Before industry, with

government backing, could be enticed to do so, both had to be
convinced it was necessary and possible.

Thus the pilot plant was

established for demonstration purposes.
A second private group, the South Central Nebraska Agricultural and Industrial Corporatiori, was formed at Hastings, Nebraska,
and was to

beco~e

important in the New Crops phase of the Program.

Both of the above groups contained competent promotion-minded
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individuals and were destined to play significant roles in the
education part of the Program as it developed from the theory stage
into the "education of the Federal Government by example" stage.
Since this

~

an important facet of the Program, it can be seen that

these groups became of increasing

imp~rtance

to Program adminis-

trators.
In advancing from·the theory stage to the actual initiation
and operation of a program which would serve as a front and a lever
for obtaining other objectives, the Nebraska Department of Agriculture assigned staff personnel to gather quantities of utilization
research information presumably not availabLe through the literature search.

Evidence of this searching, researching, discussing,

initiating and administering can be found in the 20,672 dollars in
.' Program funds that were spent by the Department by June 1962.

But

funds were as plentiful as information in those first idealistic
years of the Program.

In an initial move, the federal government

was persuaded to release 200,000 dollars to the Nebraska Program
from the·recently deactivated Rural Rehabilitation Corporation, a
. left-over from Depression years.

Either State Senator Burbach had

had his eyes on federal money in such funds as the

aforem~ntioned

Or he had surmised that, as in many previous cases, there would be
some available when he added the amendment to LB-722 in committee
which allowed any available federal funds to be used by the Program.
In any case, the 200,000 dollars was the first channeling of federal
money into the Nebraska Program.
To guide the information gathering, the funding, any future

T
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j

researchers, and the watching public in its education and evaluation,

I

Finigan disseminated the following philosophy--mainly by way of the
press:

"Since Nebraska needs results fast, most funds of LB-722 will

I

be spent ~ applied research which does not take the time of basic

j

researc h ..

,,27

Again, this was a s?und move, for applied projects

usually have more usable, "showy" results for educational purposes
than basic research efforts.

This statement was expanded in a

department publication which presented the philosophy in a candid
manner:

The position of the department and its advisory group, the
Agricultural Products Research Fund Committee, has been that
basic research is an essential element of progress, but is
primarily the responsibility of the universities and the
privately endowed institutions who can afford to look far into
the future; that, on the other hand, our present situation,
being in the nature of an emergency, cries out for relatively
short-term results. This is particularly true of the LB-722
program, financed as it is from public tax funds and heavily
dependent as it must be upon public support for its
continuancefrom one TegT'STative session.!2. the next ..

[Underlining min~28

)
The publication continued:
The main factors determining approval or disapproval of a
research project proposal have been and will continue to be:
1. Practicality of the subject matter.
2. Its apparent chance of success in the not too distant
future.
3. Its cost in comparison to its prospects.
4. Its eligibility for funds within the wording of
LB- 722.
5. Reasonable assurance that its performance will not
duplicate other previous or existing projects.
6. Demonstrated competence of the research institution
and personnel to be assigned to the project.
The department-committee team has not been hasty in
cOMnitting itself to projects. [Underlining min~29
It appeared,

then, that "practicality" figured predominately

in determining research projects and institutions '''hich could handle
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them.

The word was in fact mentioned quite frequently in Nebraska

Department of Agriculture publications.

Such an identifiable fact

possibly stemmed from one or more of the following:
1.
2.

I

3.
4.

N~aska

Midwestern heritage of practicality.
The need for tangible evidence or material to work with
in the educational effort.
The need for quick results by the Program for political
reasons on the state level and lobbying reasons on the
national level.
The pressing need for a total solution or alleviating
alternative to the agricultural surpluses situation.

The Tangible Program
It did not prove difficult to begin actual research.

The

difficulty lay in the careful selection of projects within the
money a11oted, the chief criteria for which, as noted above, was
practicality.

There was immediate interest from private companies

and individuals.

The state was contacted by American Maize Products

Company of Roby, Indiana, and Dr. J. W. Evans, Vice President In
Charge of Research, briefed the Nebraska Agricultural Products
Research Committee on the merits of corn containing a high content of
a chemical called "amylose. ,,30

Dr. Evans suggested that Nebraska

test-grow the corn and laboratory-research the results, for the
amylose starch had a high potential for use in industry.

In

addition, Dr. Evans suggested that Nebraska could point to itself as
the western-most state to undertake such an effort and could
advertise itself as a potential natural supplier for the West Coast
market.

It went without saying that the American Maize Company,

would have been happy to see a non-competitive agency supply research
effort and dollars toward the production and improvement of the very
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item the company dealt with in the manufacture of food, textiles,
paper and construction materials.

It appeared to be a natural

partnership containing much potential in regard to the publicity that
could be ga~d for the Nebraska Program.
An inquiry on castor beans

~as

received by the Department

from the Platte Valley Fertilizing Company of Nebraska.

The company

pointed out that the beans were used in industrial foams, missile
fuels, and jet aircraft high-temperature lubricants, and that ninety
percent of those put to such usage were imported from Brazil--interesting information for those attempting to find not only industrial
. uses but industrial crops to replace staple crops in surplus.

Also

of interest with respect to this particular proposal was the fact
that in 1953 the University of Nebraska had worked on a castor bean
project directed by Dr. J. H. Williams.

The effort was an attempt

to grow· the bean in Nebraska and was aided by the Baker Castor Oil
Company and the Pacific Vegetable Oil Company of Richmond,
California.

While the effort was not a total failure, for data was

obtained, it was nevertheless terminated without apparent success.
It was decided that the slow growing season and weed and harvesting
problems ruled out the castor bean for Nebraska.

The University was

therefore highly skeptical at the consequent promotion of the castor
bean by the Nebraska Department of Agriculture.

And when the

Department and its company allies succeeded in initiating an
education effort which persuaded Nebraskans in ten counties to grow
ten thousand acres of the beans in 1960 through Program education
and assistance, the University exhibited concern.

Not that it did

80
not have reason, for it could easily have been provoked by the
increasingly education-oriented Department of Agriculture's use of
the press and other mass media to promote department Program goals.
Nevertheless,

~e

was the tangible beginning of a coolness between

university administrators (especiall¥ College of Agriculture
individuals, but in the end reaching to Chancellor Hardin)3l and
Department of Agriculture administrators in regard to the Program.

32

The Department found that the first research institutionsubmitted project suggestions as supplemented by its own informationgathering on crops were sound, and added the following to its
philosophy of Program operation:
Another are? of decision lies in the phrase "research and
development." The cO!llInittee has interpreted this as
permitting work both in the laboratories and in the field
test plots (including the growth of new crops, with the
hope of eventually diverting sizable acreage from surplus
grains) as well as the development of new products • • • • 33
Now two areas of endeavor were defined which would be used to
promote the Program's educative and lobbying goals.
From Dr. C. B. Linn of Universal Oil Products Company,
Des Plaines, Illinois, came a proposal for the development of paper
from corn.

34

However, the department was at that time looking into

the making of paper from wheat and '·ras somewhat reluctant to change
its emphasis, expecting more support from the well-organized wheatgrowers and therefore more power behind its impact on the federal
government.

35

Nevertheless, high-amylose corn eventually produced

the better paper in commercial form after the Department had
accepted Dr. Linn's proposals.

It proved a belated but wise

T,
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decision, for the concrete results which were promptly forthcoming
were extremely useful to Program education efforts and political
lobbying progress.
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As proposals continued to be received and projects continued

#'

to be evaluated, the Department

f~und

its activities in the agri-

cultural administration area expanding.

Department Program admin-

istrators, Director Finigan and his aides, decided on a bold move.
It was announced through the Advisory Committee that the Committee
had voted in February 1960 to secure project proposals from private
37
.
1 a b oratorl.esG

There had been no provision made for such a move, no

basis established in LB-722.

This broad interpretation of the Bill

was another significant step in the Program in which the committee
had a part.

Further, the Committee took full responsibility for the

move, shielding Finigan and the Department from criticism and thus
freeing them for immediate action.

Before possible opponents could

grasp the significance of the move, they were presented with a fait
accompli •
There was immediate action on the part of the private laboratories, as could have been expected, for private laboratories,
non-profit or otherwise, usually have many dormant projects and ideas
which only await a source of working funds.

Southwest Research

Institute of Texas which had done previous work in the area of grain
alcohol responded, as did Midwest Research Institute of Kansas City
which had worked on uses for grain, and the Institute of Paper
Chemistry of Wisconsin which had worked on starches for paper.

The

National Chemergic Council, which was later to elect Finigan to its
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board of directors, was also heard from·with an offer of cooperation
and assistance to the Program.

This last group, being national in

character, was a step forward in achieving the national recognition
Nebraska was trying to bring to its Program,and the resulting
educative

fa110~ of which would

be inyaluable.

It was of extreme

importance to the educative/lobbying efforts of the Program that by
contracting out projects to private laboratories Nebraska had begun
to spread its efforts over the entire United States, and would soon
be able to release "results" obtained from laboratories reaching
from New York to California and Wisconsin to Texas.
A further development was that the USDA itself began
submitting project proposals.

Three were forwarded by the Northern

Regional Laboratory of the USDA at Peoria, Illinois.
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Nebraska,

which viewed this development as an immediate Program educational
success, gave the proposals serious consideration, but rejected
them when it was found Nebraska would merely have been paying technicians working on existing USDA projects under USDA administration.
This was not quite the effect of the educative/lobbying effort
l-Iebraska had in mind.

Further, patent rights for any discoveries

vould not have gone to Nebraska under such a state-federal
arrangement.

Here again there seemed to be little of educative

value, since the USDA could take credit for any discoveries.

Later,

after the ironing out of such details, cooperative projects were
established at the University of Nebraska and on the West Coast at
the USDA's Western Research Laboratory.

The USDA, though, not yet

fully cognizant of the goals of the Nebraska Program, continued to
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hold the opinion that Nebraska's work was a duplication of USDA
research work with too little effort given too much emphasis for its
size.

When a Nebraska Department of Agriculture representative

called on the USDA Assistant Administrator of Utilization Research,
Dr. W. D.

MCCl~

in

washi~gton,

copy of a Saturday Evening

~

th~

Nebraskan showed the official a

editorial (June 10, 1961 edition)

which praised the Nebraska Program, calling it "an example of the
self-reliance that was once known as an American trait."

Still not

comprehending the true goals of the Program, but thinking mainly in
terms of the research work, the administrator replied:

'~e've

been

doing this for seventeen years and they don't even know we exist."
The atmosphere of the visit remained cool during the rest of the
.
meet1ng,
accor d'1ng to t h e representa t'1ve • 39

However, other indi-

. cations of aroused USDA interest in the Nebraska Program were just
enough to convince Program administrators that they were on the
right track to the achievement of their purposes.
In all, a total of twenty-two projects and their derivations were given initial consideration by the Nebraska Program.
These included:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

Industrial utilization of wheat gluten.
Utilization of grain starch.
Market potentials for high-amylose (high starch) corn
and corn in general.
Breeding high-amylose corn hybrids for industrial
utiliza tion.
Feasibility of castor beans as a commercial crop in
Nebraska.
Development of production practices for castor beans
in Nebraska.
Modification of dry-milled starch products for use in
papermaking.
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(h)

(i)

(j)
(k)
(1)

(m)
(n)
(0)
(p)

I

I
I

I
I

I

(q)
(r)
(s)
( t)

Development of improved starch products of- increased
versatility in paper-making systems.
Effects of water conditions on the cooking, dispersion
and paper-making properties of starch.
Industrial utilization of lard, tallow, and meat scraps.
Detoxification of castor bean pomace.
Use of wheat straw in paper-making.
Utilization of flesh of yearling hens.
Saffl~er products invest~gation.
Vege~ble growth<and commercial processing.
Basic research into modification of starch molecular
structure.
Use of Nebraska wheat in bulgar-type products.
Use of hard red winter wheat in the macaroni industry.
Analysis of market opportunities for organic acids
produced by fermentation processes.
Three projects submitted by Northern Regional Laboratory
of the USDA at Peoria, Illinois.
In what could possibly be called the first approved Program

project, it was announced through the Advisory Committee that the
Nebraska Department of Agriculture would cooperate with the Great
Plains Wheat, Incorporated, organization of which the Nebraska Wheat
Commission of the Department and the privately financed Nebraska
Wheat Growers Association were members, to "give market bottlenecks
as much emphasis as moving researched products into industry. ,,40

It

had been suggested in the past that the entire Program should have
been geared to function like the Great Plains Wheat, Incorporated,
marketing programs.

41

Be that as it may, Nebraska had again estab-

lished an inroad to the federal government, for the chief partner
with Great Plains, Incorporated, was the Foreign Agricultural
Service (FAS) of the USDA which was responsible for promoting utilization through export markets.

Great Plains and FAS offices were

located in the Netherlands, Peru, India, Pakistan, Japan and
Washington D.C.

This placed Nebraska's Program in an area of inter-
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national operations, an area of endeavor which later proved to be
very successful for all parties and a rich field for Program
educational use •.. The project became increasingly important for its
ability to use its international aspects to garner national attention
--as is pOin1 out later. in this !;hapter.

Nine research projects were initially assigned of the twentytwo given initial consideration, supported by Program funds located
in the. Nebraska Department of Agriculture's Budget Appropriation·
Account Number 14-A:
MARCH 1960
"(a)" above was assigned to Midwest Research Institute,
Kansas City, Missouri.
MAY 1960
"(b)" and "(c)" above were ass1gne
.
d t 0 M'd
1 wes t Researc h
Institute.
"(f)" was assigned to the University of Nebraska
Agricultural Experiment Station, Lincoln,
Nebraska.
"(e)" was assigned to the South Central Nebraska
Agricultural and Industrial Corporation, Hastings,
Nebraska.
JUNE 1960
"(d)" was assigned to the University of Nebraska
Experiment Station.
AUGUST 1960
"(g)" "(h)" and "(i)" were assigned to the Institute of
Paper Chemistry, Appleton, Wisconsin.
By the end of 1964 contracts and understandings had been
established with seven institutions, all non-profit organizations:
BJORKSTEN RESEARCH LABORATORIES, Madison, Wisconsin
FOSTER D. SNELL, INCORPORATED, New York, New York
INSTITUTE OF PAPER CHEMiSTRY, Appleton, Wisconsin
MIDWEST RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Kansas City, Missouri
SOUTHWEST RESEARCH INSTITUTE, San Antonio, Texas
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA, Lincoln, Nebraska
USDA WESTERN RESEARCH LABORATORY, Albany, California
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The assigning of projects to the institutions carried with it the
problem for the Department of giving the institutions some idea of
what the Program was to accomplish as to both its long- and shortrange goals.

Much time was spent in conferences where the Department

stressed that research results should be
was these

qu~results,

forthco~ing,

and that it

not continued investigations, Nebraska was

interested in for educative and lobbying reasons.

The research

agencies may have found instructive what the public was being told:
Every effort is made to apportion 5esearch fundsJ among
projects with a reasonable prospect of measureable success
within the period for which they are set up. Extreme long
shots are not in favor--the Program perfers more favorable
odds and operates on a rather conservative basis. 42
It was repeatedly emphasized to the laboratories that such successes
as were realized should be exploitable.
key to the entire effort.

Exploitable for what was the

Some still believed that project results

should be marketable.
A proposal was submitted by J. Leroy Welsh to reopen a grain
alcohol processing plant which the Federal Government had operated in
Omaha during World War II.

The plant, which had produced alcohol for

aircraft engines, had operated at a loss and was consequently closed
at the war's end.

J. Leroy Welsh, being an Omaha grain dealer, had

tried for years to get legislation passed in Congress for the
addition of grain alcohol to automobile gasoline.
the Omaha plant could then be re-opened.

It was hoped that

Congress paid no heed, and

Welsh turned to the Nebraska Program immediately upon its initiation.
But the Nebraska Department of Agriculture was also unwilling to
press the case:
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/JIw

are not interested in "one shot'- uses for farm commodities where technical feasibility has been demonstrated,
but economic practicality has not. The committee thoroughly
investigated the possibilities • • • • 43

Director Finigan and his Assistant Director, Leon Kreiner, also
publicly repudiated the idea.

44

Nebraska's thinking was further

demonstrated for research institutions to heed in a speech by
Finigan before

~

newly organized, Nebraska-initiated Agricultural

Products Utilization Association (examined later in this chapter) on
September 26, 1960.

In the course of the attempt to expand the

Program's educative aspects nationally and therefore increase its
lobbying pressure on the Federal Government, Finigan counseled:
A sound economic approach similar to Nebraska's is advocated
before large sums are spent on random research projects that
could produce interesting products, but ones for which the
farmer could not afford to supply raw materials. 45
The issue of "marketability" which stood in the way of pursuit of
the Program's true goals was felt by administrators to have been
effectively dealt with.
Although several projects had been assigned to the University
of Nebraska, Nebraska's primary research and education agency, it
appeared that the Department had made these assignments to the
University to avoid criticism from Nebraskans.

It was likely that

. the University would emphasize research over education.

In any

case, it was significant that the University was given projects
which dealt only with production research, i.e. the New Crops phase
of the Program.

Since the University had done previous work on

.castor beans, safflower, and amylose corn, it was quite appropriate
that the University undertook this type of Program research.

A more
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realistic appraisal was that the Program administrators believed the
University lacked personnel and facilities for utilization research
and development, that production research facilities and staff were
more readily available, and that quick, exploitable results were
needed by the state's utilization camEaign.

The University

consequently began with two projects and later was given four more,
all but one continuing for five years.

It was doubtful that the

college even as a~ducation agency recognized that many of the
"Program's efforts were educational in nature.

It did however have a

media department which disseminated news about progress
projects.

~f

the

Later discussions with university personnel revealed that

they considered their work on these projects informative and
therefore educational.

This at least would have pleased the Program

administra tors.
Relations.between the executive leadership of the Nebraska
Pepartment of Agriculture and the University of Nebraska's College of
Agriculture were not particularly amiable.

The two agencies had in

C9llIlllon only a like dependence on the Legislature for funds, and the
"Common title of "Agriculture."

A better relationship existed on a

person-to-person basis among the second echelon workers and administrators in both agencies.

Individuals of certain divisions of the

Department and the University worked with and respected each other,
bo~h

in regard to the research effort and in other day-to-day work of

mutual interest.

But the ever-changing personnel and policies of a

Political agency were confusing and sometimes irritating to the
versity.

And the Department, in turn, did not seem to fully trust
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the University with the full duties or full knowledge of the utilization education effort.

Consequently, suspicion of motives,

operations, and objectives was evident in Program cooperation between
the two agencies, and credit for any research results was guarded by
both.

The citizen who was not able to talk with individuals working

in the agencies saw the battle being fought mainly through the
press.

This was much the way the struggle also went at the federal

level.

While the Nebraska Department pressed its case, the Federal

.",

Government's USDA attempted through the media to counter Nebraska's
educative efforts which, it began to see, had the task of pointing
out that not enough attention was being given utilization and utilization research.

Each agency, the Nebraska Department of

Agriculture, the University, and the USDA attempted to claim that its
progress in the field was the most important, most spectacular, and
most recent.

46

All of this assisted the Nebraska Program's cause of

educating the public about utilization.
The Department-University conflict escalated significantly in
late 1964 when Finigan abruptly cancelled all projects at the
University and refused to pay 100,000 dollars in research claims by
the institution.

Finigan stated that "no progress was being made at

the University and the agency had not complied with requirements for
reporting expenditures and results."

47

Chancellor Clifford Hardin,

at a meeting of all concerned, apparently ended departmentuniversity Program cooperation for some time by candidly declaring
that "["the Universit)!7 does not have ambitions in this ["utilization
research} direction.

The University doesn't want to become
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involved where it would be a contracting agency for other groups.

,,48

It could, therefore, be concluded that the Nebraska Department of
Agriculture was initially correct in not wanting to contract utilization research with the University, but was forced to do so by
pressure from the public and the Legislature.

On the other hand,

there could be little doubt that the University had ultimately
looked beyond its projects, had viewed the entire Program and had
seen that it was not a true research program, but rather an

,-

educative effort in which the University had little part in either
the research or the education, and an

~ttempt

Government by attention-getting tactics.

to lobby the Federal

In other words it saw an

attempt underway to educate the public to bring the same kind of
popular pressure on the Federal Government that it had brought on
the Nebraska Department of Agriculture in order to force the
Department.to contract research with the University.

Thus ended for

the time being cooperation between a state political agency and a
state university on a vital national problem.
approximately four and one-half years.

It had endured

In the end Program admin-

istrators had found the University deficient in the pursuit of
Program goals, both educational and political.
Exactly the opposite type of relationship appeared to develop
between the Department and the Midwest Research Institute (MRI) of
Kansas City.

And as events would show, within the contracts of MRI

lay the future power and glory of the Nebraska Program.

The

Nebraska Department of Agriculture worked most closely with this
agency and was rewarded by the production of the most spectacular
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results of the Program, promptly promoted by both institutions in
relati~n to each agency's purposes.

The philosophy of MRI seemed to

have been ready-made for Nebraska's efforts.

The outer page of an

MRl publication invariably bore the following inscription:
Nothing is so powerful as an idea_arriving at the right
time--GOETHE
Midwest Research Institute was built upon the fact that the
Midwest needed an agency to help it participate and compete
in the new technological age which this nation was entering in
the middle 1940's • • • • It is only recently, particularly in'
the post-S~ik years, that the general public has begun to
grasp the importance of scientific research; informed persons
have recognized for many years that it is essential to the
welfare of all people and to the prosperity and secur:ity of
the nation.
The continued flow of the material blesSings of civilization
depends not only on the increase in scientific knowledge, but
on the way in which knowledge can be put to use by industry • • • • MRI's research must not only be outstanding, but
of economic value to the sponsor.49
Perhaps because it so closely reflected the needs of agriculture and
the parallel educative and research needs of the Nebraska Program,
MRI became the primary research agency that helped press the
,awakening of the general public and its representatives to the
promise of utilization research.
The states had been as guilty as their publics in their lack
Of foresight in this field.

And whi I.e the USDA had carried on

research mostly in the production area, it could not be as heartily
condemned, for it did have some utiliZation research in progress.
Thus as the unique state-sponsored utilization program was underway
(viewed by the public as a program of much the same type as the
education and technology crash programs of the late 1950s, early
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19605),50 Nebraska, as it wished, became' an experiment watched by
many other states and the Federal Government.

The State of Nebraska

itself was a "pilot plant," and it fell to the Midwest Research
Institute to make good both its own and Nebraska's philosophies in
the research field.

MRI was to produce_ the results for Nebraska to

use in accordance with its Program goals.
MRI was given the first three Program projects assigned outside the State of Nebraska.

5l

Those projects, that state money, 'and

the MRI philosophy later produced, among other things, a dissolvable
film package made from corn which could be cooked and eaten without
being removed from the food it contained--an item into which
industry had put some six million dollars for research and
development.

52

Another initial MRI item was the Nebraskit Survival

Ration.

Both of these items proved invaluable to Nebraska Program

goals.

MRI immediately became the lead agency in the production of

short-range, "crash" research results in the Nebraska Program.

It

was then up to Nebraska and its Department of Agriculture to
accomplish the more subtle, long-range educational and political
results in which the Program was engaged.
A successful initial effort was also made by the Institute of
Paper Chemistry (IPC).53

It submitted promising results of its

research on grain starch as a paper bonding agent.

54

IPC was given

three initial projects in August of 1960, involving some 69,000
dollars, to try to demonstrate the feasibility of bringing grain
starch into competition with paper bonding starch then imported from
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,

.'
55
Tha11and.

Midwest Research Institute watched this effort closely,

for it was, as has been previously stated, also interested in
starch utilization as applied to uses such as packagings and films.
Nebraska Program directors were fully aware of the need and
potential of such research, but was
public at large?

~he

United States Congress or the

Nebraska Program directors did not think so.

The

head of Ford Foundation Resources for the Future, former Chancellor
of the University of Nebraska, Dr. R. G. Gustafson, who may have
been aware of the developing Nebraska effort, had stated the
situation in remarkably.clear language:
In my opinion, if the day they drilled the first oil well in
America they had, instead of hitting a supply of petroleum,
hit a supply of starch that would have served humanity for
all time, and we had carried on like research on starches as
has been carried on by the petroleum interests on petroleum,
we could have been making practically everything that we are
making today out of petroleum out of starches that are a
surplus on the face of the earth and a burden to this nation
and the taxpayers today.56
The South Central Nebraska Agricultural and Industrial
Corporation of Hastings, Nebraska extended its interests by
providing field test plots and· furnishing supplies to the research
institutions.

In addition, with Nebraska Department of Agriculture

guidance, other private individuals outside the corporations were
furnished assistance in growing test plots.

Such participation by

individuals was evidence of the initial support being won for the
Nebraska Program in its early stages through its educative efforts.
All of the above projects and institutions were involved in
the initial "tangible program" designed to produce "results" that
could be exploited for educational, and later political, purposes.
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Projects at Bjorksten Laboratories and the USDA's Western Laboratory
were added in 1961, and Snell, Incorporated and Southwest Research
Institute were sigtled in 1962.

The "research" effort was well

underway by 1963.
Goals Of The Research Projects
It should not be forgotten that two areas of endeavor were
paralleling each other during the above work.

The intangible,

ultimate goals of the Program were actively pursued on the
educational/political levels during the actual work on the research
projects.

Even though the awarded projects were of high 'importance

to the Program and its relief-of-the-surpluses public goal, they must
be kept in perspective by assigning them their proper place as a
means to an end.

And that end was an educational/political goal, the

education of the public about utilization research and resulting public
pressure on the Federal Government to adopt utilization research as a
possible solution to the agricultural surpluses problem.

It was,

therefore, not essential for Nebraska's research program to undertake
anything more than the initiation of "promising" projects and the
revelation of spectacular "results" 'for educational and political
,1easons.
In pursuing the above mentioned tactics, certain bodies of the
public were concentrated on.

It was clear that education of the

Nebraska public was of primary importance, for it supported and
maintained the Program.

Of equal tactical importance was the

attraction and education of other states of the Union which could
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lend'public, political, and financial support to the effort.
Naturally Nebraska's neighboring states were aware of proceedings
because of their proximity and their mutual interests.

But

Nebraska's efforts did not stop with the attention of neighboring
states:

a much wider national educati2n effort was planned.

Public

officials from the Nebraska Governor on down, particularly the
Director of Agriculture and the Agresearch Advisory Committee, in
addition to numerous private individuals of high prestige, energy, or
interest, formed an education task force whose focus was the nation.
This endeavor met with some success as the Program came to assume a
place of interest among certain areas and groups of the nation:
various state governments, individual public officials, legislatures, groups among the public, the press, schools and educators.
The most favorable result Nebraska hoped for among the states was
positive legislative action on their part, adding assistance to what
was yet only an isolated state action.

Bringing the ·concerted power

of state governments to bear on the Federal Government was expected
to have the influence that a reverse action usually has on the
states.
As a first step in the effort to obtain the backing of other
states, Nebraska Governor Brooks requested that a conference be held
among states having an interest in the Nebraska Program either agric.ul turally, industrially, financially, educationally, politically, or
otherwise.

It was a first attempt to establish negotiations among

the states, with the desired strategic result being a coordinated
education effort culminating in a forceful public lobbying effort
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up;'n the Federal Government.

Admittedly, the assistance which a

regional effort would bring was most important in the area of the
education effort,. for all else--moral support, financial backing,
active research participation, promotion, political
would be expected to follow.

The

~nitial

assistance-~

meeting of the interested

and the curious was held January 6, 1960 at Shenandoah, Iowa,
sponsored by that city's chamber of commerce.

57

Many of the states

represented did not confer official status upon their representatives.

Officially the roster read that Iowa, Missouri, and

Nebraska attended.

Nebraska Director of Agriculture Finigan served

as chairman of this meeting which named committees on "organization"
and "by-laws."

The name "Agriculture Products Utilization

Association" was selected to give the loose union some type of
official standing.
Director.Finigan later reported that the tactical purpose of
the meeting was "the coordination of applied research and an
exchange of information in the development of new uses for agriculture products now in surplus."

He added:

"It was not our

purpose to immediately initiate research programs in independent
laboratories, educational institutions, or private businesses as
reported by some of the press."S8

Nebraska was therefore tactfully

not asking for an immediate outlay of money by other states, a
tactic which might have caused immediate skepticism among members
and potential members of the Association.

Rather, it appeared that

the ultimate goals of the effort were stressed.

And it could not be

denied that it was an appropriate time to stress those intangible
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goals, for no greater pressure could be brought to bear on Congress
or the Federal Government than the voice of the states, their legislatures, and their people, who also choose the makeup of the Congress
and therefore the Federal Government as a whole.
of the entire effort was made

clear~for

The strategic aim

the close observer to

discern and for the states to actively support on an educational or
. political front.

The official statement as released by the

Shenandoah group declared that the group would:
• • • follow Nebraska U.S. Senator Carl Curtis' suggestions
as contained in an amendment to the 1959 House Industrial
Bill. fThese wer~: a. fContinued pressure tqJ require
the federal government through the USDA to contract with outside research facilities including colleges of agriculture
for a substantial and increasing amount of agricultural
research and, b. fContinued pressure tqJ require the
federal government to include in all agricultural-industrial
research contracts provisions for pilot testing and trial
commercialization of new farm products and new crops in order
to assist utilization. 59
Such bold indications of the true direction of the entire effort,
from Nebraska's Program to the coordinated actions of a regional or
nation-wide group, were rare.
Of passing note at this meeting was a suggestion by Iowa
State Senator Harbor.

The Senator proposed that federal financial

help be requested only as a last resort in any state's utilization
research venture.

The probable impact of this proposal on the

gathering, especially upon the Nebraskans, could be theorized as
somewhat other than positive, for prodding the Federal Government to
greater action whether on the federal level or on the state level
was one of the chief goals of the meeting and the effort.
was gained for Harbor's suggestion.

No support

It was, however, agreed upon to
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ask Vice President Nixon to attend a 'future Midwest meeting of
.
d states. 60
1ntereste

Investigation revealed no record of Mr. Nixon or

United States Secretary of Agriculture Benson ever accepting such an
.
•
•
by
1nv1tat10n

t h'1S

group. 61

Representatives of the states remained

at this point the highest opinion

le~ders

the Nebraska Program could

draw, educate, and hope to see spread its gospel.
A second meeting of the Association, held February 25, 1960 in
Lincoln, Nebraska, saw serious organization get underway among
members.

Nebraska State Senator H. B. Stryker was elected chairman

of the Association and an acting board of directors was created:
Jefferson Broady, Brownville, Nebraska
Hans V. Larson, Central City, Nebraska
H. B. Stryker, Rising City, Nebraska
Frank Hoxie, 'Shenandoah, Iowa
J. W. McMannanma, Shenandoah, Iowa
Raymond Eveland, Kelly, Iowa
Franklin Main, Lamoni, Iowa 62
Incorporation of the Association took place under Nebraska's Nonprofit
Corporation Act.

Incorporators were:

Iowa State Senator Frank M. Hoxie
Missouri State Representative Fred Mahon
Nebraska State Senator Harold B. Stryker
Nebraska Research Advisory Committee member Maynard Jensen 63
At this 'and subsequent meetings held at Saint Joseph and
Kansas City, Missouri; Denver, Colorado; Council Bluffs, Iowa; and
Omaha, Nebraska during the 1960-1962 time period, full discussion took
place on methods for advancing the purposes of the organization.
Reports of the Nebraska Program's progress were disseminated and the
views of the various specialists were heard.

Association officers and

other individuals also reported on their progress.

The organization
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had achieved the wide interstate character it had hoped for, if one
considered the states present at its meetings.
various times

repr~sentatives

These included at

from New Mexico, Oregon, Wyoming, the

Dakotas, the South, and the Midwest.
the Association in 1962 before it
Nebraska were official members.

However, by the last meeting of

ce~sed

to meet, only Iowa and

States such as Missouri continued to

send only unofficial representatives; Colorado's Governor Nichols
indicated his interest by sending a personal, but unofficial
observer; Kansas was represented at one meeting and not thereafter.
Nonetheless the Association was serving its purpose as an educational
. group, a sounding board, a pressure group, an official working body
carrying the battle to the Federal Government via the states.

This

prompted Nebraska Director of Agriculture Finigan to observe:
"A regional program, even if only Iowa and Nebraska participate at
first, will. accomplish far more than we could hope to alone."
Iowa did indeed make a valiant attempt to assist its
neighboring state.

Advocates of utilization research in Iowa,

Kansas, and Missouri had actively campaigned for programs similar to
.. Nebraska's, but only Iowa's came close to realization when in 1960
Iowa legislators indicated at the convening of their Legislature that
a bill concerning such research would be introduced.

An Agricultural

Products Utilization Association meeting was called on
November 20, 1960 by Nebraska to influence such a bill.

The

education effort undertaken upon ·the Iowa public and its representatives by the Association could be termed a precedent, forecasting
Similar action in the hope of influencing other states' legislation
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.

1TI

t h e same area. 64

Unfortunately for such hopes and for the

progress of the over-all effort, Iowa's legislation was indeed
introduced but failed to be voted into law.

This in turn,

of course, resulted in yet further intensification of the Nebraska
Program's education efforts in

Iowa~

as its need was seen to be

greater then at first expected.
Governor Brooks of Nebraska had meanwhile been utilizing his
office to assist in widening the education and political front on a
higher level, to keep the struggle to draw other states into the
effort moving.

In conjunction with Finigan's work in forming a

utilization association to act as a center for cooperative thought,
education, and action, Brooks persuaded the Governor of Minnesota,
Orville Freeman, to hold a Midwest Farm Conference in Saint Paul,
Minnesota.

(Ironically, Freeman was later to become United States

Secretary of Agriculture and was therefore to assume a position
which, among others,wou1d be a focal point of attack for the very
forces he was assisting in 1960.

After he assumed the Secretary's

duties in 1961 it soon became evident that he was seeing things
from a federal standpoint.)

The conference, held March 4, 1960, was

attended by two other Governors, Loveless of Iowa and Herseth of
South Dakota.

Representatives were sent from other surrounding

states.
The stated purpose of the meeting, significantly broad so as
to interest as many states and individuals as possible, was to
discuss the economic impact of pending federal farm legislation.
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Brooks gave added impetus by publicly ·stating:
The farm bills before Congress leave too much discretionary
power in the hands of the Secretary of Agriculture. That
situation has been substantially responsible for the agriculture problems of farmers such as in Nebraska. 65
After taking one last verbal swing at Secretary of Agriculture
Benson, branding him as "opposing all positive progress,"

66

Brooka

revealed through further statements the underlying purpose of the
Minnesota meeting.

It was to Brooks' credit that, while

criticizing present policy, he suggested constructive alternatives.
The presentation of those alternatives was the purpose of the
meeting, and those alternatives were, of course, "positive
approaches to agriculture problems like Nebraska's Legislative
Bill 722 and organizations like the South Central Nebraska
Agricu 1 ture and Ind ustria 1

.

Corporat~on 0

f

.

Hast~ngs,

Ne bras ka • ,,6

7

The conference soon focused on consideration of proposed federal
legislation and appeals by the group for serious public and federal
consideration of the utilization research approach to agriculture's
problems.

Limited results were obtained at the meeting on both

subjects, but Nebraska had at least been successful in establishing
another educative inroad among high opinion leaders, the political
leaders of other states who could do no less than amplify the
Nebraska Program's voice among their peoples and through their
channels to the Federal Government.
From 1961 to 1962 the educative effort applied to other
states to gain overt support for the Program slackened.

Nebraska

leaders Were marshalling forces and gaining new evidence with which
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to renew the tactical effort to convince other states.
Nebraska began to feel

t~hat

By 1962

its sister states, especially Iowa which

had appeared so promising, were merely tagging along providing some
vocal support but little financial or legislative action until they
saw how the Nebraska Program fared educationally and politically:
whether it could maintain public support in the face of a productionorientated tradition, and whether it did indeed have a chance of
federal recognition.

Evidence of this Nebraska concern began to

appear in speeches by Nebraska officials and in their statements to
the press.

In 1962 at one of the last significant meetings of the

Agricultural Products Utilization Association (attended, among
others, by

Iowa~Governor

Erbe, his Secretary of Agriculture Liddy,

Iowa State Senator Hoxie, Nebraska Governor Morrison, his Director
of Agriculture Finigan, and Nebraska State Senator Stryker); Liddy
responded to this criticism by asking that it be remembered Iowa had
made an unsuccessful attempt two years before to set up a program
like Nebraska's, but could get no funds appropriated.
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Governor Erbe poured oil on the troubled waters by stating that Iowa
would try again to launch a program within two years, but that
·
. 1a t ure was a b·19 11m1tat10n.
..
.
69
money f rom th e 1eg1s
ge tt 1ng

Finigan

responded that (apparently in spite of Nebraska's efforts on the
education front) "Iowa's try for a program failed because legislators and the people had not been convinced of the value of such a
program.,,70

J. Leroy Welsh, whose patience was by then growing thin

with congressional inaction on his commission's proposals, took the
occasion of a speech before the Association to blast the national
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public, Congress, and the USDA for a similar lack of understanding of
the problem.

On those notes the Association, which was a excellent

educational device, seemed to again fade into the background.

It was

June of 1962 before another concrete act took place outside Nebraska's
borders to complement the Nebraska effort.

A private group of

individuals opened Agri Research, Incorporated in Manhattan, Kansas
to promote utilization research through education to attract
.
71
industries which would use agricultural products.
The Nebraska Program also met a serious crisis on the political
front in 1960.

Approximately one year after the Program's enactment

and six months after its strong supporter Governor Brooks of
Nebraska had launched his drive for other states' support, the
Governor died in office (September 9, 1960).

Lieutenant Governor

DWight W. Burney assumed the Governor's chair.
The resulting political situation could have affected the
Nebraska Program in many ways.

The passage of LB-722 had pleased

lIl,my people on both sides of the political aisle.

The registered

Republican majority in the "nonpartisan" Unicaml'ral had until this
"time been indulgent

of

Brooks' and Finigan's Program management.

"honeymoon" was now endangered.

That

Brooks and his appointed fellow

Democrat Finigan had worked together as an effective team not only as
officials of state government but as close personal friends.
Governor's death struck Finigan deeply.

The

It also dealt a blow to the

Democratic Party in Nebraska, for its first governor elected in some
two decades was struck down before he had completed even one term.
With the assumption of the Governor's Office by Republican
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Lieutenant Governor Dwight W. Burney,' the appointed Democratic administrators of the Nebraska Program became apprehensive about the
future of the Program and of their jobs.

Their fears must surely

have increased when Governor Burney removed Mr. Frank Golden, Chief
of the State Cigarette Tax

Division~

Nebraska Department of

Agriculture, because of his parallel job as Chairman of the
Lancaster County Democratic Party organization.

At this same time,

the close cooperation between the Governor's Office and the Office ,of
the Director of Agriculture ended.

Director Finigan could certainly

have been removed for his activities as a stalwart in the Democratic
Party.

If this had in fact happened, the utilization research

effort would have lost a champion in a position of leadership within
a state.

However, events served to keep the same Nebraska

Department of Agriculture administrators with their first-hand
knowledge of the_Program in their positions.

This is not to say that

others could not have handled the Program, but to point out that
those who had helped create the Nebraska Program, managed it
through the legislative process, devised realistic goals for it, put
.it into operation, and attempted to expand it nationally were
permitted to continue in positions where their past experience could
,continue to benefit the effort.

Perhaps Governor Burney felt he did

not have a proper or powerful enough mandate at the time to make
further changes.

Possibly there were other pressures, but probably

Burney decided to await the impending elections when a most likely
(in Nebraska) new Republican governor would have the prestige of
election to remove the popular Finigan by exercising the pr'erogative

.'
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of a newly elected governor to appoint his own directors.

This

situation almost came to pass, not through a Republican governor,
but because Frank

a.

Morrison, another Democrat (from Lincoln), was

elected Governor November 3, 1960.
Despite the fact that the new governor and the incumbent
director of agriculture were of the same political party, the
question arose as to Finigan's retention.

Morrison and Finigan were

not on the best of political terms because of past differences on how
the Nebraska Democratic Party should be run.

Finigan and the late

Governor Brooks had been powerful voices in the party by right of
their offices and tended to'cooperate with the Chairman of the State
Democratic Party, Bernard Boyle of Omaha, top party policy-maker and
political foe of Morrison.

Finigan's political past was therefore

tainted as to his inclusion in a Morrison Administration.

It became a

question of whether Finigan would adhere to Morrison policy, which
would include one unsuccessful attempt and a later successful effort
to remove Chairman Boyle and replace him with a Morrison man;
whether Morrison would realize Finigan's usefulness to his admin'~istration,

to the state and to its Program; or whether Finigan might

move on to a United States Senate nomination, for which Morrison was
certain to have tried ,in the next election and for which Finigan was
now considered the most likely substitute.

It appeared likely that

Finigan would have announced his Senate candidacy had he been turned
out of office,72 but he first made known that he would prefer to
remain in Nebraska, in his job with the Program, and in harmony with
Morrison.

Morrison accepted the new ally whose worth he realized and

. --.',

···,11\
:t
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whose help against Boyle he needed, and reappointed Finigan after the
Governor assumed his office January 1, 1961.

Finigan therefore

remained as one hold-over link between the old administration and
the new one in regard to the Nebraska Program, for Senator Jensen,
author of LB-722, left the Nebra,ska Legislature to ·himself assume a
federal job.

Thus the Nebraska Program weathered political events

and fortunes during the first year or so of its existence.

The

future appeared promising, for the Morrison Administration anchored
itself on the Program and began to apply itself to it; however, the
use of it for gaining public exposure for the administration later
proved to hinder the true goals of the Program, which were educational.
The Political and Economic Context of the New Crops Effort
At first the New Crops section of the Program.made the most
progress while the laboratories were beginning the somewhat slower
activity of product utilization research.

The goal of this work was

to demonstrate to Nebraskans that they could become the nation's
leading producers and processors of industrial oil crops.

The

ability of Nebraska to compete in this field was based on its
abundance of usable land and water, in contrast to chief competitors
Texas and California with their high-cost land and water.

The

over-all effort was helped by the very kind of political assistance
Nebraska was trying for--federal legislation.

In 1962 Congress

passed legislation permitting the farmer to plant industrial crops
on the same idle acres he was drawing government payments on for
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taking the land out of production.

The farmer could therefore

plant, harvest, and sell the very crops the Nebraska Department of
Agriculture was encouraging through the New Crops section of its
utilization education program, while drawing one-half of his
previous federal payments.
effect was noticed:

In this particular case an interesting

The Nebraska Program, stressing utilization

education, had capitalized on the traditional production-oriented
thinking of the farmer, and Nebraska castor bean and safflower
"
d slgnl
"
"f"lcant I y. 73
acreage lncrease

This successful experiment,

especially the castor beans, proved to be a "feather in the cap of
"
. "
Dlrector
Flnlgan
an d t h e Ne bras ka Department

0

fAgrlcu
"
1 ture, .. 74 not

to mention the fledgling Democratic Administration which was
striving to gain prestige and maintain position.

But more in

keeping with Program goals, such success with legislation and
experiments could not help but have. had an educative effect on a wide
public and its representatives.
While attending to the favorable educative and political
effects all this would have, Director Finigan was aware of the
desirability of achieving a transition from a state dependent upon
agriculture to one dependent upon industry, although an agricultural
emphasis would have to be maintained in that industry.

At least a

balance would be tried for, with an a"lareness that industry would
later have to gain a predominance if Nebraska and her fellow agricultural states were to compete effectively in an industrialtechnological American society.

This fact could also be found in

the Nebraska Blue Book statistics for the 1950's, for even though
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the industrial work force rose in the ·state from 1950 to 1960, the
rise was not in balance with the reduction in agricultural workers:
AGRICULTURAL
(FARM)

YEAR

WORK FORCE

1950
1960

200,000
130 ,000
70,000

INDUSTRIAL
(MANUFACTURING AND PROCESSING)
WORK FORCE

+

45,000
66,000
21,000

The progress of the New Crops effort was not without its
troubles.

Noteworthy among these was the running University of

Nebraska-Nebraska Department of Agriculture battle conducted mainly
in the press as to who should get credit for ·introducing industrial
crops to Nebraska and for educating the state's public as to their
worth.

The University, while willing to concede that its fellow

state agency had been fairly successful in its education program to
gain widespread adoption of the crops, correctly claimed that it had
been the first to recognize the importance and promise of such a
program and had experimented with the industrial crops in the past.
~he

University was effectively countered by the fact that it had

concluded that industrial crops were not suited for growing in
Nebraska and had abandoned its efforts to convince Nebraskans to
plant and grow them.
Another inevitable struggle was the political two-party
confict.

Although the Program enjoyed over-all bipartisan support,

it became painfully clear to Republicans that the Democratic administrations were deriving total benefit and increasing strength from
Program progress.

Republican-oriented newspapers, such as the
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Hastings Tribune owned by former Eisenhower Secretary of the Interior
and later Nebraska gubernatorial candidate Fred Seaton, mixed their
reporting of the Program with criticism, however constructive •. Among
various charges by the Tribune and the Omaha World-Herald was the
Tribune's accusation that the Program

A~visory

Committee was

encroaching on the duties officially assigned to the Resources
Division of the Nebraska Department of Agriculture, the legitimate
organization charged with bringing industry into the state and
locating it.

(In doing so, the Division was to educate industry

about Nebraska, and Nebraskans about how to get and treat industry.)
The Tribune commented:
The Agriculture Committee is taking over some of the duties
of the Nebraska Resources Division in locating industry in
Nebraska. It isn't that the Resources Division can't use
help, but it appears to this writer that the committee would.
be more effective in using its funds for basic research • • •
Indeed, it would seem that Finigan, in his newspaper columns,
should discuss functions of the committee, telling just what
it can and can't do.75
The foregoing was valid, constructive criticism, but no direct
reply by Finigan was ever made.

The answer to such a charge lay in

the fact that the Resources Division, though it had done a
commendable job in the past, lacked adequate funds and personnel to
.fully carry out its duties.

Since Nebraska and its Midwestern sister
'i

states needed all the help they could get in attracting industry, the
chance to use the funds, personnel, .educational structure, publicity,
. and prestige of the Program was looked upon by Program administrators
as an assist to the Resources Division's work, not as a usurpation or

duplication of its authority and duty.

In addition, not only was
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Director Finigan the head of the department of which Resources was a
division, but he was by law the Resources Division Advisory Committee
Chairman as well as being Chairman of the new Nebraska Program
Advisory Committee.

In sum total Director-Chairman Finigan was in an

excellent position to utilize the

Reso~rces

Division and the Nebraska

Program for similar purposes as he pleased.
As a sidelight to the above situation, and perhaps a clue to
why the Resources Division question was exploited by the Seatonowned Tribune, was the fact that the Resources Division head,
Mr. David Osterhout, was.a staunch Republican appointed during a past
Republican administration.

It was well known that his views and

Finigan's were not compatible, for obvious reasons.

The political

climate that had caused many Republicans to desert their party and
assist in electing a Democrat governor in 1959 caused that governor
(Brooks) to .wisely maintain his strength by being moderate, even
quite conservative (as his successor Morrison would be), and keep
many Republicans in leadership positions within the state govern~ental

structure.

This sometimes caused delicate working rela-

·tionships and some political conflict, as can be seen from the
Finigan-Osterhout situation.
The New Crops Educational Effort
A look at the New Crops branch of the Program can best be given
by viewing the work done with castor beans.

The need to change the

thinking and behavior of agricultural workers was pointed out by such
things as this newspaper headline:

"Need To Find Replacement Crops
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For 245,000 Acres Of Wheat Lost As Quotas Tighten.,,76

In Nebraska, a

Cheyenne County committee went to the state university with the
problem.

The University promised to do research; however, it was by

that time significantly behind the Nebraska Program in such a field,
having concentrated its efforts on increasing production of traditional crops through hybrid grains production research.

The

University had originally experimented with castor beans in the
i

1950's, but had abandoned them as not feasible for growing in the
"

Midwest.

At the beginning of the 1960's another state agency took up

the challenge on two fronts:

the education of the public in the

growing of the plant, and the utilization of

~it.

Using as a stimulus the fact that ninety percent of all castor
oil used as low grade lubricants, medicines, and high temperature
oils in the United States was imported from Brazil, the Nebraska
Department of Agriculture let contracts for laboratory experimentation on the oil as an industrial fluid and funded the growing of
1,500 acres of the plant by the University of Nebraska and the South
Central Nebraska Agricultural and Industrial Corporation of Hastings
~in

1960.

With the help of the Department the Hastings Corporation

contracted with Pacific Vegetable Oils Corporation of 'San Francisco
and Baker Castor Oil Company of Bayonne, New Jersey for purchase of
the harvest from 1,000 of the planted acres.

This purchase proved

that the all-important buyers, the industrial users of the product,
were available.

It was up to the' Nebraska Program to make the

Midwest public aware of the opportunity to attract these industries,
and to therefore widen production of both raw materials and finished

112
products.

The Federal Utilization Laboratory at Albany, California,

a federal government institution which was watching the progress of
the state-run, state-financed Program, estimated that an awakened
agriculture industry could increase its castor oil market by ten to
fifty times--significant encouragement for the Nebraska Program from

I

I

an important branch of the

Progr~m's

target federal agency, the USDA.

The University of Nebraska reactivated its abandoned castor
bean breeding program and, with restored Nebraska Program funds which
previously had been withdrawn as recorded in this chapter, began
experimentation on the production of hybrids for the Midwestern
climate and conditions.

The University was back with the Program,

operating where it performed best--production research.

As education

about this crop was increased by the Department and the newly
aroused University, interest within Nebraska increased:

five hundred

people gathered at Hastings, Nebraska to see the first castor bean
crop harvested in the fall of 1960.
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Another 1,500 acres of the crop were grown in 1961, but in 1962, as the education effort expanded, those who had held back to
-watch the outcome of experimentation cast their vote, and 10,000 acres
were grown.

This figure represented fifty percent of the nation's

1962 production of a crop hardly known in the Midwest before the
Nebraska Program.

78

McRoberts Industries of Hastings, Nebraska

be gan pro d
'
.
h ea ds to f'It wh eat com b'lnes, 79
uClng
castor bean h arvestlng
and tractor-mounted flamethrowers were experimented with for cultivating the crop. 80
Education designed to increase acreage, and publicity about

....'
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the attraction of more industry to Nebraska and the Midwest, an
attractive prospect for urban workers, continued under Program
auspices.

Finigan stated that companies were discussing the possi-

bility of establishing processing plants in the state costing three
million dollars and having a projected_payroll of one million dollars
if 60,000 acres were grown.

This was verified when the Pacific Oil

Company of San Francisco indicated that if Nebraska could grow five
hundred short tons of castor beans the company would build such a
plant.

81

Finigan and his staff met repeatedly with Nebraska

chambers of commerce to discuss the attraction and location of such
industry.

82

Finigan then proceeded to ask the State Legislature for

a 1960-61 Program budget increase of 156,000 dollars over the current
1959-60 allotment for resources and industry attraction, an increase
over that total of 142,000 dollars in 1961-62, and a leap of
333,000 dollars over that in the 1962-63 budget.

83

Using the methods and inertia of the successful castor bean
program, education about a second new crop, safflower, was begun.

The

newly aware farmer evidenced a crop-growing attitude and behavioral
-change that increased safflower' s acreage enough that the Pacific Oil
Company of San Francisco did indeed build a processing plant at
. Sidney, Nebraska.

84

Sesame, a Southeast Asian plant used by Americans

in foods, was introduced into the state by the educative machinery of
'1962,85 WhOI
the Program 1n
1 e guar, anot h er new crop f rom Ind'1a and
Pakistan, continued to be studied in test plots. 86
The Nebraska Democratic Administration seized upon the foregoing progress for political advantage in the eyes of the state
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public, while continuing the effort to gain nationwide attention for
the Program.
The PoliticRl And Economic Context Of The New Uses Effort
As time progressed, the laboratory projects, or "New
Industrial Uses" branch of the Program, picked up momentum and began
to gain its share of attention from the education unit.

By

September 1960, approximately one year after the Program's
initiation, 444,630 dollars worth of projects had been approved for
contracting to research institutions, and the Nebraska Research
Advisory Committee, slowly regaining stature, continued to meet
monthly to consider further proposals.
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At this point projects

were well underway and could be used for educational discussion
purposes, but there were as yet no results or discoveries to
"tilize.
The Nebraska Legislature also' continued to work closely with
the utilization research and education effort.

A move to widen the

scope of LB-722 to include certain other areas of investigation by
the University·of Nebraska was supported by Director Finigan and
passed in September 1960.

88

The Program's education unit had gained so

.much prestige for its accomplishments that Senator Joe Vosoba, at
Governor Morrison's request, introduced a University of Nebraska
study which resulted in the Legislature's Education Committee rushing
to the floor a bill (LB-702) to create a Nebraska Industrial Research
Institute, then sending in LB-160 designed to have the state's
Abandoned Property Trust Fund finance it.

Again Director Finigan
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supported the move.
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There were indications during this time that the Nebraska
Program's educative apparatus was gaining increased national
attention for the Program, a direct goal of the effort.

In

September 1960 representatives of the Jederal government (USDA),
Midwest Research Institute personnel, and Director Finigan met in
Kansas City, Missouri to discuss what Nebraska was doing.
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The

meeting was reported in these terms:
The federal government is curious about practical studies
made by Nebraska • • • • The work of Finigan's department is
beginning to attract widespread attention. There is
hopefulness in the state's new policies. •
But there
are national problems in agriculture which cannot be
successfully treated on the state level. 91

-

After such praise on the state and national level,Nebraska reitera ted its bid for the location of a federal utilization laboratory
in the state,92 pushing its new-found advantage to the fullest
extent.
The Legislature and the Nebraska Department of Agriculture
began in 1961 to take action designed to anticipate the future.

As

information on results in the r.esearch projects began filtering in,
consideration of patents on new products and processes was begun.

In

much of the research entered into by the Nebraska Agricultural
Products Research Fund Committee the contracts provided for the

assigTh~ent of patents on discoveries to the Committee (1959-1960).93
Since the department had no previous guidance for dealing with
patents, it was necessary for the Legislature to provide a further
legal base.

LB-597 was passed in 1961 designating the Nebraska
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from the Nebraska-financed Program stay wi thin Nebraska boundaries.•
This of course hindered progress toward the interstate cooperation
state officials .were working for.

It became apparent that increased

education efforts were necessary to inform Nebraskans of this need
as well as to educate the national

pu~lic

as to its duty.

was soon switched to this endeavor for a period of time.

Emphasis
Finigan,

however, did not hesitate-to approach the state public for increased
financial support for the Program, commenting that he wished "to see
the Agricultural Research Fund Levy raised to .5 percent of a mill
from .1 percent.,,98
Utilization Education Material:

New Uses Project Results

An examination of the laboratory research achievements found
a tendency on the part of research institutions to claim significant
or encouraging initial results in order to prompt renewal of their
contracts.

It was difficult to determine which claims of the

research laboratory, the contracting agency and its education effort,
and the politician were actually significant and which were part of
the "carrot" technique.

During 1960 the Midwest Research Institute (MRI) of
Kansas City, Missouri, working with a project under the direction of
Dr. J. W. Barger, a former DuPont Company scientist in charge of
basic and developmental research, produced a clear plastic film from
amylose corn which had packaging, wrapping, and other commercial
possibilities.

Dr. Barger, Dr. J. W. Evans, Vice President for

Research of American Maize Products Company, Roby, Indiana, and
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Dr. John Lonquist, a University of Nebraska specialist, conferred
with the Nebraska Merrick County Industrial Group and a Hamilton
County group to see about the raising and supplying of amylose corn
to the laboratories and eventually to a manufacturer.
was selected.
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Merrick County

Florida winter planting§ of the corn to speed up

research by year-around experimentation were cancelled as a result of
the Merrick County group's agreement and the imminent perfection of
the films.

lOO

Nebraska proceeded to take the necessary patent steps, filing
applications in the United States ("Plasticized Extrusion for
Amylose," United States Patent Office, Serial Number 159,752,
December 15, 1961), in Britain and in Canada, all retroactive to
December 15, 1961.

An MRI patent attorney informed the Nebraska

Department of Agriculture that a European Common Market single patent
registration was imminent and that filing with the Continent could be
held till then.

Governor Morrison requested bids on the patent and

the Department of Agriculture placed a legal advertisement in the
Wall Street Journal,
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a significant historic move, for few states

-had ever put patents up for bids or _received royalties from them.
Response was immediate.

A number of countries, several European and

,one Asian, expressed interest in the development of the film. l02
American firms such as Thiokol Chemical Corporation of Trenton,
New Jersey and others, it was learned through Dr. Max Thorton, a
Vice President of MRl, had been paying visits to MRI during the past
year gathering information on research progress in addition to
sending written inquiries.

l03

In April 1962 the Nebraska Department
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of Agriculture applied for the approval' of the United States Food and
Drug Administration for the films.

By the end of 1962 the films

were being experimentally produced commercially, with construction
of a pilot plant at Central City, Nebraska slated for 1963.
During this time the Department's

educ~tion
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unit prepared to exploit

one of the developments it had hoped would be produced to dramatize'
the Program's goals.

The pilot plant was invaluable to this effort.

As MRI continued its film, textile fiber, and adhesive
research utilizing surplus agricultural products, Bjorksten
Laboratories at Madison,Wisconsin, with an expenditure of 16,312
dollars later produced another plastic, film-like material with a
tensile strengtb of 7500 pounds.

The interesting aspect of this film

was that it was made from ground-up corn cobs.

Further pursuit of

this project saw the development of a by-product, cornstarch-based
adhesive made from the same process. 105

Bjorksten also developed

cornstarch-urethane foams in solid form for insulation and padding.
This institution, which had been given a contract to develop foam
from starch for structural purposes in 1961,
for such uses

107
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produced these foams

a full year before the Burlington Railroad Company

announced the development of the same in its research and testing
shops.
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The Institute of Paper Chemistry (IPC) at Appleton, Wisconsin
submitted its findings.

The Institute had found that 306 million

pounds of tapioca starch were imported into the United States during
1961 (five times more than in 1954) for use in making paper and
adhesives and for industrial sizings.

This raw material amounted to

',:i
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eighty-nine percent of all American starch imports and entered the
nation's shores duty-free, in contrast to the European Common Market
which imposed a twenty-eight percent duty on it.

Wheat was initially

tested as a prospective competitive substitute for this import, but
was outperformed by cornstarch as a filler and beater adhesive for
paper at IPC.

109

The Institute was sure that cheap, dry-milled corn

flours could compete and gain the market for surplus American agricultural products.
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IPC was soon able to produce high-quality

paper with its process and a large quantity was experimentally manufactured for the Nebraska Program's educational unit's use.

lll

The year 1962 marked the beginning of an alfalfa project at
the federal government's USDA Western Division Laboratory in
Albany, California.

With the addition of this agency and the USDA's

Northern Laboratory, two of the four USDA laboratories operating in
the United States were actively cooperating with the Nebraska
Program.

The State of Nebraska allocated 200,000 dollars for this

. project in 1962, with a Platte Valley farmers group supplying the raw
material.

The Nebraska Department of Agricultpre coordinated the

three-party "New Uses" effort, as its over-all education and
lobbying effort appeared to be making progress.
Also in 1962 Finigan announced that the Southwest Research
Institute of San Antonio, Texas would investigate the use of grain
alcohol in fuels to combat automobile exhaust pollution.
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(That

year 200,000 tons of lead were released into the air by automobiles.)
This institution had done past research on, and was expert in, the
area of fuels and air pollution.

In addition, J. Leroy Welsh, Omaha
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grain dealer and producer of the Welsh 'Report, agreed to serve as an
unpaid consultant to the parties engaged in the contract, while
maintaining his

as a trustee of the Southwest Institute.

d~ties

The

Institute, after six months of work, released the usual encouraging
news:

"Grain alcohol research is proll!ising in reducing lead in the

air.,,113

Mr.

Welsh, Program administrators, and the supporting

public appeared satisfied with such pronouncements, but the gap
between promise and fulfillment remained wide.

Nevertheless,

because it was an important part of the education effort the aura of
promise continued to be emphasized, and attention and support for
the Program continued to be gained in the state and nationally.
Midwest

~esearch

Institute again gave the education effort

assistance when it took a survey of Nebraska Department of Roads
highway paints and theorized that soybean oil could be refined and
made cheap enough to win back the paint market from synthetics.

As

in the grain alcohol project, MR.I felt "the problem was economics; a
"
quest10n

0f

ma k"1ng pro d ucts

C h eap

"d ustry. ,,114
enough f or 1n

The new

project brought about a state-wide test of soybean oil-based highway
paint:

test strips were laid down and the education unit erected

signs by these strips telling of the Nebraska Program project.

All

these developments were excellent material for the educational
purposes of the Program, and gained the Program a good deal of
discussion in the press
strips were located.

l15

and in the communities where the test

Reports on' this project continued to be opti-

mistic, with testing lasting into 1964.
Another Program project entered what could be considered to be
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a spectacular and controversial area of endeavor when it was
announced by the Nebraska Department of Agriculture that combinations
of agricultural and petroleum materials were being subjected to
cancer-control studies.

These materials were said to be undergoing

cancer chemotherapy screenings at
to Nebraska.
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~

research laboratory under contract

Naturally some publicity was given this project by

the media, but it was perhaps too dangerous an area for spectacular
claims or promises, and investigation shows that the Department's
educational unit did not exploit it for its purposes.
The latter part of 1962 saw another project produce educational, political, and practical results.
development.

It was a most timely

Foster D. Snell, Incorporated of New York City had been

given a contract to do research on new uses for animal fats and acids.
The main goal was to find a non-foaming, degradable (soft) form of
soap which would compete with market-dominating, petroleum-based,
non-degradable (hard) detergents for the 800 million dollars per year
market.

117

However,

Mid~est

Research Institute developed such

promising soft detergents made from corn starch that they were given
- emphasis, while Snell turned its attention to developing lubricants
from animal fats and tallows.
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The Program's soft detergents gained public attention because
of the increasing controversy over pollution of the nation's waters
by non-degradable detergents whose petroleum base caused foam which
would not dissolve through the processes of nature, unlike soft
detergents.

Detergent companies were under pressure from public and

political reaction to the growing menace, a menace emphasized by the
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nation's media and of increasing concern to a newly educated
citizenry.

Nebraska therefore asked its researchers to increase

their efforts to perfect a soft detergent which might dramatize the
suggestion that agriculture gain the market by getting a product
made from surplus agricultural

ma~eria1s

on store shelves before

detergent companies could market a petroleum-based degradable soap.
The State also aided the project on the educational and political
fronts.

Finigan formed a Detergent Study Committee to act as a

sounding board for project efforts and to assist in the educative
functions of the project through its advisory duties.

This citizens

committee, meeting infrequently at the Capitol Building in Lincoln,
considered evidence of pollution in the nation's rivers, darns,
streams, and reservoirs, and was instructed by various individuals
concerned with control of water pollution in other parts of the
nation.

It considered alternatives and dispersed to form other

discussion groups, give talks, and in general spread the message
using educative techniques.

The State Legislature was also presented

with this evidence and the knowledge that other states of the Union,
plus the federal government, were considering restrictive legislation.

It was found that Germany and other European nations had

already passed laws controlling marketing and use of hard, petro1eumbased detergents.
The administrators of the Nebraska Program continued to push
their advantage.

The Director of Agriculture recommended that the

Legislature impose a tax on hard detergents in Nebraska,119
realizing that not only would the state's waters benefit, but the
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Program would gain considerable attention because of its soft
detergent research.

Such a bill
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was introduced into the Nebraska

Unicameral by Senator Harold Stryker of Rising City, an individual
who in the past had played a significant part in the Program.
failed to pass.

It

The Program absorbed !his political setback and

continued its developmental research on the detergents, while easing
its educational efforts in the area.
Snell, Incorporated, having been removed from detergent
research, concentrated on its oil research.

Nebraska had become

increasingly envious of the role played by neighboring Missouri in
the new missile and space age.

Missouri had been able to acquire

federal government contracts and to attract much private business and
industry to help build missile and space vehicles, including manned
orbital capsules.

Nebraska, in contrast, had almost nothing outside

of Strategic Air Command personnel.

The state, through the

educative apparatus of its Program, began-demonstrating that castor
bean oil and animal fats as lubricants might have a missile and space
age role.
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Snell laboratories found that such fats and tallows were

-suitable for high temperature lubricants (in the 650-900 degree
range) for use in jets and missiles.

The company's contract which

had called for an initial 12,000 dollars was doubled to 24,000
dollars and extended one year.
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The Nebraska Program now had the

glamorous federal space program to utilize as another utilization
education device.
September 1, 1962 marked the beginning of a most unique and
modern education project by the Program.

In cooperation with the
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Nebraska Wheat Growers Association and the University of Nebraska,
the Nebraska Department of Agriculture contracted for an information
retrieval project for use in educating the public.

The Association

and the state agencies furnished the facilities for collection of all
information available or being published on the subject of the
,

utilization of wheat.

North Carolina had just completed such a

project with tobacco as the subject, and Miss Margaret Drenowatz who
had been in charge of the Carolina effort was hired to direct the
Nebraska retrieval project.

She and her staff were to gather all

available material into a central repository and publish a monthly
abstract of publications for interested individuals and groups.
As ·the project advanced, a discovery was made which bore upon
the philosophy of the Nebraska effort.

It was found that the State

of Washington was conducting a similar project with wheat as the
subject and was preparing to publish an abstract.

Receipt of a test

abstract from that state caused consternation among Nebraska Program
administrators.

Here was clear evidence that there was a lack of

coordination between the states in their utilization research and
education efforts.

The Nebraska retrieval project nevertheless

continued to its completion on September 1, 1963.
At the end of 1962, Midwest Research Institute in its
previously cited starch investigations came upon an ironical sidediscovery.

It was found that certain parts of agricultural starches

which had the function of helping a plant·to grow could be isolated,
condensed, and used to stimulate rapid growth in other plants.

This

placed the Nebraska Program in an awkward position, for the "utili-
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zation" program had rendered an "increased production" result.

At

the same time, the University of Nebraska College of Agriculture
announced it had found a hybrid wheat which would double current
production.

These two developments illustrated exactly the type of

thinking and research the Program

an~

the several individuals who

testified at the Welsh Report Hearings were publicly professing to
be fighting and attempting to change via utilization research and

education programs.

The education unit, while viewing the

University's find as a predictable result of the production ethic
tradition, worked to provide an answer to the potentially
embarrassing position in which the

Nebraska~Department

culture and its administrators found themselves.

of Agri-

Use of the

stimulants for traditional crop production was played down, and
their use on the new crops of the Nebraska Program was emphasized
by the

edu~ation

unit.

Statements to that effect by officials,

notably Finigan, also lessened the negative implications of the
s.timulants.

As for the University's discoveries, it was noted that

they continued to be production-oriented even when faced with a
surplus of the researched commodity.

It was likewise expected that

lobe University would continue to educate its constituency to produce
more.

The educative thrust of the Program had yet to hav.e its

e!fect on this institution.
Field tests of the stimulants were scheduled for the spring
of 1963 in five Nebraska counties, under the supervision of
Dr. J. B. Skaptason, President of Biosearch and Development,
Inc
.orpora t e,
d
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Various encouraging

"
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statements by Nebraska officials and MRI people ("The research is
moving fast, and if things work out the stimulants could be
available in commercial quantities in 1964 •

may provide more

patents • • • •") 124 accompanied each step of the project.
publicity attracted the desired

att~ntion,

Such

and the material from this

project was useful in the New Crops education effort.

Queries were

received in the Nebraska Department of Agriculture from, among
others, interested cotton industry groups in Washington, D.C. and
New Orleans, Louisiana.

In a successful conclusion to an event that

occurs frequently in research, accidental discovery of an important
side effect while in pursuit of the main goal, the rights to the
stimulants were,sold in late 1963 for 300,000 dollars in advance
roya1ties--a figure equalling the budget of the Nebraska Program for
. one year.
One of the best known results of the Program in Nebraska and
nationally, one which became almost a symbol of the effort because
of its renown, was the NEBRASKIT.

This small, edible wheat bar

gained an educational value unsurpassed by any. other instrument
developed by researchers for the Program's purposes.

In fact, it was

one of the few Program items that moved from a place of educational
value to one of commercial value.

Its name was registered as a

trademark with the Nebraska Secretary of State, and a patent was
applied for.
The NEBRASKIT became a prime device in the effort to urge the
Federal Government to increase agricultural utilization research.
The immensity of the national defense posture motivated Nebraska

',.,
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officials to plan to link agriculture to national defense through the
125
accumulated grain reserves and by aggressive research and lobbying.
In 1961 circumstances created a situation which allowed the
Nebraskans to capitalize on their ideas.
the Federal Government announced

plan~

Facing a Berlin crisis,

to move 213,000,000 bushels

of surplus bulk wheat from Midwest storage points to metropolitan
areas of the United States.

This food would be stockpiled in

readiness for an all-out United States-Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics armed confrontation.
Immediately upon learning of the Federal Government's plans,
the Lincoln, Nebraska Chamber of Commerce through Mr. Daniel Olson,
Chairman of its,Agriculture Committee, proposed in a letter (dated
July 29, 1961) to President Kennedy and other officials that the
wheat be processed into an edible wafer form before shipment.
reasoning was: .(1)

His

Bulk,wheat would be of very little use to an

urbanized society whose processing machinery was destroyed and,
(2) bulk wheat would be more difficult to store and dispense than a
processed item.

Governor Frank B. Morrison rushed a delegation with

Finigan at its head to Washington to talk to USDA, Civil Defense,
Pentagon, Congressional, and White House personnel.

Before leaving

for Washington, Finigan authorized crash work on the formulation ofa
wheat bar by Midwest Research Institute with an initial allocation of
3,000 dollars.
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The Federal Government through the USDA had done previous
work with wheat as a basic food for mass feeding, but mainly in the
area of shipment of bulk wheat without processing.

The only act

12.9
which could be considered "processing" was the crushing of the grain
to make it more usable.

Since the government bad five such

processing plants in the United States and planned to buy
130,000,000 bushels for feeding use, Finigan and his staff worked to
get both crush-type processing

plan~s

and end-item, wheat bar

processing plants into the Midwest, therefore connecting the area
more closely to national needs and the national administration of
agricultural raw material utilization.
Nebraska, while not gaining its grain-crushing processing
plants, did see the federal government begin a quest for processed
grain "survival rations."

The Defense Department decided not to

purchase the type of ration developed by the USDA from the Federal
Government's own crushed-wheat raw material because of the ration's
unsatisfactory characteristics.

In addition, the Pentagon found

that the food industry did not have sufficient facilities
immediately available to efficiently produce such a ration on a
full-scale basis.

The State of Nebraska therefore gained added time

to gear its educative apparatus to the vigorous promotion of its
Program-developed "survival ration. ,,127
obtained a measure of success.

In this endeavor Nebraska

By joining forces with the civil

defense education effort and anticipating the need for a ration to
stock shelters in the then strong fall-out shelter market, by
initiating research through an in-progress research program, by
aggressive competitive bidding, and by intensive lobbying by public
officials, Nebraska gained an initial five million pound order for
NEBRASKITS out of a 30 million pound federal order to industry.128
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In April of 1962 the Federal Government purchased another 16 million
pounds of NEBRASKITS,

3,700,000 dollars worth, out of an 18.3

. d ustry. 129
m1°11'10n pound contract to 1n

And in June, Nebraska received

another far larger order for 45 million pounds of the ration,
11,063,589 dollars worth.
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The State of Nebraska through one of

its public agencies had begun the movement of agricultural raw
materials from laboratory research to end-item sale, and involved
itself in a commercial endeavor that dealt with the sale of a
processed item to another public agency.

Specifically, 66 million

pounds of NEBRASKIT survival rations were processed by industry and
purchased by the Federal Government from January 1962 to June 1962.
By such example Nebraska could say it was itself practicing what it
was preaching through its educational program.
At this particular time there was increasing fear, building to
a climax since 1945, of a third world war between the Communist Bloc
dominated by the USSR and the Western Alliance led by the United
States.

It was the "darkest before dawn" period before the

Kennedy-Khrushchev detente of 1963.

Therefore, just as the Berlin

. Crisis of 1961 had, in the government' s view, created a need for an
item such as the NEBRASKIT, so did the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962
.create a public demand for it as a commercial product. 131

As the

public became educated about and reconciled to the realities of
atomic age civil defense, sales of fall-out shelters rose, and correspondingly so did the demand for food stocks that could be met by the

Realizing the potential of the public as a market, and that

131

this could translate into the crowning educational vehicle for the
utilization research program, Nebraska worked to move the NEBRASKIT
wafer into commercial markets.

The State applied for a patent on the

formula and requested bids from private companies.
Defense, which gained the formula

~s

The Department of

a proviso of its former

contracts, contracted with the National Biscuit Company and the
Kroger Company to provide more rations for the Federal Government's
programs, for the State of Nebraska's Department of Agriculture was
no longer acting as a coordinating agency between private industry
and the Federal Government.

Nebraska did, however, continue to

receive royalties from such federal licensing agreements, just as it
did from its own.agreements with private producers.

The statements

of Nebraska's Governor Morrison and his director of agriculture about
the Program eventually paying its own way began to appear quite
valid.
The commercial aspect of the NEBRASKIT proceeded, directed by
a state agency (an unusual situation in NebraSka), by distribution of
·
' department stores an d retal'1 Ch
'
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The product sold well, possibly out of need for it, possibly out of
novelty, but surely because of the immense publicity given it.
retail outlets Were constantly sold out.

All

The education unit of the

Nebraska Department of Agricul ture kept a large supply on hand in
its State Capitol Building offices for use in the education effort,
besides acting as coordinator of ·bulk shipments between commercial
producers and distributors.

Every item of educational

material mailed or handed out to individuals or groups contained
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NEBRASKITS and their utilization research success story.

The

Nebraska Program now had a product which was financed by one state
(Nebraska), developed in another (Missouri), and produced in yet
another (The Johnson Company, Council Bluffs, Iowa).

There were at

that time no facilities for producing_the ration within the State of
Nebraska, but the Department of Agriculture stressed the fact that it
hoped to locate such a plant in Omaha as part of the "industrial"
aspect of the· Program.

By such moves the opportunities to reach the

state's largest urban population with utilization research education,
in this case using the NEBRASKIT, were being seized.
Realizing that the survival ration market was a severely
limited one, as .critics were quick to point out, Nebraska asked its
contracted laboratories to modify the NEBRASKIT in order to move it
'into international feeding programs which were designed to reduce
i

world political tensions through the policy of sharing the wealth
and filling the stomach.

A strong possibility for expanded use of

the item was under the newly inaugurated Public Law 480 Food-ForPeace Program passed by Congress in 1962.

Nebraska, already

blessed by having native son Theodore T. Sorenson working as Special
Advisor to the President of the United States, was further
encouraged when it saw former United States Senator George McGovern
of South Dakota, an old friend of Nebraska and its Director of
. Agriculture, appointed to head the 480 Program by the Kennedy
Administration.

Governor Frank Morrison again moved on the political

front, organizing a Nebraska Food-For-Peace Committee which from
1962 until 1967 held meetings with the Governor, the Nebraska
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Department of Agriculture, various United States Senators, and other
interested individuals and groups.

Because of such early efforts,

which resulted in Nebraska being the first state to organize such a
committee to assist the federal government's program as administered
by the USDA, Morrison and Finigan

w~re

called to Washington by

United States·Secretary of Agriculture Freeman.

There, voicing the

belief that "food could be used as a weapon," they spent considerable
•
•
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The education of the Federal Government and its USDA could be seen
to be proceeding apace •. Now it was not the USDA laboratories
requesting information from the Nebraska Program, it was the
Secretary of Agriculture himself.
Parallel to these efforts to establish a cooperative project
with the Federal Government, an effort to which the Nebraska Program
was well geared, Program administrators began cooperative projects
through the Nebraska Department of Agriculture with other groups:
The Great Plains Wheat Marketing Organization, The Nebraska Wheat
Growers Association, and the Nebraska Wheat Commission, all
marketing and educational organizations.

Cooperation with these

public and private organizations led to several Latin American
projects utilizing Program-developed food bars.

NEBRASKITS were

sent in quantity to Peru where a feeding program suitability test
was conducted under the supervision of Program personnel and individ..
134
ua 1 s f rom the a b ove organLzatLons.

The success of this test

resulted in a Nebraska Department of Agriculture representative
being sent to Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama, and Columbia to
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attempt to arrange programs which would see Program food rations,
including the newly developed solid milk bar, sent to relief agency
officials in those countries for use in feeding programs for school
Ch 1..1d ren. 135

One interesting result of this face-to-face nego-

tiating was a request for NEBRASKITS by the armed forces of Columbia
and Guatemala for testing with their troops on maneuvers.
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It was

not exactly a "food-for-peace" request, but they received their test
rations.

Officials of the American Dairy Association met with
Director Finigan to discuss markets for the follow-on to the
NEBRASKITS, the new Program-developed solid milk bar.

As a result of

coordinated efforts, joint agreements were concluded with the Federal
Government (State Department and Food-For-Peace), United Nations
relief agencies, and several private agencies for initiating
shipments of NEBRASKIT wheat and milk bars to Europe.
shipments went to Greece.
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The first test

Corn, soybean, and milo were also

developed into food bars, and growers of each crop sought a
processing plant in Nebraska with the assistance of officials in
the Nebraska Department of Agricu1 ture.

The Program had gone inter-

national.
And utilization education was taking big strides.

In its

short span of life from 1959 and reaching toward its cut-off date of
1967, the Program had developed working relationships with the
Federal Government, the United Nations, and national private
agencies.

It could not be denied that some surprisingly solid

achievements had been made in research, and satisfactory progress was

135
evident in the education effort's attempt to gain attention for and
understanding of utilization and utilization research needs among a
newly awakened public.

The long-range goals of the Program, public

awareness resulting in pressure for federal attention and help,
appeared to be realistic in their

cha~ces for success. l38 The cost of

this success was made available for the supporting public to scrutinize whfm, for the first time, Program administrators released
financial information in mid-l962:
Contracted Research To Public and Private
Agencies, including $59,482 to the University
of Nebraska

"~'"

$473,563 (87'7.)

Personal Services

37,934

Travel Costs

20,672

Board and Lodging Costs

4,840

Miscellaneous (Office supplies, equipment,
maintenance)-

9,478

TOTAL PROGRAM COST (approximately three years)

$546,487

The Program had operated for a sufficient time to provide the
figures, and the public was by then educated and involved enough to
-expect such information.

Program officials pointed out that admin-

istration costs were six percent of the total figure, in contrast to
USDA research administration costs of twenty percent for the same
amount of money.
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Program administrators could, in retrospect, feel

confident in the progress of the demonstration and education effort.
The public continued its interest and support.
appeared to be working.

The educative effort

And, given the success of the NEBRASKIT, one

last area remained to be further exploited:

the international sphere.

136
Utilization Education On An International Stage
The effort to gain national interest was increased as the
Program progressed.

Nebraska used every opportunity to expand its

state-supported Program into a states-supported one, and finally into
a federally-supported one,

It began its efforts with its neighboring

states and worked toward such expansion through meetings of regional
associations.

But Nebraska's neighbors adopted a friendly, cautious,

wait-and-see attitude.

By 1962, Iowa, which came the closest to

direct assistance, apparently wanted another two years to view results
of the Program before fully committing itself.
Inquiries were received from other states after Nebraska
presented its case at the Fourteenth Annual National Chemistry
Conference in Kansas City on November 16, 1962.

Twenty-four papers

on agricultural utilization research and education were presented at
this meeting and Director Finigan was asked to serve on the
conference's main symposium.

In addition, another important stimulant

to other states' interest occurred when the National Utilization
Research· Association agreed to hold its 1962 meeting in Lincoln,
. Nebraska.

The informational and educational opportunities presented

the Program by the meetings were augmented by an offer of cooperation
from the National Chemergic Council in a letter from that body to
Finigan •
.Utilizing national stages afforded by national associations,
the nation's press, the United Nations, and traveling Program representatives, the Program became known in many parts of the world.
Requests for and usage of food bars by Latin American and European
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nations has been discussed previously.

Some other examples:

In 1960 five English businessmen representing the British
milling industry visited the Nebraska Department of Agriculture and
submitted a request for a shipment of Program-developed high-amylose
flour for experimental purposes.

The request was filled somewhat

belatedly because of developing department reluctance to release
research results free-of-charge.

However, because of the overriding

interest of utilization education which could exploit possible
market development, the English got their Program product.
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In 1961 Program administrators received news of a foreign
utilization research development which stimulated their interest.
Just as Ame.rican scientists had in the past obtained nylon from
coal, so had a Belgium manufacturer now produced cloth made from
milk and wood.

Program officials had a dress made from the process

and displayed it throughout the. nation along with other Program
results.

The education unit of the Program, aided and abetted by the

nation's press, had a field day.14l
In 1962 news of Program-developed dissolvable wrapping films
not only gained the interest of the United States Army Quartermaster
Corps, which asked for test samples, but brought inquiries from
C. Itoh Company, Limited of Japan, and from an import-export company
in Sweden, asking respectively for manufacturing rights in the Orient
. ht s f or th e Scan d
'·'
.
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countrl.es.

Al so f rom

Sweden via Canada came a "new" process (though used in England for
fifteen years) for making fire-proof building insulation from
straw.

143

A pilot plant for the educational purpose of demonstrating
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the feasibility of this process was established in Nebraska by
Program administrators.

Various other countries such as Germany

requested information about the Program and its results, thereby
demonstrating the interest engendered in this modest, cautious,
scientific/educational Program with

~ocia1ly

and economically

important goals run by one lone state and supported by a small taxpaying population.

The need for utilization education and research

in Western European nations at the time was demonstrated by France's
experience with the agonies induced by agricultural surpluses:
For French farmers,'government officials, riot policemen and
vacationers, harvest time has become a sort of annual
summer madness. Every year, increasingly mechanized and
efficient farms yield such a cornucopia of produce that
market prices inevitably collapse under the load. And then
the 'madness,' or--as the French call it--Ie malaise
agraire, begins • • • • Farmers stage rebellions reminiscent
of what their serf forebears did in the Middle Ages, aimed
at prodding the government into doing something about the '
surplus produce. In one city 6,000 farmers stormed into the
area. President Charles de Gaulle, however, thought the
vision of the farmers was faulty. The surplus problem, he
quipped, lay not with the government but with the 'good
Lord.' Instead of seeing their local government prefects,
the general added, the peasants should go to their
bishops.144
In addition to the above international affairs, the Department
was engaged in other types of international projects.

A personal

friend of Finigan, Sergeant Shriver, Director of the newlyestablished Peace Corps, contacted him about assisting in the
recruitment of agricultural volunteers.

Even though Peace Corps

efforts concentrated on acquiring production-oriented people for
underdeveloped countries, this assistance was given in the form of
an information saturation effort in Nebraska by the Program's
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,
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education unit, and the appointment of a department recruiter.
The prospect of sale of grain to the Soviet Bloc was also
considered by the pepartment in 1962.

Several organizations

questioned department officials closely as to whether this might be
tied into the Program in some

manne~.

However, the Department

decided to concentrate on less controversial Program subjects,
letting the USDA field such issues in the foreign policy area as
trade with the Soviets.

In fact, it was not until ten years later,

in 1972, that such trade was actually established.
This did not, however, preclude Russian visits to Nebraska.
At the 'beginning of the 1960' s an agreement to exchange visits of
certain cultural and professional personnel had been worked out by
the United States and the USSR.
a group

0

After an initial tour of Russia by

•
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the visit in the summer of 1962.

Upon reaching the Midwest the

group, which included K. G. Pysin, Soviet Minister of Agriculture,
and M. A. Olshanskiy, President of the All-Union Academy of
Agricultural Sciences, insisted upon seeing Nebraska Department of
Agriculture and Economic Development operations and talking with,
Director

Finigan~

Department operations and the Nebraska Program

were discussed in detail.

Because of the intense Russian interest in

the Department and what it was doing through the Program, so much
time was spent that the group's entire tour schedule had to be
• d . 147
reV1se

This exchange program eventually sent United States Secretary
of Agriculture Freeman to Russia and brought Soviet Premier
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Nikita S. Khrushchev on an agricultural tour that reached into Iowa.
Premier Khrushchev, even though he was but a few miles distance, did
not express an interest in the Nebraska Department of Agriculture,
its Program, or its director.

The Premier was known to be production-

oriented and concerned with opening up Siberia to agriculture.
Nebraska Director of Agriculture Finigan was, however, officially
invited to tour the USSR under the exchange program.

He did not do

so, as departmental and political concerns pressed without let-up.
The Program demanded constant attention and Nebraska was approaching
the November 1962 gubernatorial campaign, thereby increasing
political duties.

Programs such as the Nebraska effort do not

operate in a neutral vacuum, and politics began to have its effect.
Regardless of far-flung international dealings, the parochial
influence of state politics was always the more pervasive.

The 1962 Gubernatorial Campaign--The Political Situation
Nebraska Republicans had not had a chance to manage the state
government since the inception of the Program in 1959.

It appeared

that, unless they could find a particularly strong candidate in
1962, their party would not be able to unseat Democratic Governor
Frank B. Morrison because of his personal popularity and the success
of his administration's programs.

The political climate of the

State of Nebraska had in the past been unfavorable to the election of
a Democratic governoYa

So Republican and conservative was the state

that, should a Democrat win any state office, his re-election would
be equally startling.
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The Democrats, who were fortunate enough to see their
candidate elected in the 1958 gubernatorial election for the first
time in some thirty years, were unfortunate enough to see him die in
office during his first term.

But the Republican Party fielded a

weak candidate against Frank B. MOErison, Democratic Party candidate
in 1960 and a man who knew how to project an

imag~

and the

Republicans found themselves without the governor's office for
. another two years.
Morrison, although he had not held elective office before,
proved adept at handling official duties while maintaining his image
and improving his and his party's political position in Nebraska.
The two years from 1960 until the 1962 election were busy in
preparation for the predicted hard fight by the now thoroughly
determined Republican Party to win back the governor's chair.
Morrison vigorously pushed his administration's programs, building
groundwork for political claims of accomplishment in 1962.

And that

year did indeed see the need for a strong position, for the battle
was joined with a well known Republican, Fred A. Seaton of Hastings,
Nebraska, former Eisenhower Secretary of the Interior.

Morrison,

the incumbent, naturally enjoyed an advantage and had in reality
been conducting his campaign during the preceding two years.

The

challenger was left to form his issues, what few he could find.
Because of the lack of fresh, substantive issues, the campaign
proceeded slowly.

It reached what the state's press termed "the

bottom of the barrel" after it had covered the usual charges and
counter-claims about highway mileage built, soil and water conser-
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vation, state promotion, and education.

Finally, personal attacks

began on Morrison and his Director of Agriculture for the dismissal
of several employees of the Department of Agriculture during the
reorganization/revitalization and economy measures Finigan had underway.

This issue served two purposes:

(1)

It could be used as a

badly needed campaign issue and, (2) it led an attack on the
Morrison Administration's strongest area, the Nebraska Program
directed by the Department of Agriculture under Finigan.
The Program In The Campaign
Except for the short interim opportunity of approximately four
months by Republican (Lieutenant) Governor Dwight W. Burney, between
the time Governor Brooks died in office September 9, 1960 and the
assumption of office by Morrison on January 6, 1961, Nebraska
Republicans had only been able to state what they would do with the
Nebraska Program.

They could not get in position to take action.

Candidate Seaton needed to find areas of Morrison Administration
weakness in the Program and give creditable suggestions as to where
he, Seaton, would improve it, for this Program alone became
recognized as the one which would make or break either candidate.
It had great voter interest.

As the campaign progressed, however, the

public began to appear fairly satisfied with the job Morrison and his
Administration were doing.
Seaton used the previously mentioned attack on Finigan to try
to weaken some of the prestige the director was building for
Morrison and for himself via the Program.

He faced a difficult task.
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Because of the lackluster campaign which had few major issues except
for the Program, there were some in Nebraska who commented:
is perhaps more valuable than either candidate."l48

"Finigan

Even though

Finigan had in the past been associated with Morrison's political
enemy and rival for party 1eadership._Democratic Party Chairman
Bernard Boyle of Omaha, Morrison and Finigan achieved a working relationship which culminated in the governor's answer to a campaign
question of would he or could he replace Finigan:
replaced."
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"Finigan cannot be

Seaton, in a speech and question and answer session

before University of Nebraska students in October 1962 did not seem
as sure', or at least as clear, in his answer· to the same question.
Morrison.and Seaton met twice, once for a debate at the
University of Nebraska and once for a question and answer session
before the microphones of Radio Station KFMQ of Lincoln, Nebraska.
Each time the Nebraska Program received considerable attention.
Morrison never failed to stress its progress, and Seaton never failed
to say he would "strengthen and accelerate it, mainly by using the
University of Nebraska more instead of giving contracts to companies
outside the state.

ulSO

Seaton was, of course, appealing to the pride

and sense of justice of Nebraska tax-payers.

Morrison would counter

Seaton's statement by citing Program accomplishments, thereby
challenging the suggestion that strengthening and acceleration of the
Program were needed.

And the listening taxpayer was then led by

Morrison to believe that Seaton"s ideas entailed more money.

Finigan

would counter the remainder of Seaton's statement by proclaiming
that:

"Forty percent of the Agresearch dollar already goes to the
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University of Nebraska.

The university is working on all it can
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• h t proJects.
.
"lSI
han dl e 1n

Finigan was supported in his attempts

to keep control of the Program out of the hands of the University by
farm groups who feared the Program's utilization education emphasis
would be warped or over-shadowed by
school.

~he

production orientation of the

They appeared to also feel that state officials were in a

stronger position to deal directly with industry and the federal
government.
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The day after the election left no doubt about the Program's
role in Nebraska political history.

With its state, national, and

international image, it had caught the public's fancy.

How it would

affect the state's or nation's social and economic, as well as
political, history remained to be seen, but a re-elected Governor
Frank B. Morrison knew where to give credit for assistance:
Governor Frank Morrison placed his finger on striking progress
in Nebraska's Agricultural Research Program as the key voterappeal factor in his re-election victory. Tasting the sweet
fruit of the largest Democratic gubernatorial triumph in the
past 26 years, Morrison pointed to five phases of his ["administration's progresil which he believes attracted heavy
voter appeal. First by far, the 57-year-old chief executive
declared, was the Agricultural Research Program. 153
The Nebraska Program At High Tide And Waterloo
The Program pursued its educative way with surprisingly smooth
sailing through the middle 1960's.

Critics and skeptics refrained

from open battle, apparently choosing to adopt a wait-and-see
attitude combined with occasional sniping.

The educational effort

continued to get sympathetic assistance from the state and national
media.

Sophisticated Program education unit methods and materials
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had, by the middle 1960's, reached·a point of routine operation and
dissemination.

And the research projects, which had produced a

flurry of exploitable material in the early 1960's, continued to
offer a convenient item frequently enough to keep the educative/
lobbying effort alive and moving. _ All of the above established an
inertia for the Program that continued until approximately 1965.
After the Program had weathered its use in the 1962 gubernatorial
battle, its administrators attempted to put the Program into
perspective with the rest of the educational and political programs
of the State.

It was not as heavily utilized as a campaign issue

when Governor Morrison went on to win a third term in 1964.

The more

spectacular methods and claims utilized early in Program were mostly
gone, as promotive techniques gave way to orthodox educational
methods.
The .lower profile and more orthodox methods possibly contributed to an easier than expected Program renewal struggle in 1963.
It was not a time for observers, directors, or senators to draw solid
conclusions about the Program.

While some state senators severely

disagreed with the Nebraska Director of Agriculture's committee
hearing statement, "1 feel the Program has made good strides,,,154 a
majority appeared to agree, as did the media.
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The Nebraska

Legislature therefore accepted for debate Senator Jules Burnbach's
bill to extend the Program to 1968,156 but debated primarily the
administration of the Program and its involvement with the University

of Nebraska.

This assuredly was a short-sighted view of the Program,

yet political reality demanded that this type of debate again take
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place.

The long-range goals of the Program were almost totally

ignored--except as they pertained to the administration/University
debate.
Most senators were as yet reluctant to form a firm opinion of
the Program.

But they were equally reluctant to let a vote on

Program extension slip by without hearings, feeling that information
might be gained which would assist in developing an opinion.
Governor Morrison, Senator Burbach, and Director Finigan would have
been pleased to See the Program allowed to continue without the
lengthy interruption of committee hearings.

Senator Burbach, who had

introduced the extension bill upon the request of the Governor, asked
that the measure.be placed on general file without a public hearing,
but those who resented past use of the Program for political gain
thwarted this move.

Even though Burbach attempted to appease the

Legislature -by declaring "I chose 1968 because that date will fall in
the middle of the new four-year gubernatorial term and keep this
legislation £PrograrrY out of politics," he was thwarted by such
statements as the following:

A great amount of money has been spent on the Program since
1959.

I want to see if we are getting our money's worth. 157

I wish to question policies regarding the Program and use of
out-of-state facilities. 158
I would like to explore the possibility of delegating more of

the work to the University of N~braska.159
· h ear~ng.
.
160
I wan t a pu bl ~c
Director Finigan adopted a discreet silence:
men dation to rna k e on

.

th~s

su b·Ject. ,,161

"I have no recom-
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All doubt that the Program would not be granted continued life
was removed when the Legislature's Revenue Committee voted 6-1 for
renewal of the Program's tax levy.
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In order to assist this

continuance, Governor Morrison made, among others, one statement
calculated to gain continued support fur the Program from the public
and therefore influence its representatives:

"I believe that it's

possible the Program will be self-sustaining by 1968 from royalties
·

.

f rom researc h d 1SCQVer1es.
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This was a politic statement but,

given the true goals of the Program, it did not appear to have a
good chance of coming true.

The research was not designed to achieve

such a 'goal, being useful as a means to other ends.
August of 1966 Director Finigan would state:
designed to make money.,,164
lobbying effort only.

In fact, by

"This Program wasn't

This was true, it was an educative!

Finigan, in the same 1966 statement,

confirmed that the Program was only an education-effort-by-example
when he announced that the state had proved its point and therefore
his department would not actively support continuation of the Program
by the 1967 Legislature.
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Finigan's statements, uttered in the late 1960's as the
Program approached another renewal date, were prompted by rising
criticism of the Program's administration.
that certain members of the media
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There was no indication

and the Legislature,167 who

became the chief critics, had come to disagree with the goals or
even the means of the Program.

'Their interest appeared to lie with

the money spent and how the Program had been administered.
The administration of the Department of Agriculture as an
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agency was not challenged.
have done so.

Nor would" it have been easily possible to'

Finigan, his staff, and the Program had continued to

change the concept and image of the Department of Agriculture.
People who had bemoaned the fact that the Department had in the past
been merely a routine

inspection-col~ection

operation, began by the

end of 1960 to see the strong administrative hand of Director
Pearle F. Finigan bring about positive changes.

Finigan initiated

significant changes in the Department's operating structure,
combining scattered similar administrative functions into a single
office, merging inspection duties to eliminate overlap, eliminating
/

activities such as state-line truck inspection ports-of-entry which
were not paying their way and substituting more economical means.
He particularly emphasized cost reduction in his agency.

The

reorganization of these offices and activities brought about a ten
percent decrease in department operating expenses from 1960 to 1963.
The director was consequently praised for overcoming Parkinson's
Second Law, but severely

cr~ticized

by some individuals for putting

workers out of jobs and arbitrarily shifting personnel who had no
Civil Service protection.

The latter figured in the 1962 guberna-

. 1 campalgn.
.
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tor~a

In 1963 two bills reached the floor of the Nebraska
Legislature which assisted in changing the concept and operation of
the Department.

Legislative Bill 717
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requested a change in the

Department's name from the Department of Agriculture and Inspection
to the Department of Agriculture and Economic Development.

The bill

won first-round approval, was then killed, but later waS revived and
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passed. 170

At the same time Governor Morrison proposed Legislative

Bill 767 which would have set up an independent division of state
government designated the Department of Economic Development.

The

bill, which also reappeared later and successfully established such
a department late in the 1960's, was defeated by a 25-15 vote of the
Unicameral on June 4, 1963.

As the Governor's bill read, the

Department of Agriculture would have lost both administrative control
of the Nebraska Program and the Department's Resources Division
which dealt with promotion of Nebraska's industrial development.
Whatever the merit of arguments for the bill, the fact is that
Program management remained within the Department of Agriculture and
Economic Development until the Program's semi-demise in 1967.
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By

this time the significant changes in the Department were stabilized
and Nebraskans began to realize and rejoice in a fact long recognized
by perceptive observers, that:
The work of Finigan's Department LwasJ beginning to attract
widespread attention. What [haQ] happened LWasJ a
departure from the conception of a state department as a
caretaker agency to one of constructive competition against
depressing problems. l72
However, the skepticism and .reduced support evident in the
Legislature as to continuation of the Department's education and
lobbying program could be charted with a listing of the steps taken
when the Program came up for its second renewal in 1967, and for
subsequent Legislative action.
1967 LEGISLATURE (77th SESSION), GERDES LB-34
Created the Nebraska Department of Economic Development,
formerly the Division of Nebraska Resources in the
Department of Agriculture and Economic Development.
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1967

LEGISLATURE, CARPENTER LB-862'
Changed name of Department of Agriculture and Economic
Development back to Department of Agriculture.

1967

LEGISLATURE, ROBINSON LB-877
Transferred Nebraska Agricultural Products Research
Fund to Department of Economic Development,
effective July I, 1967. Passed: For 43 Against 2
Not Voting 4,17 3
-

1967-71:

OLD NEBRASKA PROGRAM DORMANT
The Economic Development Department, because of
criticism of past administration of the Program,
preferred to let the research projects run their
course and to not initiate any new action of an
educational or lobbying nature. It was considered too
much of a "hot potatoe" politically in the state. 174
-

1971

LEGISLATURE (82nd SESSION) SCHMIDT LB-776
Frustrated by non-renewal of the original Program and
by the'inaction of the Department of Economic
Development where the reduced program was placed,
Senator Loren Schmidt obtained the passage of a bill
establishing an independent Agresearch Committee of
the Legislature for a two-year period, funded with
68,000 dollars. The Department of Agriculture was
,listed as an advisor. This development is examined in
the Evaluation section of this paper.175

1974

LEGISLATURE (83rd SESSION) SCHMIDT LB-756
New, reduced program reaches renewal date.
Governor Exon signs into law, March L, 1974, legislative bill 756 severing the Committee from the Legislative Council and creating an independent agency:
Agency No. 60, Agricultural Products Industrial
Utilization Committee. Appropriation given of
117,423 dollars to June 1974.
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CHAPTER 4
EDUCATIVE OPERATIONS AT CLOSE-HAND
Those who viewed the Nebraska Program with a penetrating eye
should have been able to discern that the Program was other than a
true research effort.

Nor, given the level of spending authorized,

could it have been a true research effort.

In the face of the tens

of millions of dollars industry put into utilization research each
year, 300,000 dollars per year for research by a state was woefully
inadequate.

The real goals of the program--and the only reasonable

goals, given the Program's funding--were edu~~tional and political.
The utilization research effort was but a device to achieve those
ends.
Seen not as a research and development effort but as an
educational effort, the Program still represented a considerable
undertaking.

It was going against hundreds of years of tradition in

challenging the thinking of those who believed that agriculture's
problems could be solved by traditional production efforts.

Program

administrators were faced with initiating nothing less than an
immense re-education effort with clearly-defined attitudinal and
behavioral objectives.

Achievement of educational objectives was to

be evidenced not only by an attitude change (support for utilization
research over production research) but also by public action
(pressure on the federal government to increase its utilization
research).

Moreover, the Program would have to be managed in such

''''.
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a way as to secure continued public support (i.e. funding).
administrators reasoned thus:

Program

an education effort utilizing a

dramatic research. program would through promotion cause the Nebraska
taxpayer to support the program, thus causing him to continue to fund
the very device which was used to acquire his support.
"research program" had three goals:

Therefore the

to educate for utilization and

utilization research, to lobby the Federal Government, and to keep
itself going.
There were indications in 1959 of how much the new Brooks
Administration appreCiated the role of education even as Brooks,
himself an educator from McCook, Nebraska, took office.

His office

immediately initiated an educational program for agriculture,
calling a Midwest meeting of the University of Nebraska, the
Nebraska Department of Agriculture, farm organizations, and other
groups from within and without the State.

The purpose was to plan

the engagement of the public in a discussion which would raise agriculture's tarnished image.

That image included loss of status as an

industry, price supports as a tax burden, and agricultural groups
whose attempts to raise market prices produced a rise in consumer
prices.

l

It took approximately one and a half years to get the

effort organized and launched, but the formal announcement finally
came that the program was in existence and operating.

At that time

a committee was formed and charged by Brook's successor, Frank B.
Morrison, to draw the public into an educational effort in the
previously mentioned areas.

2

This Brooks-initiated program was to

be completely overshadowed by the educational work of the Nebraska

153
Program.

By its very nature and goals the Nebraska Program encom-

passed the concerns of the governor's committee.

The Program's

efforts, which began almost immediately upon passage of LB-722 in
1959, had gained such a head start and so much emphasis and attention
that the governor's connnittee was ec!ipsed.
As a first step in the Program's educational effort, the
Nebraska Attorney General was asked for an opinion on the use of
Department of Agriculture funds for public education on utilization
research in agriculture.

This official ruled that department funds

contained in its Resources and Wheat Commission Divisions had been in
the past and could in this instance be used for such education.

It

was assumed that most Nebraskans would be interested in the plight of
agriculture and therefore drawn to the Program.

As taxpaying students

they would also be paying their way.
The _.next move Was to begin gathering personnel to handle the
educational effort.

Program administrators realized that they must

have on hand written material to work with, material the public could
read and digest.

Every educational effort needs its textbooks.

A

journalist hired as "publications director" was given the mandate to
expand the supply of printed documents.
eventual use of all media.

From this base came the

The first job of the publications

director was to promote the Program, to get its name before the
public.

Like a politician, this educational effort with a political

goal had first to sell itself in order to draw people to it and its
cause.

Once a dialogue was established, education could proceed

with interested participants.

The first educational documents
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produced of which there is any record were of a promotional type quite
simple in design and message.

They were attractive and designed to

announce the State of Nebraska's initiation of a program of utilization research which was said to offer an answer to the problem of
market-depressing surpluses.
A Nebraska Department of Agriculture assistant director was
named, moved up from heading a department division, and given the duty
of not only overseeing day-to-day operations of the Department but of
directing the Program's newly formed education unit.

It was signif-

icant that this particular man, besides being loyal to the party in
office, .was a former educator who was currently working on a
doctorate in educational administration at the University of Nebraska.
This appointment meant that the educative business of the research
program was to be given serious attention at a high level in the
Department •.. The business of directing the research projects would
fall mainly to another individual, a "research coord ina tor," and to
the department director.
A full staff under the assistant director, to complement the
,already acquired publications specialist, began to form with the
addition of two former university agricultural economics instructors,
a former science instructor, and graduate students from the University
of Nebraska's Education, Political Science, and Agriculture
Departments.

In addition, a former 'agriculture instructor who was

also working on a doctorate in Adult Agricultural Education
Administration was named Secretary of the Nebraska Wheat Commission of
the Department of Agriculture, moving from a position with the
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University of Nebraska Center for Continuing Education.
Initial deliberations by this education unit centered around
the best methods to educate the public.
realized.

Certain things were

First, the research projects were to be used to dramatize

utilization research.

Second, the

m~dia

would serve as the chief

educative device whereby teaching and learning would be pursued;
later, in-person group instruction would be added.

Third, the

educational effort would gradually be expanded to reach all
Nebraskans, to interest the public outside Nebraska in other states,
and finally to engage certain agencies of the Federal Government.
The planners also added private agency personnel to their numbers.
The Lincoln, Nellraska firm of The Carroll Company was selected in
1961 to assist because of its years of experience in handling the
educational work of the Nebraska Wheat Commission.

However it was

not without difficulty that the firm was oriented in a primarily
educational, in contrast to a purely promotional, direction.

The

Program's early need for promotion created a mind-set that gained a
momentum of its own.

Certainly publicity had to be given the Program,

but the educational goal was to remain uppermost.

This effort

became even more complicated when the final political goal of
influencing the Federal Government through education of the public
became enmeshed in Nebraska politics and accompanying party struggles.
The Carroll Company began by initiating radio shows and
building traveling displays.

The radio shows were centered around

the definition and value of utilization research.

Experts were inter-

Viewed, various subjects explored in-depth, people visited with, and
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information disbursed in great quantity.

The public was invited to

participate by sending in written questions which would be answered
by the education unit through correspondence if not on a radio show.
This format was followed until the research projects began to
produce exploitable material.

The focus then shifted from people

to projects and their products.
The traveling displays were designed by the education unit
with various suggestions by Carroll Company personnel in regard to
their actual construction.
time very much in vogue.

Use of machines in education was at the'
The use of electricity, light and sound,

was gaining adherents among entertainers and among those who would
make education

~ttractive

(and possibly even entertaining), as the

education of an adult clientele must be.

Therefore the first

displays were teaching machines, large, cumbersome affairs, full of
lights and.wires, which displayed questions on utilization research
and required the adult to manipulate buttons to gain an answer.

The

panels were purposely built at a high physical level to thwart a
child's playfulness, but the urge to stop and "play" with these
machines was too great for most passing adults.

The displays drew

those curious about the machines as well as the Program.
tional cause was served.

The educa-

Attendants were later stationed by these

displays to pursue that cause even further by engaging the participants in informal conversation about utilization research and the
Nebraska Program.

Attempts would later be made to conduct formal

Program effectiveness surveys in this manner.

The displays, which

would in time become less kinetic and less cumbersome, were especially
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useful in the education of Nebraskans at state and county fairs in
Nebraska,- since a large number of Nebraskans attended those
occasions.

The displays were by no means limited to fairs, showing

up at most any function that had people and floor space.

University

students hired part-time were dispatched throughout the state with
department trucks full of such exhibits; on-special occasions,
higher-level department personnel put in an appearance.
was also true:

The reverse

no department official appeared anywhere without a

display and printed material.

Eventually the more elaborate machines

were to be utilized nation-wide as the Nebraska Program expanded its
constit-uency as planned.
A second.company was hired in 1962 to submit and pursue ideas
on how to educate through use of the media.

Rall and Raglin,

Incorporated of Lincoln, Nebraska consisted of Frank Ral1, a
scholarly individual who often lectured on journalism at the
University of Nebraska, and Jim Raglin, a dynamic, outgoing personality.

Both were former newspaper reporters (and editors) who had

been assigned to the State Capitol Building.

They therefore had

good experience in the writing of news releases and news stories,
and in knowing the right people for getting the fullest exposure for
the Program.

As in the case of the Carrol Company, Rall and

Raglin's main efforts were to be directed toward drawing attention to
the Program, using news stories, articles, and printed material to
engage the public in a full-fledged discussion of utilization
research.

The underlying purpose was to motivate members of the

public to inform themselves about utilization versus production
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research, and to form them into a pressure group so convinced of
utilization research's value that the federal government would be
influenced by their powerful lobby.
A first move by RaIl and Raglin was to send out to all newspaper publishers and editors a memo pad made from newly-developed corn
starch paper with a short message about the Program printed on the
bottom of each page.

(By this time the research projects were

beginning to show results.)

The result was almost total saturation

mention of the Program in the state's press--both in columns and
editorials--in December 1962.

The in-depth analysis included in this

attention was considered educationally invaluable.

The state press

continued to cooperate as the results and promise of the research
projects began to provide copy.

Almost any statement composed and

distributed by Program officials found space in numerous newspapers
throughout the state.

The education unit and its allies became

increasingly busy composing speeches, news copy, articles, printed
documents, scripts, and research abstracts.

It was not until 10

years later, 1972, that society would realize the opportunities latent
-in the use of newspapers to give formal instruction.

The National

Endowment for the Humanities in cooperation with the Extension
Service of the University of California, San Diego, began to offer
.

co 11 ege courses by newspaper at t h at t1me.

3

Department planning provided for a consistent and everincreasing supply of information to be utilized by the daily press.
Weekly or monthly magazines and newspaper supplements provided a
format for in-depth presentations.

These in-depth articles and the

"".
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loose-leaf material the Department printed provided education unit
personnel with their first "textbook" materials:

now they could

begin to deal witb formally organized groups in the state.

Nebraska

Program instruction at first assumed the character of a speaker's
bureau, consisting of six of the seven personnel assigned in the
Department's utilization research area and two of the people working
with the New Crops section.

A direct follow-on from this effort was

the production of taped instruction packages and slide shows.
Professionals from radio and television were brought in to lend
their expertise and trained voices.

Of course, the radio and

television programs were also available on tape and film for playback
to groups.

In the course of this work the education unit became

experienced enough to produce its own series of radio shows through
the Ash Williams Recording Studios of Lincoln, Nebraska utilizing
only the unit's own personnel.
for over three years.

This type of instruction continued

Complementing the previously mentioned

material were the research abstracts produced in abundance by
cooperating laboratories or test farms.

In essence they represented

a constant up-dating of all the "textbook" material.

Finally, the

Department expanded its Biennial Report, a publication required by
the State as a state-of-the-department message to the governor,
legislature, and people of Nebraska, to include a large section on
utilization research, the Nebraska Program, and the research
abstracts.

One could almost label these reports the textbooks of

final authority.
The farm groups were the organizations which contained the

".,'1
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most interested and participating individuals in the education effort,
as might have been expected.

Department personnel spent a great deal

of time out in the state with these groups, until group leaders were
either well enough informed in-the-field to take over or until they
could be brought in and instructed in the department's offices in
Lincoln.

During the early 1960's the Grange's president spent a

period of time working in the department's offices learning about
utilization.

The Farm Bureau, the Grange, and the Farmers Union were

most cooperative, with the National Farmers Organization less readily
accessible.
students:

Other groups with an educational bent were willing
The Future Farmers of America (FFA), Future Homemakers of

America (FHA),

4~H

clubs, and similar groups of many names.

It was

felt that the youth were open to change and a new emphasis in agriculture because their economic future depended upon adaptation and the
sensing of trends or the need to change.

The main thrust of the

Program's message was always the imbalance between production research,
which was generously funded and produced ever larger crops, and utilization research, which was not funded at the level necessary to
-supply new uses for those crops.

Of great advantage in conducting an

educational program among these groups was their practice of holding
regularly scheduled meetings.

The atmosphere was not always one of

open acceptance of ideas when working with production versus utilization, given the long traditions of agriculture, but the instruction
and discussions usually met with interested listeners and participants--something all educators sincerely appreciate but do not always
find at levels of learning other than adult education.

According to
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Nebraska Program group leaders, to work with these groups was to feel
that one was indeed assisting the process of "learning."

To observe

the actual changing of attitude or behavior was exhilarating.
Groups which either contacted the Department or were contacted
by the Department were fed a steady stream of speakers, printed
matter, instructional lectures, and audio-visual materials.

These

groups included community development leaders of Nebraska towns and
cities, high school classes and assemblies (especially FFA and FHA
classes), college classes and groups (especially in agriculture
colleges), discussion groups such as library, church, and adult
education classes; radio and television shows with group discussion
formats, educational television, political education groups such as
the League of Women- Voters, political party meetings, conventions,
and service group meetings such as the Elks, Eagles, Lions, Masons,
Rotary, Chamber of Commerce, and union and business groups.

The

education of these last opinion leaders, which usually included the
community development personnel, business leaders, school and church
personnel, and governmental officials of a city or county, was
. considered of utmost importance.

More than one conflict in

scheduling was resolved in their favor.

The use of department-

sponsored field trips to the participating laboratories and to the
New Crops test plots was a useful device in attracting and holding the
participation of these leaders.

The Department's education unit and

the personnel assigned to a particular research project usually
conducted the laboratory trips, while the two New Crops men assigned
from the Department's Weed and Seed Division assisted the education
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unit with what could truly be called "field" trips to planted
acreages and test plots.

These last two men, both gentlemen

farmers, had previous experience with experimental farm crops
through their state government seed work and, most importantly, had
experience in education through one of their number being a former
college agriculture instructor.

Both had conducted a state

government educational program in weed eradication, including the
building of displays, the composing of printed material, media
exposure, and the handling of test plot field trips--surely the right
men for the new job in the Nebraska Program.

These men were

responsible for taking the New Crops effort to the public, and the
public demonstrated its interest by turning out 500-strong in 1960 to
see one of the first large castor bean harvests in Nebraska (see
Chapter 3, Footnotes 46 and 77).
The passing of time brought the expected exploitable results
from the research projects, plus a gradual increase in the acres of
new crops planted.

The project results were used, as had been

...

planned, to dramatize the utilization

research.~rogram

and what

could be done if efforts were increased in this area--especially on
the federal level.

The results so used are examined in the

discussion of the research projects in Chapter 3 of this study.
Suffice it to say here that the products made from surplus agricultural raw materials found wide use as teaching examples:

foams,

paper, milk bars, Nebraskits, growth stimulants, insulation, fuel
additives, adhesives, foods, packagings, and paint.

Pilot plants to

be used for the purpose of producing some of these program-developed
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products were established in several Nebraska towns.
two goa,ls:

The plants had

to produce example products to draw the people to the

Program in order to be educated, and to demonstrate feasibility to
industry in hopes of attracting it to the state to put the new
products into production.
While group and opinion leaders were being trained and high
school and college instructors were being asked to move utilization
and utilization research study to a primary place in their curriculums in the state, the media were kept busy with their important
contribution.

This effort Was of a continually expanding nature,

some of' it through trial and error, but mostly planned by the
educational unit of the Nebraska Program using its knowledge of
educational methods.

As the Program began to operate smoothly in

the state, the decision was made to execute the next step, taking
the Program to the nation's public.
The pattern followed the methods tested and proved in the

,

State of Nebraska.
,pUblic's interest.

It was first necessary to catch the national
The greatest concentration of effort had to be in

the states with a primary interest in- agriculture.

The most fertile

ground was thought to be the southern states, with which Nebraska
often found itself allied in Congress because of common agricultural
interests and conservative philosophy.

These cotton- and tobacco-

growing states were ripe for the Nebraska

~ffort,

as evidenced by the

following press report appearing in 1961:
There is a need for two things in the cotton industry. There
is a need for a positive educational program to win back the
public image of cotton as a vital industry producing vital
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materials; to dispel the negative image of cotton as a pricesupport tax burden. Further, there is a need for cotton to
go deeply into research to win back markets from synthetics.
The cotton industry has just now begun an information
retrieval project based on the successful tobacco industry
effort. Cotton is an old industry with a built-in love for
the status quo. Its biggest hurdle is to overcome entrenched
traditions. If the cotton industry ever goes out of business
it will be because of dogged clinging to the past. 4
The warning evidently carne too late, for on July 1, 1964 the
historic New Orleans Cotton Exchange closed after ninety-three years
of business.

Advertisements were placed in the nation's newspapers

which pointed out precisely what Nebraska was saying in its educational effort:

the

agri~ulture

industry as a whole had failed to

take heed of the situation which the cotton growers had experienced,
and past,federal actions had proved ineffective or unfair.

The

Exchange's swan song read thusly:
We cede our role in the market place to the United States
Secretary of Agriculture. Under federal government substitutions' for the free enterprise system, cotton is the first
to fall. Will the cotton industry be fo'llowed by all the
rest? [We blam§7 the closing on a new government cotton plan
under which the government would pay 6.5 cents per pound
subsidy on domestically consumed cotton. The taxpayers will
not stand still for these subsidies forever. s
The conclusion could be drawn that cotton as a part of the agriculture industry had indeed been tardy in entering the education,
utilization, and utilization research fields.

In spite of that

negligence, Nebraska's Program was saying, it had a chance to regain
its stature through these mediums.
The Nebraska Program was, in contrast to such status quo
factions of the agriculture industry, aggressive in its education
efforts.

Utilizing modern mass media, it adopted the methods of
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industry and manufacturers in its "southern campaign."

The states

of North and South Carolina, because of their emphasis on cotton and
tobacco, were the prime education targets in the South.
As to the rest of the nation, a media program was designed and
pursued in an ever-widening circle out from the State of Nebraska.
Articles frequently appeared in newspapers in Wisconsin, Colorado,
Kansas, Iowa, the Dakotas, Missouri, Texas, and Florida.

The best

coverage on the national level was considered to be articles placed
in the Wall Street Journal (see March 25 and November 5, 1965, for
examples) and one by Bob Considine, a nationally syndicated
columni"st (example in the Boston Record-American, March 18, 1962).
Coverage of the.Nebraska Program was also given on a HuntlyBrinkley NBC-TV News Special.

The educational unit immediately

tried to get a full specia1 done on the Nebraska Program over network television.by these same individuals.

Despite requests by high

Nebraska officials and some indication that the effort might be
successful, the NBC program as it was finally produced dealt with the
plight of agriculture and its surpluses in general, mostly outlining
the problems, not solutions.
The spreading knowledge of the Program enticed the Association of State Departments· of Agriculture to hold its convention in
Nebraska in 1962.

After absorbing some of the Nebraska Center for

Continuing Education's (Kellogg Center) ideas and methods, education
unit personnel worked to the point of exhaustion arranging formal
seminars, informal discussion groups, field trips, and displays.
Here was adult education operating at its finest, with a group of
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interested, live-in students located in the best of facilities with
a program designed for them.

It was realized that a state's news

people followed the movements and doings of their state officials;
therefore the media effort alone, especially in the area of printed
matter, was massive.

Neither the officials nor the media returned

home with their heads and hands empty.
As a follow-up, education unit individuals visited certain
colleges and capitols of the states in attendance, concentrating on
the colleges of agriculture, and discussed with them utilization
versus production philosophy, the idea of increased utilization
research, new crops, and the Nebraska Program.

It was at approx-

imate1y this same time that Nebraska's Department of Agriculture,
after viewing the successful tobacco and cotton information
retrieval programs, initiated its own information retrieval endeavor
as part of_its education effort.

One outcome of this retrieval

program was a realization that some education and lobbying had to be
directed toward certain of the large United States corporations, for
it was found that since the companies were entering the agriculture
area by buying up farm land, their .laboratories were beginning to
devote increasing attention to finding better ways of producing agricultural crops.

These corpora~ions were found to be increasing their

agricultural raw material-producing landholdings until states such as
California had 45 corporations owning some 3,700,000 acres, making
California the leading farm state by the end of the 1960's.6
increased production emphasis was, of course, anathema to the
Nebraska Program.

The
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A more welcome increase came in the area of national attention
for the Program.
middle 1960's.

The effort proceeded well during the early and
The attention of state governments, private labora-

tories, the USDA, Congress, the White House, the national news media,
and a wide public was drawn to the Nebraska endeavor.
Nebraska Program had not yet ended its expansion.

But the

It initiated

movement into the -international arena in order to use resulting
publicity for educative/lobbying purposes.

The projects involved in

these international affairs of state are discussed in another part of
this paper (see Chapter 3).

Only mention of their educational aspects

is made' here.
Naturally when a state of the Union dealt directly with other
nations the Federal Government
dealing,

~nowing

stimulated.'

too~

notice.

And Nebraska began so

that the federal government's interest would be

The NEBRASKIT and the milk bar were relied upon to give

dramatic emphasis to the Program through international attention, and
the Food-For-Peace Program was found to be the most natural outlet
for these food products.

The Nebraska Program had utilized a

national stage when the Federal Government was convinced to buy tons
of NEBRASKITs for civil defense shelters.

Now the NEBRASKIT was

gaining an international stage. - Nebraska was convinced that the
nation and its Federal Government would soon see the immense value of
increased utilization research.
Accompanying the international movement of food ,products were
the inquiries received from foreign nations such as Sweden and Japan
concerning the patenting of Program-discovered processes.

Clearly,

"
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had the Program been an effort adequately funded for utilization
research rather than one utilized for education and lobbying
purposes, it could have been impressive indeed, by several indications including this one.
~

Yet, perhaps all efforts, education,

research, and lobbying, would have failed in the end no matter what
the emphasis and funding, in the face of political manipulation--and
in the face of increasing confusion over the Program's goals (was it
a research and development program or an education and lobbying
effort?).

These problems are examined in the final chapter of this

study.
>The education unit took advantage of the increased attention
given to the Program by initiating continuous correspondence with
individuals.

Aware of the success of the United States Government,

private industry, and military suggestion programs, the education
unit (using Director Finigan as its voice) asked individuals to
correspond with the Department and write in their ideas for research
projects.

7

Out of this grew a type of educational correspondence

bordering on a correspondence course for the individuals involved,»
for a constantly increasing amount of upgraded material was sent to
them for study.

This educative aspect of the Program developed to an

extent whereby it required a good deal of Program personnel time, and
several secretaries were assigned to assist with the immense amount
of paperwork.

On a purely state level the effort was valuable for

its contribution to state government-private citizen relations,
especially in giving the taxpayer-supporter of the Program a sense of
partiCipation and authority.

Herein lay a recognizable adult
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education method aptly described by Malcolm Knowles:

"The adult

education processes were most effective in mobilizing public support

•

when used directly. for this purpose."

8

In addition, Program personnel talked at length with citizens

t"

in the state and nation as well as keeping in contact with federal
officials.

What could be called formal interviewing was carried out

most commonly by personnel stationed with traveling displays.
Education unit personnel assigned to these exhibits eventually devised
a short checklist which they used to prompt questions and record

4
.1

,",)

anSWers.

Of course, statistical information could be checked each

year to' discern how much more acreage of new. crops had been planted,
how much more

u~ilization

research the federal government's USDA was

doing in its laboratories, how much more correspondence was coming

'!

in, how much more media coverage had been attained, or how much more
educational material was being prepared and used.

Nebraska Department

of Agriculture staff meetings of Program personnel usually ended with
education unit members and department director Finigan attempting
some evaluative steps by discussion and by use of such material and
statistics.

These education personnel were Finigan's top staff

members, as they in fact should have been in view of the utilization
research program's true educative goals •. These should also have been
the evaluative personnel.

It is easy, however, for personnel to get

so involved in a program that they do not fully and objectively
examine it.

Operations assume a life of their own, and activity

confers a seeming value upon the individual worker and his efforts.
The Nebraska Program was no different.

Its history of accomplishment

Ii
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as orchestrated by administrators and the education unit, and
documented by the media, seemed commendable.

Even the eventual

realization by the public that the Program was not in itself a true
research effort that would solve agriculture's problems did not
lessen the worthwhileness of the effort in relation to its methods
and goals--though this realization was in part responsible for the
reduction. and modification of the Program in 1967.
Were the Program's true goals accomplished?
attitudes and behavior been affected?
industry on their way to being solved?
effective?

Had the pUblic's

Were the problems of an
Had the education effort been

The next section of this study looks· at these questions.

The methods, the progress, the triumphs and failures have been
evaluated by this researcher, in the expectation that the experience
of the Nebraska Program can serve as a model for similar efforts by
similar agencies which find the courage to pursue this kind of
education program.
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CHAPTER 5
EVALUATION:

ADJUSTING THE PROGRAM MODEL

The Program's personnel did not do a very systematic job of
evaluating their work.

Some evaluation was done, but Program

personnel did not concern themselves at all with the answers to
questions which were uppermost in this researcher's mind.
such as:

Questions

Were citizens mistrustful of an education program admin-

istered by a political agency?

From what sources did Nebraskans get

information about the Program?

What organizations did people trust as

sources of information?

Consequently, this researcher found it

necessary to conduct a survey of Nebraska citizens and their legislative representatives.

The results of this survey (See Appendix B),

along with the investigation of the conduct of the Program in
Chapter 3, provided the basis for the conclusions presented in this
chapter, and made it possible to identify the points at which the
program planning model should be adjusted.
Two separate questionnaires were composed:
lators and one for citizens (see Appendix B).

one for legis-

The legislator

questionnaire was sent to every senat.or who had served in the
Nebraska State Legislature during the years 1959-1967.

The citizen

questionnaire waS sent to a randomly-selected group of Nebraska
citizens in cities, towns and rural areas selected via area-

probability sampling.

The areas represented in the survey were an

eastern Nebraska small town and .surrounding rural area (Geneva), a
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western Nebraska small town and surrounding rural area (Bridgeport),
a medium-size city (Grand Island), and a metropolitan area (Omaha).
Results of the Citizen Survey
Agencies or officials wishing to initiate similar education
programs may be heartened to discover that responses to the citizen
survey indicated that the public can be receptive to education
programs originating with po1itica1--in tbis case state governmental-agencies.

Contrary to this researcher's expectations, most people

surveyed felt that the information they had received in connection
with the Program had been of an educational nature, that its
purpose had been educational rather than political.

Few seemed to

have felt that the Program had been exploited for personal or party
political gain.

Despite this public confidence in the apolitical

nature of the Program, this researcher felt that political exploitation (along with secretive administration-and confusion over
goals) hurt the Program when it came up for renewal before the Legislature in 1967, resulting in considerably reduced stope and funding.
It should be noted here that 16'7. of the legislators and 18'7. of the

citizens responding to the questionnaire did feel that the Program
had been exploited for political purposes.

A number of citizens

indicated that they had felt the Program had been both educational
and political, and 37% said they had voted for candidates who
supported the Program.
It was pointed out in Chapter 3 that despite the earnest
desire of most people connected with the Program to "keep the
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Program out of politics," it was almost impossible for the Program to
avoid politics:

to begin with, one of the goals of the Program was

political--Le. pressure on public representatives at the state and
national levels to support utilization research.

Further, the

Program was initiated and administered by a government agency.

The

fact that the Program operated in a political context made it
dependent on the good graces of politicians for its very existence.
It also made the Program susceptible to political exploitation by the

existing state administration and the object of criticism by
opponents of that administration.

At the heart of the Program,

of course, was its massive education effort designed to change the
attitudes of a production-oriented citizenry--an effort with an
economic rather than a political motive.
A number of questions on the survey were designed to ascertain
how many people had received information about the Program, where
they got it, and how they regarded various sources of information.
(See Table 1.)

A whopping two-thirds of those to whom the Program

was directed had heard of it.

And of those who had heard of the

_Program, 75% said they had supported it (the other 25% were undecided).
There was no significant difference in degree of support for the
Program between rural and urban xespondents.

It is interesting to note

that virtually all of the urban respondents indicated that they felt
their work, if not directly related-to agriculture, was related to the
fortunes of agriculture:

in light of this feeling, urban support for

the Program is not surprising.

Of course, urban support for the

Program may also have had something to do with the fact that new uses
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TABLE 1

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Respondents to the citizen questionnaire were asked to identify the
sources from which they received information about the Nebraska Program. The table below lists the various media utilized by the Program
in its education effort and the percent of respondents who learned
about the Program through each. Sources are listed in order of
effectiveness.
INFORMATION SOURCE

... "

% OF RESPONDENTS REACHED

Newspapers

76%

.. ··Television

40%

: Magazines

32%

Word of Mouth

26%

Radio

26%

Farm Organization

24%

County or State Fair Display

20%

Speaker

00%

Printed Pamphlet

00%

Department of Agriculture Personnel

00%

. Respondents were also asked to rate the trustworthiness of various
sources of information. The table below lists the various agencies
and media which generated information about the Program and the percent of respondents who felt each to be trustworthy. Sources are
listed in order of trustworthin",.ss.
INFORMATION SOURCE

% WHO FELT SOURCE TRUSTWORTHY

Nebraska Department of Agriculture

64%

Media

56%

Nebraska Department of Economic
Development

40%

Nebraska Governor's Office

32%
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for agricultural products might result in new jobs in new industries
(although one 26-year old respondent said he didn't regard new
industry as desirable per se).
Of those who said they had actively supported the Program,
just under half said their chief means of active support had been
vocal--talking about the Program with friends and neighbors.
Consequently, it was not surprising to find that approximately 25% of
the people who had heard about the Program had gained at least part
of their information by word-of-mouth.

In terms of number of people

reached, newspapers ranked first (75% of respondents had gained at
least part of their information from newspapers), television second
(42%), magazines third (32%), and radio, word-of-mouth, farm organizations, and fair displays fourth (20-25% apiece).

It was inter-

esting to note that a significantly larger number of rural than of
urban respondents cited magazines, fair displays and farm organizations as sources of information.

This finding should be of

interest to educators attempting to reach adults in rural areas.
Newspapers, radio, television, and word-of-mouth were equally
important sources of information for both urban and rural respondents.
The Program's educational effort relied heavily upon press
coverage to disseminate information, so <it was not surprising to find
that newspapers were the largest single source of information about
the Program cited.

Responses to a question which asked citizens to

rate sources of information for trustworthiness rated the press
considerably higher than either the Governor's Office Or the
Department of Economic Development (the present Program custodian).
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It should be noted that the Nebraska Department of Agriculture also

rated comparatively high in trustworthiness ("comparatively" because
even the press received only a 56% vote of confidence!).

A related

question asked whether citizens would place more confidence in information released by private research laboratories or by university
college of agriculture laboratories.

Responses gave an edge of 10'7.

to university laboratories, not a very considerable margin, but
nonetheless a significant one>,

This result tends to confirm the

judgment>of those legislators and Program personnel who had argued
for a larger role for university laboratories.
>All of the sources of information discussed so far--newspapers, radio, television, etcetera--have involved individual
learning.

Responses to the questionnaire revealed that group

learning also played an important role:

60% of those surveyed had

participated in some sort of group discussion of the Program.

In

addition, 45% of those responding said they would consider joining
a discussion or study group on the topic of utilization research if
such were to be offered in the near future.

And although 20% said

they would not be interested in joining such a group, 35% were
undecided, all-in-all an indication of considerable receptivity to
the idea of group learning.

O£ those who had participated in group

discussions, 25% had attended a farm group, another 25% a school or
church group, and the remainder had participated in informal groups
of various kinds.

Although group participation was not significantly

greater in the rural areas than in the cities, it was the rural
respondents who had participated in farm groups and the urban ones
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who had participated in school or church groups.

The 25% partic-

ipation in farm group discussions seemed to justify the time, effort
and expense which the Program expended in getting educational information out to these groups.

However, responses to the questionnaire

revealed that other kinds of groups (e.g. school and church) ought not
to be overlooked.
Because the Nebraska Program was designed as a model to
demonstrate what should and could be done in the field of utilization
research, the results of its various research projects were themselves employed as educational devices.

The results of the projects

which produced the Nebraskit, milk bar, paint from soybeans, paper
from cornstarch,.etcetera were widely publicized.

Samples were made

available to the public at state fairs and were distributed as widely
as resources made possible.

This being the case, this researcher was

interested to discover how well people remembered individual projects,
and how many had had an opportunity to test any of. the results.
The two best-remembered projects were the Nebraskit wheat
biscuit and the grain alcohol additives for auto fuel (recalled by
·68% and 64% respectively).

This result was not surprising to this

researcher, as the Nebraskit had been the most widely used of the
projects in the educative effort.

It was named after the state, was

widely covered in the media, and was served at countless dinners and
luncheons.

The fuel project, though less widely publicized, was the

one project continued by an independent committee of the Nebraska
Legislature and vigorously pursued after the original Program was
reduced in 1967 (at which time most of the surviving projects were
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given to the Nebraska Department of Economic Development).

Thus most

recall of this particular project was probably a result of recent
media coverage.
Three other projects--milk bars, paint from soybeans and paper
from corn starch--were recalled by about a third of the respondents:
only half as many as recalled the Nebraskit, but still a respectable
showing.

Again, this researcher was not surprised, as these projects

had lent themselves particularly well to educative situations.

The

milk bars, along with the Nebraskit, were touted as survival rations
and as nutritional supplements.

Highway paint test strips were put

down iIi numerous connnunities and identified via signs posted for
motorists.

Corn paper was made into desk pads, etcetera.

What did

surprise this researcher was the fact that, considering the wide
distribution of samples, so few respondents (only 17%) had actually
tested any of the research products.

There is scanty statistical

evidence that these teaching materials contributed as significantly
to the education effort as believed.

The fact that so many more

people recalled these projects than had actually tested them confirms
the superiority of the media for information dissemination.
not to say that the research products were not important:

This is
the

Nebraskit in particular was important as a symbol--as an example of
what could be done--but it was important irregardless of whether you
had actually tasted one!
One other project should be mentioned here:

growth stimulators

were recalled by a significant number of respondents despite the fact
that no particular effort had been made to publicize them (aside from

179
acknowledging their existence as a project).

The discovery of growth

stimulators as a new use for surplus agricultural raw materials was in
itself somewhat ironic, and one can only surmise that people
remembered them because they continued to be interested in increasing
production despite the best efforts of the Program to shift emphasis
to utilization.
Considering the reasonable success the Program had in reaching
a large constituency, it was interesting to find that 68% of the
respondents felt that they had not received enough information about
the Program.

rn addition, almost all the respondents indicated that

they would like to see more information about utilization research
prepared and made available to the public.

One suspects that this

would have been gratifying intelligence for Program officials, for it
signifies that the education effort had interested, motivated and
responsive learners.

rt appears that the public would have welcomed

an education effort even more ambitious than the one undertaken.
Although almost no one was opposed to the Program or its goals, a
significant percentage of respondents were undecided about its
-merits.

Given the respondents' stated desire for more information

about the Program, it seems likely that the 25% or so of respondents
who were undecided about the Program simply lacked sufficient information to respond affirmatively.
When asked to compare the 1959-67 Nebraska Program with its
modified successor, most respondents found the former effort to have
been satisfactory in both scope and funding.

They appeared dubious

that the reduced program was doing an adequate job of achieving
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Program goals.

However, when asked whether they agreed with a state

senator's opinion that the Legislature would grant the Program all
the money it asked for, only 18% of the respondents agreed that this
should be done.

It is this researcher's opinion that this response

reflects a commitment to the idea of fiscal restraint, rather than a
reluctance to fund the Program adequately (especially since most
respondents felt the original, better-funded program was preferable
to the present one).
I t is doubtful that reliable statistical information of this

sort regarding public attitudes toward spending for utilization
research was available to State Legislators when the Program came up
for renewal in 1967.

Program evaluation efforts conducted by Program

personnel were neither particularly extensive nor systematic.
Further, although some evaluation was conducted, there is little
evidence that the guiding officials utilized this feedback to good
effect to modify the existing program.
and failure of education programs.

This is a common criticism

Probably a system of evaluation

should have been devised by the Nebraska Department of Agriculture
when it first assumed administration of the Program.

But it is

possible that initiation of operations required all expended effort.
In any case, evaluation phased _into existence slowly and uncertainly
during the education unit's work.

This researcher's survey found

that none of the respondents had been involved in any attempt to
evaluate the Program prior to the present one.

181

Results of the Legislator Survey
The results of the legislator survey are most interesting at
those points where they provide a contrast with the results of the
citizen survey.

For example, responses to the legislator survey

suggest that attempts to get information to legislators should
utilize different avenues than those used to educate citizens.

Most

legislators (85%) got at least part of their information about the
Program directly from the Nebraska Department of Agriculture--from
personnel associated. with the Program's education unit or from
Program progress reports forwarded directly to individual legislators"

This provides a significant contrast with citizens, none of

whom cited the Department of Agriculture as a direct source of information.

Citizens seem to have received their information almost

entirely secondhand--e.g. through newspaper reports (75%),
vision (42%), magazines (32%) and radio (26%).

tele~

While legislators

also read about the Program in their newspapers (60'70 cited newspapers as the source of at least some of their information), only
10% of legislators cited the electronic media (radio and televisiop)
as a source of information (5% cited radio and 5% television).
The close physical proximity of the Legislature's chambers
and offices to the Department _.of Agriculture's offices probably
accounted for the success of direct department contact with the
senators.

It is harder to account for the fact that so few legis-

lators cited radio and television as sources .of information.

Either

the legislators didn't watch television, or other sources of information were so far superior that television was insignificant in
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comparison.

The one method of acquiring information which ranked in

the same order of importance for both legislators and citizens was
word-of-mouth (cited by 25% of both citizens and legislators, with
legislators naming lobbyists, personal staff,and other senators as
well as department personnel as sources of word-of-mouth information).
In general, the legislators seemed to be even better informed
about the Program than the citizens--in particular they had better
recall of individual projects (with one important exception) and fewer
were undecided on questions which asked for personal responses to the
Program.

This was at least partly a consequence of the fact that

legislators had to vote on the Program's renewal:

this made it

imperative that they inform themselves on its progress and accomplishments.
The combined influence of the education unit and the need-toknow requirement of individual legislators created a Legislature well
informed about the Program's various research projects:

90% of the

legislators recalled the fuels project, compared with 64% of the
ci tizens; and .407. recalled paper compared with 287. of the citizens ..

·Interestingly, the citizens recalled the paint project twice as well as
the legisla·tors:

only 157. of the legislators recalled this project

(compared with a 307. recall by citizens); making i t one of the
projects least well-remembered by legislators.

Citizens, on the other

hand, recalled only the Nebraskit and the fuel projects better.

The

reason lies in the efforts of the Program's education unit,which went
into a large number of communities and literally "painted the town" by
laying down numerous paint test strips on the main streets.

Close
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contact on the local level eVidently made this project stand out in
the minds of citizens, while legislators recalled it only dimly if at
all.
When asked to evaluate the success of the .Program's effort to
re-educate the state's production-oriented citizens, 80% of the legislators said they felt the Program had been successful:

as a result

of the Program, the state's citizens would be willing to support
increased utilization research.

This result correlates favorably

with the citizens' own evaluation and suggests that the legislators
knew their constituencies very well indeed:

79% of citizens agreed

that utilization research needed more emphasis.
Interestingly enough, while 80% of the legislators felt that
the Program had been responsible for increasing public support for
utilization research, only 33% felt it had been responsible for
increasing.support in the Legislature itself (33% disagreed and 33%
were undecided).

The senators may have felt that they did not need

the Program to convince them of the necessity of utilization research:
after all, they would hardly have initiated the Program if they had.
not been already convinced of the need for utilization research.
Not surprisingly, those who felt the Program had not increased legislative support for utilization

~esearch

included the 16% who

expressed the belief that the Program's educational effort was
essentially political, as well as the 20% who opposed emphasizing
utiliza tion research a t the expense of production research.
Some 30% of the legislators said that the information they had
received about the Program made their attitude toward the Program
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more negative.

Those who chose to comment on the source of their

negative attitude cited a feeling that the Program had promised more
than it had delivered.

One senator whose attitude had become more

negative during the course of the Program said he felt that the
Program had been a good investment, but he had come to feel that
utilization research could be better carried out on the national than
on the state level.

His feelings exactly parallel those of Program

administrators in the Nebraska Department of Agriculture, who came
very early on to see that the Program could hope at best to be no
more than a model program, an example for other states and the
Federal Government, and that no one state could support the level of
research necessary to get new projects into actual production.
The feeling of disappointment, of unfulfilled 'promise, on the
part of certain legislators points up an important failure of communication between Program administrators and the Legislature regarding
Program goals.

While legislators were remarkably well informed

about individual projects, many senators seemed to regard these
projects as ends in themselves.

When they voted for the Program,

most, senators had felt that they were making a direct investment in
the state's economic well being--that the Program would spawn new
products which would utilize the state's agricul tural surpluses.

If

this expectation of direct economic dividends from their investment
was unrealistic, no one in the Legislature seemed aware of the fact
at the time; what is surprising'is the fact that Program administrators did not disabuse the senators of their expectations after
it became clear that the Program's goals would have to be more modest.
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Confusion over the Program's goals (should the Program be seen
as an "example" program, or should it press on for marketable
products?) may have contributed to its 1967 reduction in scope and
funding.

In any event, legislators were divided on the survey

question which asked them to judge whether the reduced Program was
doing an adequate job of meeting Program goals.

The survey found

that 50% of the legislators approved of the reduced Program and 30%
favored the old one, with 20% undecided.

If, as Director Finigan had

asserted, the Program had served its purpose out by 1967, the
question of which program was better is academic.

(The Department of

Agricul'ture had not recommended renewal in 1967, arguing that the
Program should be seen as an "example" and that its work had been
done.)

There is however considerable evidence that to this day many

senators see the Program's essential focus as research and development.

For example, of those who favored the better-funded 1959-67

Program, half said they would have favored giving it even more money
than it had been allotted--as though more money would have enabled it
to be a "real" research and development program rather than a mere,
example.

Also, half of those who preferred the present reduced

Program favored reactivating some of the projects initiated by the
1959-67 Program.

The citizens··gave an even stronger vote of

confidence to the old Program, 40-50% favoring the old Program and
only 5-10% favoring the new one.

One can only conclude that most

Nebraskans felt that paint from soybeans might be on the market today
but for the 1967 cutback in Program funds.
This is the point at which to retaIl that nearly everyone
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queried felt the Program had been educational--i.e. the information
they had received about the Program had been informative, reasonably
objective, and seemed to be in the public's best interest.

This is a

particularly important verdict, considering that the Program had
been administered by a government agency.

On the other hand, just

because the respondents felt the information they had received was
educational does not mean that they understood the·Program's goals
to be "merely" educational, or that they did not expect marketable
results from the Program.

The evidence, as noted above, is quite

otherwise.
·If the Nebraska public did not get what it expected from the
Program, what did it get?

Clearly, it got itself educated about

utilization research, but did it get anything more?

More had been

promised, even in the fairly modest objectives of Department of
Agriculture. administrators.

It had been hoped that if the Program

could not produce marketable results on its own, it would at least
attract the attention of other states and the Federal Government, so
that acting in concert expanded utilization research programs migh~
be undertaken.

What evidence is there that this in fact happened?

When Nebraska legislators were queried about the influence the Program
might have had on Congress,
influence.

57~

felt the Program had had a positive

Another 247. disagreed, and 19% were undecided.

Queried

about the Program's influence on the USDA, 38% felt the Program had
had a positive influence.
undecided.

Nineteen percent disagreed, and 38% were

The large number who were undecided points up again the

lack of systematic evaluation of the Program.

It also suggests that
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many senators had never considered the Program's influence on Congress
and the U.SDA to be an important goal, and so were unprepared to make
a judgment on thatpoint.
How Effective Was The Example?
There remains the question of how effective the Program was in
reaching the public beyond Nebraska's borders.

In particular, what

influence, if any, did the Program have on spending for utilization
research by other agricultural states and by the Federal Government?
As we have already noted, there is no record of any attempt by
Program personnel to answer these questions.

This would seem a

rather serious omission for an "example" program whose ultimate goal
was to convince Congress, the USDA and other agricultural states of
the need for increased utilization research.

On the other hand, this

investigator discovered that the statistics necessary to make such an
evaluation are all but impossible to come by.

The researcher wrote to

seven agricultural states requesting a comparison of expenditures for
utilization and production research during the life of the Program.
Without exception, he was informed that available records did not
distinguish between these two categories of research, and that the time
and expense required to compile such figures would be prohibitive.

It

is possible that such statistics would have been easier to acquire had
they been requested each year as budgets· for agricultural research
became available.

At any rate, they are not available now.

It was

called to the investigator's attention that the best source of information about agricultural economics is the Current Research Infor-

'.'"f
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mation System (eRIS) which inventories agricultural research at the
state agricultural experiment stations and the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA).

However, this system waS not set

up until 1966, and consequently would not provide statistics for the
years when the Program's influence would have been felt most strongly.
Efforts to evaluate the Program's influence on the USDA met
with somewhat better success, partly because it was possible to
obtain the necessary statistics from the USDA Agricultural Research
Service.

It should be recalled that only 38% of Nebraska legis-

lators responding to this investigator's survey had felt that the
Program had had a positive influence on the USDA.

There is,

of course, no way of telling from statistics alone whether increased
spending for utilization research was the result of the influence of
the Nebraska Program.

However, an analysis of USDA spending for

utilization research from 1959-1967 reveals that the greatest increase
in spending occurred during the first half of the decade.

It is

interesting to note that these were the years when the Nebraska
Program waS expanding its activities and making its most successfuL
bid for public attention.

Of course, spending for other kinds of

agricultural research (including production research) waS also on the
rise during these years.

In

f~ct,

there was only one year during

which the spending for utilization research increased at a significantly greater rate than spending for other kinds of agricultural
research.
In 1963 spending for utilization research increased by 21%-the biggest jump of the decade--while spending for other kinds of

189
agricultural research increased by only 4%.

This significant

increase in spending may reflect the lobbying efforts of the
Nebraska Program and the National Utilization Research Association
(which had held its 1962 meeting in Lincoln, Nebraska).

This was

also the year that the Kansas City National Chemistry Conference had
heard 24 papers on agricultural utilization research, and Nebraska
Program Director P. F. Finigan had participated in the conference's
main symposium.

Last but not least, 1962 was the year that the

Federal Government purchased 66 million pounds of Nebraskits for use
as survival rations.

It is not impossible that the USDA's 1963

budget-for utilization research, drawn up during 1962, was
influenced by these events.

The relevant statistics were provided

this researcher by the USDA and appear in Table lIon page 190.
The Program's most-clearly-demonstrable success remains the
success it had with Nebraskans, educating them about utilization
research and reordering the agricultural research priorities of the
University's College of Agriculture.

Statistics provided this

investigator by the College of Agriculture reveal that from 1959-1970
spending for utilization research increased by 305% while spending
for production research increased by only 126%,
relative gain however; in

te)Cm~

This is only a

of dollars spent, production research

still outstrips utilization research.

(See Table III, page 190.)
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TABLE II
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Agricultural and Utilization Research Obligations, 1959-1967
(In Thousands of Dollars)

Fiscal Years

Other
Agricul tural
Research

1959

$109,057

1960

115,207

057.

19,198

007.

1961

137,597

167.

22,105

147.

1962

137,554

007.

22,870

03%

1963

143,958

047.

18,897

217.

1964

177,703

187.

30,154

On.

1965

200,864

127.

35,683

147.

1966

224,000

107.

35,655

007.

1967

230,733

037,

37,693

057.

% of Increase

Total
Utilization
Research

% of Increase

$19,900

TABLE III
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE
Funding for Agricultural Research
Production
Research

Year
1959
1970

$

7. of Increase

601,770
1,364,987

Utilization
Research

7. of Increase

$104,995
126%

. 425,699

3057.
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Final Evaluation
At this point, the strengths and weaknesses of the Program can
be assessed.

The strengths lay in three areas:

and educational methodology.
numerous:

funding, personnel,

The weaknesses were on the surface more

friction with the University of Nebraska College of

Agriculture, unpreparedness on the part of the-administering agency,
, political exploitation of Program gains, failure to communicate
goals to the public, and inadequate evaluation.

Actually, all five

of these problem areas had their source in the fact that the
Nebraska Legislature had broken new ground in assigning what came to
be an education program to a political/governmental agency.

Under

the circumstances, it is remarkable that the Program did so well.
From the vantage point of hindsight, none of the problems encountered
by the Program are at all surprising.

It would even seem that they

might have been anticipated and steps taken to prevent or minimize
them.
For example, friction with the University of Nebraska College
of.Agriculture was inevitable the moment the administration of

wha~

was essentially an education program in agricultural economics was
assigned to a "non-educational" agency.

In any field the personnel

of an established institution-understandably think of themselves as
the appropriate persons to conduct research in that field.

It should

not have been at all surprising then if university personnel felt
their expertise had been neglected when the administration of the
Program was given to the Nebraska Department of Agriculture.
university pique wasn't merely a matter of bruised egos:

But

adminis-
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tration of the Program would have brought with it access to special
sources of funds not otherwise available to the school.
competition for funds in education is well known.

The intense

Reputations depend

upon funds for research, and when the administration of the Program
was given to apolitical agency, the College of Agriculture had to
content itself witb the five projects (and associated funds)
allocated to it by the Department of Agriculture.
This problem was in fact not unforeseen, and when the issue of
Program administration was being debated in the Legislature, the
College of Agriculture had its proponents.

Patiently, opponents

argued that it was precisely because the College of Agriculture had
traditional competence in the field of agricultural economics that it
should not be entrusted with a project designed to challenge the
prevailing wisdom in the field.

The leaders of institutions which

have worked in a given way over a period of years develop a proprietary interest in their work and cannot be expected to regulate or
change themselves to any great extent.

It was further argued by

those who opposed administration of the Program by the University that
- the College of Agriculture, with its strong programs in production
research, should itself be one of the targets of a utilization research
education program.

In supporting the prevailing orthodoxy (production

research), the University was engaging in social and economic maintenance; its programs reinforced existing thinking and priorities
rather than reordering them.

B. E. Swanson and C. Lindly, in an

article entitled "College and the Community," have warned adult
educators that established educational institutions, busy maintaining
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the status quo, cannot be counted on as agents of social intervention
or change.

1

In the end, the Nebraska Legislature allowed itself to be
persuaded that the Nebraska Department of Agriculture ought to go into
the education business, or as it was seen at the time, the research and
development business.

Administration of the Program was given to

this Department, which had no particular education or research bias,
since it had never done either:

its job heretofore had been

inspection, tax collection and consumer protection.

If the University

College of Agriculture was upset by the decision, it was only
natural; and it was only natural that the University should adopt an
"I told you so" attitude when the Department of Agriculture found
itself ill-prepared to undertake the resulting educative effort.
Unlike the University, the Department of Agriculture did not
have its own facilities either for research or for public education.
So it began by delegating these tasks--research to private laboratories, and education to private firms.

What could be sounder?

It

was felt that, with no philosophical preconceptions, these private
agencies could be counted on to carry out the tasks for which they
were being paid.

As the focus of the Program changed from research

and development to education, the Department began to put together an
education unit of its own.

At first, however, the department's

education unit saw itself as only another kind of public relations or
public information agency, whose work was no different in kind from
that of the hired public relations agencies.

It engaged itself in

promoting the Program (assuring Nebraskans that their investment

194
would payoff), the Department of Agriculture (look what a great job
we're doing for you), and the administration of Governor Frank
Morrison ("Nebraska's Governor has provided valuable support to the
Nebraska Program," headlined a state fair display).

Fortunately for

the Program, this public relations phase was outgrown.

It is,

however, hardly surprising that a governmental agency with little or
no experience in the field of public education should initially
conceive of its job in terms of public relations.

No one in the

governor's office--and none of the Democratic appointees in the
Department of Agriculture--was going to object if the Program's
education unit engaged in public relations for the Governor or the
Department.

Nor were the state legislators averse to making

political points from Program successes.
Political exploitation of the Program and consequent pressure
on Program personnel to produce visible results--especially in terms
of potentially marketable products--was responsible for what was
perhaps the Program's greatest weakness:

its inability to state its

goals clearly and publicly, and to acknowledge the fact that its
administrators had come to see' it as essentially an education
program--not as a research and development program.

Program admin-

istrators suspected that Nebraskans would not take kindly to the
idea of investing 300,000 dollars a year in what was essentially an
effort at consciousness-raising.
the purse:

Furthermore, legislators controlled

the Program would be up for review every four years, and

senators who had voted for research wanted results to report to the
folks back home.

It is not surprising then that respondents to both
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the citizen and legislator questionnaires of this investigator seemed
to regard the Program's primary focus as research and development-even though they granted the educational nature of the information
they had received about the Program.

Nor is it surprising that 68%

of the citizen respondents felt they had not received enough information about the Program (as opposed to individual research projects):
the public had been left to infer Program goals from bits and pieces
of information about utilization research and about individual
projects.

It was not until the Program neared its second renewal in

1967 that Nebraska Director of Agriculture P. F. Finigan publicly
stated-his understanding of Program goals, saying he considered the
effort to have been no more than an "example" program, that in fact
as far as he was concerned its work was done--even though only one
project had reached the marketing stage.
On

the face of things it would seem that Program administrators

had been disingenuous, that they saw that continued funding depended
upon their producing some kind of visible results, and so they
allowed people to think that products like the Nebraskit would some
day be produced in Nebraska, providing a ready market for state agricultural products.

Meanwhile, Program personnel were importuning

federal officials and their own representatives in Congress with the
argument that the Nebraskit was only a "model" product, an example of
the sort of product which could be manufactured and marketed if--and
only if--federal funding and facilities were re-directed toward this
end.
Evidently, Nebraska Department of Agriculture officials did
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not in fact care if the Program failed to generate marketable
products.

It was as if they set the Program up with every expec-

tation that it would fail, that they counted on it to fai1--that is,
to raise expectations which could not possibly be met.

And that they

expected to use those disappointed expectations to raise a cry for a
stronger utilization research program on the federal level.

In a

sense, this was a maneuver designed to turn certain failure into
success.

By a shrewd early assessment of what the Program could

reasonably be expected to accomplish, Program administrators had
seen that if the Program was to succeed it would have to succeed as an
education program rather than as a research

~nd

development program.

And since they believed in utilization research, they were willing to
accept this more modest but clearly important goal.

They were also

shrewd enough to suspect that the Nebraska public would not be willing
to pay for "a program which would not return innnediate economic
dividends.

Consequently, Program personnel did all they could to

encourage public excitement over the Nebraskit and other research
products.

It looked to the public as though its investment in the,

Program was paying off.

The Program was indeed paying off--but not

in the way John Q. Public thought.' The projects raised public
expectations, and raising pubLic expectations vis-a-vis utilization
research had become a major goal for Program administrators.

In their

view of things it did not really matter if a project ever reached the
marketing stage:

John Q. Public may have .had his eye on the market,

but the Program had its eye on John Q.
massive public education campaign.

He had become the object of a
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If politics was the reason that the Program's goals were not

clearly delineated to the public, it was also the reason that the
Program was not adequately evaluated.

That is to say, the Program

was not evaluated in terms that would satisfy an educator.

In the

political sphere, a program's success tends to be judged in terms of
its ability to garner votes for its legislative supporters;
"evaluation" comes down to a legislator asking himself whether the
program had a positive press so that he can count on the people back
home being favorably impressed.

And while the Program's admin-

istrators' could not have- shared the senators' reasoning, they too
depended largely upon the press for feedback about the Program,
hiring a press clipping service to keep a record of the Program's
progress.

Not that the Department really expected the media to be

critical.

The chief role of the media, as the Department saw it,

was to provide an avenue for disseminating information about utilization research to the public.

The Program's education unit or one

of the public relations agencies provided copy, and the media
cooperated by using it.

It must be said that the Program enjoyed a

cooperative, even an enthusiastic press.

This happy arrangement

lasted until 1965, when a reporter for the Lincoln Journal decided to
do some investigative

reporti~g

on the Nebraska Program and find out

for himself precisely what the people of Nebraska were getting for
their investment.

He wanted to know, for instance, exactly how much

money was being spent and on what, and when and where the Program
would payoff in the marketplace.
was of course "never. It

The answer to the latter question

Department officials were certain that
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answer would please neither the paper's reporter nor its readers, and
repaid the reporter's curiosity by declaring him persona non grata.
Although a full disclosure of spending had been made in 1962, no
further disclosures were made, and as journalists pressed to take a
more active role in evaluating the Program, Program officials became
increasingly reluctant to release information.

Strange behavior on

the part of a program which "welcomed" feedback from the public.
Letters which the Program received at Department of
Agriculture offices represented another potential source of feedback,
but they do not seem to have been seen in this light by Program
personnel.

Public suggestions and comments had been actively

solicited by Di,ector Finigan, especially at the beginning of the
Program when Program personnel were looking for research projects.
The public's response to this invitation to participate in Program
design was .to broaden into a give-and-take exchange resembling a
correspondence course for participants.

Here, as with media

coverage, Program personnel showed themselves to be more interested
in getting the information out than in evaluating public responses.
Every contact with the public was seen as an opportunity for
spreading the word about utilization research:

little thought was

given to the possibility of u~ilizing these contacts to provide feedback about the Program.
The single exception to this pattern took place at the state
and county fair exhibits.
and it occurred to

so~eone

Program personnel manned these exhibits,
in the Program's education unit that

friendly chats with passersby could be turned into opportunities to
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conduct non-directive interviews.

Mental files were replaced by nole-

taking which was in turn replaced by a survey sheet.
were not, however, very scientific.

•

These surveys

No attempt was made to extend

the survey to include the non-fair-going population, and there is no
evidence that such feedback as was acquired in this way was utilized
to modify the Program.
This lack of attention to the business of evaluation is
particularly surprising when it is recalled that the Program was to
come up for review after a stated length of time.

The material

describing the Legislature's creation of the Program made no mention
of evaluation procedures despite the provision for periodic review,
but as has been noted, legislators have their own methods of judging
..

~

a Program's success.

Nor are their methods to be scorned:

Homer

Kempfer, in his book on adult education, cites among informal but
useful methods of program evaluation "votes at elections, trends in
vital statistics, and attendance at speeches and group discussions.,,2
Judging by their reluctance to disappoint public expectations about
the Program, Program administrators were themselves not a little
. sensitive to such indicators.
We have seen that all of the Program's problem areas--friction
with the University, initial unpreparedness on the part of the administering agency, political exploitation, failure to communicate goals,
and inadequate evaluation--have their source in the fact that the
Program represented a new kind of venture for the administering state
agency.

Even had it accomplished nothing else, the Program would have

demonstrated the sorts of problems likely to beset a state agency that
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undertakes an educational venture.

Not that all of these problems

are the-exclusive property of programs conducted under the auspices
of governmental institutions.

For example, an article in the 1970

Handbook of Adult Education noted vis-a-vis program evaluation that
"Often evaluation plans are not considered prior to the implementation of the program.

As a result, there are often inadequate

bases from which to determine the success of the program."

3

This researcher has suggested that many of these problems
might have been foreseen and steps taken to prevent or ameliorate
them.

At any rate, if the Nebraska Program is to serve as a model

for similar education programs, one wants to. adjust the model at the
points where problems occurred.
themselves:

Some of the adjustments suggest

the problem of inadequate evaluation could be avoided by

setting up evaluation procedures during the planning stages of a
program.

It is also clear that evaluation is not possible without a

clear statement of a program's desired outcomes.

In the case of the

Nebraska Program, the goals were clear to Program administrators, but
were not clearly understood by the public.
depends upon a public statement of goals:

Not that evaluation
programs designed to change

attitudes and/or behavior do not often state their purposes in so
many words.

But if evaluation is to become a matter of public

record, as it clearly must if a program is to be reviewed by a state
legislature, a clear public statement of goals would seem to be
imperative •

•

Some problems can hardly be avoided--e.g. controversy over who
should administer a program.

In the case of adult education programs,
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institutions with traditional competence in the field of education
will resent the competition of agencies whose primary function is
seen as something other than education.

Similarly, when government

goes into the education business, it is not going to be possible to
entirely eliminate political pressure.

There are steps which might

be taken to minimize political pressure, but they are not foolproof.

For example, a bipartisan advisory committee might be created,

in prder to prevent polarization of support for a program along party
lines, with one party claiming credit for the program and the other
trying to sabotage it.

(The Nebraska Program did have an advisory

committee, but it wasn't realistically bipar"tisan.)

Another measure

which might insulate education programs in government from political
pressure would be the setting up of independent education divisions
within the administering agencies.

Of course, personnel of even

"independent" divisions are not completely immune from political
pressures.

Further, if one is going to be concerned about the

philosophical bias of established educational organizations, an
education division of a state agency is going to be no less susceetible to bias than, say, the state university.
It would clearly be impossible to preclude all problems in a
venture of this sort.

Moreover, if the entry of government into the

field of education and social change is fraught with problems, it is
also blest with certain advantages.

All of the Nebraska Program's

strengths--funding, personnel, and methodology--can be traced in part
to the fact that it was a program of state government.
funding:

For example,

the Program was initiated by the State Legislature and was

202

generously funded from the outset.

Unlike many new education

programs, it did not have to allocate funds for itself out of
already-limited resources.

•

Similarly, the fact· that the Nebraska Program represented a
new venture on the part of a state agency was at least partially
responsible for the way in which its education unit was staffed,
drawing as it did upon the skills of public administrators, public
relations and information officers, and professional adult
educators.

Some of these personnel were transferred from other

duties in the Department of Agriculture; others were new recruits.
In any· event, it never occurred to the Department that the work of
the education unit should be entrusted to educators alone.

One of

the results was that the education unit functioned initially as a
sort of public relations agency for the Program, and while it quite
properly moved beyond this public relations function, public
relations skills continued to be important throughout the Program.
This is not surprising:

Roger Axford has observed that the true

adult educator is:
•• a person who could just as well have been with an
advertising agency • • • • An honest-to-goodness adult
educator is ready, willing and anxious to have his ideas
duplicated, emulated, replicated or even stolen..
4
Furthermore, adult education programs have long had to employ promotional tactics as an integral part.of their structure--e.g. in the
"selling" of programs to potential participants.

•

Nebraska Program was no different.

In this, the

Potential participants in the

New Crops program or in farm organization discussion groups on utili-

203
zation research needed to be "sold" on the Program.

When Boyle &

Johns, in an article in the 1970 Handbook of Adult Education, caution
about public relations tactics in adult education, they are
discussing a kind of public relations which the Program soon outgrew:
Public relations efforts, even though of an educational
nature, are usually intended to generate support for the
agency. Consequently, they are illustrative of an administrative or maintenance function directed toward a population external to the agency • • • • 5
While certain of the education unit's activities did in fact serve
to generate support for ·the Department and even for the Governor and
his administration, the general thrust of the Program could scarcely
be called "maintenance," directed as it was at social and economic
change.
Levin and Slavet, in Continuing Education:

State Programs

for the 1970's, speak of programs like the Nebraska Program in terms
of the rise of a new profession.

They contrast the traditional

approach to education in state government, which was conducted
through public information officers and served primarily to

promot~

particular agencies, with what they see as a new professionalism.
The "new profession" of state agency education places its emphasis
upon substantive education and requires· the related skills of public
administration, adult education, and public communication, as well as
familiarity with the substance of state agency programs.

6

This is

in fact quite a good description of the Nebraska Program's education
unit.

Besides the public administrators transferred from othe.r
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department duties and the public relations individual hired at the
outset of the Program, the education unit recruited a number of
professional adult educators.

Professional adult program personnel

have not been plentiful in the past.

Only a few universities

trained these individuals, who were then faced with very narrow
employment opportunities.

As more attention has been focused on

providing adult programs in society, more professionals are becoming
available.

At the time the Nebraska Program was initiated, there was

no Department of Adult Education at the University of Nebraska;
there was, however, a handful of individuals in the Education and
Agriculture Departments who were attempting .to specialize in adult
education programs.

This small group was drawn upon to form the

nucleus of the Nebraska Program's education unit (a list of personnel
is included in Appendix A).
suggest another.

One man was usually depended upon to

On the face of it, this procedure might smack of

parochialism, for well-trained personnel might also have been found
outside state boundaries.

In point of fact, hiring practices were

influenced by a belief that Nebraskans "knew the territory" better.,
and of course, by politics:

qualified adult educators who not inci-

dentally were good Democrats recommending other good Democrats.
Strong in funding and personnel; it is not surprising that
the Program's education unit went to work with a will, developing a
formidable array of educational methodology.

It tried just about

\

everything except offering a formal course in the subject of utili-

I

zation research--an important exclusion, reflecting perhaps an adult
educator's philosophical bias against the methods of formal
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education, or perhaps the ad-hoc nature of the education unit and the
resources available to it.

It was clearly not possible for the

education unit to hold formal classes in utilization/research for an
entire state, and responses to this investigator's surveys revealed

t

that while the vast majority of legislators had received information
about the Program directly from the Department of Agriculture, the
citizens had' received all of theirs second hand, catch-as-catch-can
via print and electronic media, state fair displays, discussion
groups and word-of-mouth.
While certain physical constraints--e.g. available personnel
and size of the target group--were operative, there was also good
theoretical basis in the literature of adult education for this
informal, catch-as-catch-can approach.

For example, in its concen-

tration upon agricultural workers, the Program was directing its
efforts toward a group of low socio-economic status whose formal
education was comparatively low.

The author of an article entitled

"The Influence of Social Class Behavior upon Adult Education Par ticipation" reported that persons of low socio-economic status prefer
informal participation in activities of an educational nature to
formal.

7

Verner and Booth, in their text on adult education,

confirmed this preference for-informal participation:

they reported

that 60% of the population, irrespective of economic status, does not
take part in the organized group life of a community, although there
is a high rate of informal participation.

S

This is borne out by

responses to this researcher's survey, which revealed that fully 50%
of the citizens who had participated in group discussions of the
j
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Nebraska Program had participated in informal, rather than formal
groups.

Responses to the survey also confirmed dramatically the

utility of the media as an avenue of informal education.
noted here that the Nebraska Program's use of the

It should be

medi~especially

the

newspapers, to transmit educational content, antedated by a full
decade the University of California's pioneering experiment in
offering college courses via newspaper.
Researchers in the field of public attitudes point out the
importance of the role of opinion leaders.

The Nebraska Program's

education unit tried to reach opinion leaders by making a special
effort to proselytize for the Program among farm group leaders.

This,

however, ignored. that group of opinion leaders who are not formal
leaders and who are consequently difficult for educators to identify
and influence.

Here again reliance on the media as the chief avenue

of education paid off.

As Katz and Lazarsfeld have pointed out,

informal opinion leaders:

I

• • • tend to be the audience of mass media who then disseminate the information gathered to those whose opinion they
influence. Such leaders are not readily identified, therefore
adult educators cannot work through them directly. By
judicious use of mass media, through which information can be
diffused to opinion leaders as well as to potential participants, the importance of adult education can be amplified. 9

.

Fully 25% of the citizen respondents to this investigator's survey
cited "word-of-mouth" as a source of at least some of their information about the Program.

It would seem that informal opinion

leaders were at work here picking up information about the Program
from the media and "disseminating the information gathered to those
whose opinion they influence."
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The importance of individual participation in the learning
process is axiomatic in contemporary education theory.
self-help

activiti~s

American heartland.

Further, group

are considered a social virtue--especially in the
The Nebraska Program itself was originally

conceived of as a self-help program, and the Program's education unit
provided numerous opportunities for citizen participation:

the

New Crops program, group discussions, and state fair displays which
required the individual to take part rather than remaining a spectator.

Many of the state fair displays were mechanical or electronic

and operated in the manner of teaching machines.

Responses to this

researcher's citizen survey revealed that 20'7. of respondents had
received at least part of their information about the Program via
these participatory fair displays.

Another 60% of the citizen

respondents had participated in a discussion group of some sort.
Participation in the New Crops branch of the Program was particularly
gratifying to Program administrators, especially considering the fact
that this phase of the Program was seriously understaffed.

The

increase in acreage planted to three of the new crops was dramatic: ,

CASTORBEANS
SOYBEANS

l

SAFFLOWER

1960
1970

153,000 acres
2,000,000 acres

1960
·1970

150 acres
824 acres

1960
1970

3 acres
86 acres. lO

The Program's other industrial crops, although introduced and grown
on private acreage, remained primarily experimental.

Guar, for

example, proved to be unsuitable for Nebraska's growing season.

It
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should be noted that the New Crops branch of the Program appeared to
be the best evaluated, probably because it was the easiest to
evaluate, involving no more than a comparison of acreage figures
available from other sources.
By way of conclusion, one might recall Arthur Garner's
observation that:
Almost every department of every level of government is
actively engaged in adult education, yet within the governmental structure itself there is little awareness of the 11
extent to which government is involved in adult education.
The Nebraska Department of Agriculture, as it existed prior to 1959,
bore out this observation.

It had given little thought to the

educative aspects of its operations, and although it had a public
relations officer in its employ, her role was seen largely as
promotion of the agency.

When the Department assumed administration

of the Nebraska Program in 1959 it was breaking new ground, moving
beyond its traditional service capacities to a position of advocacy.
It found itself serving as an education agency and operating, as it
were, within the context of what Malcolm Knowles has called a
developmental philosophy--education as a means to an end.

12

Kidd

would call the same philosophy "reconstructionist," which he sees as
deriving from Progressivism--educational goals derived from
national purposes, while social processes provide the context for
13
.
1 earnl.ng.

The Nebraska Program's goals were nothing if not derived

from national purposes:

its ultimate goal was nothing more nor less

than the socio-economic well-being of citizens--and education,
directed toward reordering p:iiorities in agricultural research, was
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seen as the means to that end.

Further, the educative work of the

Nebraska Program clearly went on within a context of social
processes.

Those processes had been at work eroding the socio-

economic well-being of the nation's agricultural population, eroding
as well the agricultural worker's sense of self:

the most efficient

agricultural workers in the world had not only lost status as an
indus,try, but had also been baffled and hurt by public resentment of
farm price supports and rising consumer prices for agricultural
products.

Social processes had made the Program necessary and social

processes ensured it an ,interested and highly motivated clientele.
'The success of the Nebraska Program in educating its target
groups--and the ,size of the investment made by the State of Nebraska
in this education venture--bodes well for similar programs.

Adult,

educators, after decades of existing on marginal finances usually
earned on a self-supporting basiS, may find that their time has
finally arrived.

Impressed with the practical results a successful

adult education program can show, government may be more willing to
devote tax monies to adult education programs, and the clientele o{
adult education may be vastly expanded.

If this should prove to be

the case, the Nebraska Agricultural Products Industrial Utilization
Research Program (Nebraska Program) should be examined as a model for
future government agency education programs.
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Program Personnel
Behind the phrase "Program administrators" is a group of able
and energetic men who deserve to be described more fully.
PEARLE F. FINIGAN:

After his appointment as Director of

Agriculture and Inspection by Governor Brooks in January 1959,
Finigan took strong administrative control.

He exhibited enthusiasm,

ability, and perceptiveness as to what the Nebraska Program could do
for Nebraska, for agriculture and its problems, and for the Brooks
Administration.

His leadership of the Research Advisory Committee

became almost total, since he was the only one to have a day-to-day
relationship with the Program.
the recommendations of his
details of all work.

He negotiated research contracts, with

staf~

and therefore knew the complete

The committee then was filled in on the details

arid usually approved contracts on the basis of Finigan's recommendations. ' This was not to say that the committee was entirely
useless, but to demonstrate Director-Chairman Finigan's control and
to further point out that the "advisory" role was somewhat reversed.
Finigan was showing himself to be a developing master poli,tician as well as a competent administrator.

In a year and a half he

had become so well known that he was considered "in the running" for
United States Secretary of Agriculture if'John F. Kennedy was elected
"

in the 1960 presidential election.

Mr. Finigan seemed to possess all

the qualifications Mr. Kennedy specified.

Actually, Director Finigan

stood about seventh in line for the job, and when a man of higher
rank and of ' more strategic political value, Governor Orville Freeman
of Minnesota, got the job (despite Nebraska Governor Frank B.
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Morrison's ardent support for his Director of Agriculture), Finigan
was appointed to head the Nebraskans for Kennedy 'organization.

1

Finigan would no doubt have accepted the position of
Secretary of Agriculture, had it been offered to him.
office.

It was a high

It would have continued a rapid rise in politics and, as a

cabinet office, would certainly have made good references for an
elective term in a state or national legislative body or office.
Further, and most important to this analysis, he would have been in
a position to strongly back the cause of federal assumption of the
burden of utilization research in the field of agriculture.

His

selection and the loss of his services would have been a tactical blow
to the Nebraska Program, but a strategic victory for the cause.

One

of the goals of the Program, a recognition of the importance of and
need for increased utilization research, would surely have been
closer to realization.
Finigan apparently decided that his future and the Program's
success did not lie with his acceptance of certain jobs within the
Federal Government.

Several times from 1960 to 1963 he was offered

. positions by the Federal Government such as the Food-For-Peace
directorship which George McGovern of South Dakota left in order to
run for Congress.

c

But Finigan-would consider only a top job,

preferably in the USDA as an assistant on utilization research to the
Secretary of Agriculture.
his work for Kennedy.

He refused all other offers of payment for

Governor Morrison and other individuals and

groups continued to promote Finigan

2

from the time he was considered

for the cabinet position until the Kennedy Administration (and most
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of Nebraska's White House contacts) crumbled with Kennedy's death in
November 1963.

3

It should also be noted here that Finigan was

considered for the Nebraska Democratic Party's Senatorial nomination
which the late Governor Brooks was certain to have tried for in the
November 1960 Congressional election.

However, because of personal or

political considerations Finigan did not make the bid, and the
Nebraska Program retained its top administrator at a crucial time.

4

Finigan was reappointed by Morrison in both 1961 and 1963, both
seemingly content with their relationship and the progress of their
and the Program's fortunes.

Finigan continued to gain luster and

stature state- and nation-wide as a result of the Nebraska Program,
being elected to_the National Chemurgic Council's Board of Directors
in December 1962

5

and to the Vice Presidency of the North-Central

Association of State Departments of Agriculture in June 1963.

6

In

this instance the situation made the man, not to neglect the point
that Finigan gave a commendable account of himself as an individual,
politician, and administrator.

He proved himself a Democrat for

Republicans to contend with if he moved on to other things from a
-Program which had made his name known--even popular--with the public.
In 1962 a University of Nebraska senior wrote an in-depth
study of Director Finigan and his directlon of the Nebraska Department
of Agriculture and its Program.

Though slightly dramatic, the

lengthy newspaper article won a national journalism award for the
student, Mr. Norman Beatty, and the University's Journalism School.
Mr. Beatty had access to a great amount of information about Finigan,
the Department of Agriculture, the Nebraska Program, and the

"'!
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political state of affairs, for he was employed in a part-time
position by RaIl and Raglin, Incorporated, one of the agencies
handling Program Rublic relations for the Department of Agriculture.
A large number of Nebraska newspapers carried the article, some in
condensed or serial form.

Whatever the form, it gave immense

publicity to Finigan and the Nebraska Program, furthering the image
of both through the positive and sometimes dramatic style of the
author.

7

Staff
At the time the Program was initiated, no special division
was set up within the Department of Agriculture to carry out the work
of Program administration.
Director's staff.

This workload was assumed by the

All department divisions and offices Were expected

to contribute personnel and material, and all personnel were
expected to put forth effort for the furtherance of the Program.

In

the early days of the Program, the only people formally identified
as having responsibility for the Program were the Department
Director (as Research Committee Chairman) and an individual whose
job it was to serve as "research coordinator. 1I

The education unit

moved around to different locations within the Department, finally
finding its home in the assistant director's office and ultimately in
the research coordinator's office.
Finigan gathered around him a young, dynamic staff, many of
whom were still engaged in getting their education.

They were loyal,

ambitious, and intelligent. 'At the end of 1963 most of these
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personnel working directly with the Program held designated official
positions within the department as assistant directors, special
assistants, consultants, division chiefs, or field men.

A total of

nine full-time individuals were most readily identifiable.

Four held

college bachelor degrees, four held masters degrees, one held a law
degree.

Of these, four were former full or part-time teachers, three

were part-time college students (one of these was pursuing his
doctorate), and one was a former reporter.

They were assisted by

other university undergraduate and graduate students hired part-time
from the fields of Education, Political Science, Agriculture, and
Law.

Director Finigan held firm control.

Assistant Directors

LEON W. KREINER {January 1960-July 1962) and JEFFERSON R. BROADY
(July 1962-December 1966) handled duties ranging from routine day-today Program matters to some long-range planning, but generally
existed to lighten the load on the Director as far as smooth operation
of the Department was concerned as it administered, among its varied
responsibilities, the Nebraska Program.

Although overshadowed by

Director Finigan, assistant directors were intelligent, competent,
- shrewd individuals, loyal to the Program and confident of its success.
ROGER L. LANGENHEIM was perhaps one of the most unsung
influential individuals involved in the administration of the
Program.

Certainly he was as responsible for the Program's

development and progress as Director Finigan, for Finigan relied
heavily on this man's advice.

Langenheim was a student attending his

final year at the University of Nebraska's College of Law and working
part-time as a reporter for a Lincoln,

,braska newspaper when the
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Program was initiated.

He took an interest in what he considered to

be a Program with far-reaching implications, and supported it with
the "power of the press."

He was consequently hired away from his

reporter's job by Finigan and put to work examining research
proposals submitted to the Department by laboratories and gathering
extensive information on such research.
much~re1ied

Langenheim soon became a

upon individual in the Program's administration,

ultimately earning the title of Research Coordinator.

Within this

designation from January to May 1960 he occupied a position similar
to the assistant director, but did not have as a primary duty
anything to do with department operation.
administration of the Program.

I

His first concern was

Langenheim maintained an advisory role

in the Program even upon moving from the Department to.employment with
a law firm in Kansas City, Missouri, for the firm was the very one
which handled the Program's account in its contracts with the Midwest
Research Institute of Kansas City.

Langenheim's influence could be

considered strong in project considerations and development work
through 1964; he was in effect carrying out the role of the advisory
committee.

In point of fact, it can be stated that he was the only

person outside of the director and assistant director who devoted
some time to the important "development" part of the Program:

the

introduction of research results into industry and the commercial·
ization of patents.

Finigan continued to respect Langenheim's

advice even as distances, communication, and relationships changed
from 1960 to 1966.
Because of the above unusual relationship of Mr. Langenheim to
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the Program, this gentleman was later accused of conflict-ofinterest by political opponents of the Program and its administrators.

These

~ntagonists

accused Langenheim, apparently

,correctly, of being a paid lobbyist in the State of Nebraska's
Legislature for a western cattle firm at the same time he was a fulltime lawyer in Kansas City and working on the State of Nebraska's
Department of Agriculture payroll--an involved situation to say the
least and one which could possibly sustain the charge.

Whatever its

negative aspects, it should not overshadow the fact that the Nebraska
Program owed much to the labor of Mr. Langenheim, a fact which will
probably remain little known.
Other individuals involved in administering the Program were:
DONALD L. DOESCHER, a dynamic, intelligent individual who
assumed the title of Research Coordinator after Mr. Broady vacated
the position when he succeeded Mr. Kreiner as Assistant Director.
(Broady had originally succeeded Langenheim as Research Coordinator.)
Doescher was capable of great flexibility in handling a variety of
"trouble-shooting" duties in regard to Program administration and
-department operation.
R. HAROLD MARKS, information and publications supervisor of
the Department, moved from the-Department's Resources Division to
the director's staff in June 1960.

He was a competent and meticulous

journalist by training, and handled the press and public relations
duties so important to the Progra'm' s acceptance and progress.
ELLSWORTH R. CARLSON and ARTHUR E. HABERLAN, the New Crops
,managers.

Carlson rose from an inspector's job with the Weed and

218
Seed Division of the Department to chief of that division, which was
to handle the field activities of the New Crops part of the Program.
Haberlan became chief field agent for the New Crops effort under
Carlson.

Together these two practical, amiable Nebraskans, who took

intense pride in their work, created a warm working relationship
with a skeptical University of Nebraska, the diverse farm groups, and
other individuals whom they had contact with throughout the state.
RAYMOND M. SNYDER, a scholarly, well-read individual whose
in,te11igence and interest in the Program gained the notice of the
department's Program staff and raised him from an obscure position in
the Department to the director's staff in 1963.
These individuals, together with numerous department
personnel, outside resource people, and university student help, put
together an educative effort which included an example research
program that lasted nearly eight years.
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QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear Fellow Nebraskan,
This nation is aware that American agricultural workers have
been extremely effective in the production of agricultural raw
materials. In fact, so successful has the production effort been
that a large surplus of such materials has accumulated. In view of
this fact, the State of Nebraska initiated a program during the
1960's which attempted to deal with the problem of surpluses. The
program worked to change the priorities of the public, the Congress,
the USDA, and the colleges of agriculture from an emphasis on
production to one of utilization. Using the dramatic results of
small research projects, and utilizing educational methods, the
Nebraska Program tried to present itself as such a powerful example
of what utilization research could do that no group or institution
could resist the lobby of are-awakened, re-educated public.
A sample, of which you are an important part, is being taken
of selected groups among the public. The enclosed questionnaire is
a part of that sample, and is designed to find out how well the
Nebraska Program presented itself to the public-and how successful
it was in its methods and aims. Your answers will represent the
thinking of several hundred of your fellow citizens. It is believed
that governmental agencies wishing to conduct similar programs in this
or other states will benefit by responses to studies of this kind.
The public's interest will be served by government's knowledge of how
the public accepts and reacts to such programs which attempt to
solve societal problems. Better programs can then be constructed and
pursued with the interest and active support of the individual
citizen.
The questionnaire is strictly anonymous. If you sign your
name to any comments, it will be held in confidence. The answers will
be used to compile statistical totals. The value of the study will be
increased if you will give careful thought to each answer and return
the form to me as promptly as possible.
Thank you for taking a moment from the numerous demands on your
time.
Sincerely,

Kent Murray
Ph.D. Candidate
University of Nebraska
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CITIZEN QUESTIONNAIRE * NO NAME PLEASE
ALL ANSWERS ARE COMPILED AS STATISTICS
1 *1 lived in or around Omaha, Grand Island, Ge'neva, Bridgeport,
Nebraska during the 1960's. CIRCLE CORRECT CITY.
2 *If you did not live in one of the above named areas during the
1960' s. WRITE IN CITY AND STATE LIVED IN:
3 *1 was out of the State of Nebraska during the following years of
the 1960's:
STATE YEARS:

4 *Occupation ______________-c Age ______~____ Sex __________________
5 *1 consider my work directly related to agriculture.
YES

40%

NO

60%

.•

6 *If not directly related to agriculture, I. consider my work
related to the fortunes of agriculture. YES
74%
NO
27%
7 *Do you recali a state program during the 1960's called the
NEBRASKA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS INDUSTRIAL UTILIZATION
RESEARCH PROGRAM (AGRESEARCH)? YES
48%
NO
52%
IF YOU DO NOT RECALL THE NEBRASKA PROGRAM, PLEASE RETURN THIS
QUESTIONNAIRE NOW WITHOUT ANSWERING THE REST OF THE QUESTIONS.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME.
8 *The Nebraska Department of Agriculture administered the Nebraska
Program during the 1960's to change the priority of the public,
the Congress, and the USDA by education and example from an
emphasis on production to one of utilization in regard to agricultural raw ~aterials. CHECK THE PROJECT YOU REMEMBER HEARING
ABOUT:
NEBRASKIT
MILK BARS
PAPER FROM CORN STARCH
PAINT FROM SOYBEANS
WRAPPING & COOKING FILM
INDUSTRIAL FOAMS
AUTO FUEL FROM GRAIN

68%
32%
28%
28%

20%
04%
64%

GROWTH STIMULATORS
24%
INSULATION FROM STRAW & COBS~
20%
TANNED HIDES UTILIZATION
32%
CASTORBEANS
44%
SAFFLOWER
16%
GHAR
00%
NONE OF THESE
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9 *1 supported the Program described above.
BLOCK:
17%

57%

26%

QCIl6

CHECK APPROPRIATE
QCIl6

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
10 *If you supported the Program, how? Vocal support 48% ,Wrote
letter to newspaper 04%
,Wrote letter to state legislator 04%
Voted for candidates that supported the Program 37%
Other (State) 07%
11 *During the .1960's the Nebraska Program attempted to get
Nebraskans to support a program of utilization research to find
new crops and:!!§g ~ for agricultural products as strong as the
state's very successful production research program locatedin~
the University of Nebraska College of Agriculture. Do you agree
that utilization research needed more emphasis?
22%

57%

22%

00%

00l!

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
12 *One of the goals of the "New Uses" branch of the Program was to
draw industry into Nebraska to produce the new products. 1supported this goal.
27%

59%

09%

00%

05%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
13 *1 had an opportunity to test actual products such as Nebraskits,
milk bars, and corn paper. YES 17%
NO 83%
STATE PRODUCT
TESTED:

-----------------

14 *1 participated in evaluating the Nebraska Program. YES
NO 96%
State method of evaluation: SURVEY.-;:;-_ __
INTERVIDI
MACHINE TEST
QUESTIONNA1RE~___
OTHER (STATE) _____

05%

15 *How did you get information on the Nebraska Program? FARM
ORGANIZATION 24%
NDlSPAPER 76%
MAGAZINE 32%
RADIO 26%
T. V. 40%
WORD OF MOUTH 26%
SPEAKER 00%
PRINTED
PAMPHLETS 00%
COUNTY OR STAT;: FAIR DISPLAY 20%
CONTACT WITH
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE PERSONNEL ASSOCIATED WITH THE
AGRESEARCH PROGRAM 00%
16

groups did you participate in that discussed the utilization research projects and products part of the Nebraska
Program? FARM BUREAU 16% . GRANGE 04%
FARMER'S UNION
NFO 00%
FAMILY 08%
SCHOOL 08%
INFORMAL GROUP 24%
OTHER 20%

'~hat

04%

,
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17 *What groups did you participate in that discussed the New Crops
part of the Nebraska Program? (STATE):
FannBureau=16%
Grange =04%
Other = 12%

18 *Considering all the sources of information on the Nebraska Program
listed in questions 15, 16, & 17, do you feel that you got:
ENOUGH INFORMATION 39%
TOO LITTLE INFORMATION 68%
MORE THAN
I CARED FOR 00%

19 *Do you.remember considering this information as:
POLITICAL 00%
BOTH 18%
NEITHER 14%

EDUCATIONAL

68%

20 *Studies of the public during the late 1960's and early 1970's
reported a distrust of information produced and distributed by
the Federal Government. I trusted the information coming from my
state government agencies on such subjects as agricultural
production, utilization, and education.
23%

59%

09%

09%

00%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
21 *1 trusted the following agencies or organizations for information.
CHECK AGENCIES: Nebraska Department of Agriculture 64%
Nebraska Department of Economic Development 40% The Nebraska
Governor's Office 32%
The Media (newspapers, radio, T.V._,.
newsmagazines, etc.)
56%
22 *1 would have placed more confidence in information about utilization,' utilization research, and the Nebraska Program if it had
been given out by private laboratories contracted with by the
State of Nebraska.
22%

17%

30%

26%

04%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
23 *1 would have placed more confidence in such information if it
had been given out by University of Nebraska College of Agriculture laboratories.
22%

35%

22%

22%

00%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
24 *1 would have liked more educational information about utilization, utilization research, and the Nebraska Program to have
been prepared and issued to the people of Nebraska.
32%

59%

09%

00%

00%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
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25 *1 would now consider Jo~ning a discussion group or study group
formed by an organization such as the state educational agencies
(NU), the farm organizations, the Elks, the Rotary, a labor
union, social, church, or library club, etc., to better educate
myself about utilization research, resulting increased farm
opportunities, and jobs from new industry in Nebraska cities.
10%

35%

35%

15%

05%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
26 *The Nebraska~rogram and its $300,000 per year were taken from
the. Nebraska Department of Agriculture by the Legislature in
1967. The research projects continue at a reduced rate in the
Nebraska Department of Economic Development because of reduced
funding. The implementation of research findings (applications
.such as the Gasahol Car) was given to an independent Committee of
the Nebraska Legislature and continues at a reduced level.
26a

*The old Nebraska Program was better with many,
diverse projects, top priority, and $300,000
per year.
-18%

23%

55%

00%

05%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
26b

*The reduced program is better with fewer projects,
reduced priority, and $68,000 per year.
00%

11 %

53%

21 %

16%

Strongly Agree/Agree/UndecidedjDisagree/Strongly Disagree
27 *In 1972 certain Nebraska Senators in the State Legislature stated
that the Legislature almost to a man would give a utilization
research and education program all the money it requested. Do
you agree with this attitude?
00%

18%

41%

36%

05%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
28 *Nebraska utilization research and education programs located outside the University of Nebraska College of Agriculture in other
agencies such as the Committee of the Legislature or the
Department of Economic Development should be cancelled altogether.
05%

05%

41%

36%

14%

Strongly Agree!Agree!Undecided!Disagree!Strongly Disagree
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YOU ARE ENCOURAGED TO USE THE REST OF THIS PAGE AND THE BACK OF IT
TO MAKE COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS OR TO "LET OFF STEAM" ABOUT THE
NEBRASKA PROGRAM. YOU MAY SIGN YOUR NAME IF YOU WISH TO MAKE THIS
QUESTIONNAIRE AND THESE COMMENTS A MORE PERSONAL REPLY, BUT YOUR
SIGNATURE WILL BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE.
, THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR TIME.
AS POSSIBLE.

PLEASE MAIL THIS FORM BACK AS SOON

COVER LETTER FOR LEGISLATOR QUESTIONNAIRE
TO:
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Present or Former Nebraska Legislator

SUBJECT:

Research Survey

Dear Sir/Madame,
The Legislature of the State of Nebraska initiated an effort
during the 1959-1967 time period known as the Nebraska Agricultural
Products Industrial Utilization Research Program. It was administered by the Nebraska Department of Agriculture. Using the
dramatic results of small research projects, and utilizing educational methods,the Nebraska Program tried to present itself as such
a powerful example of what utilization research could do that Congress,
the USDA, and the colleges of agriculture could not resist the lobby
of are-awakened, re-educated public. Nothing less than a complete
change of priority from production to utilization was expected.
Records indicate that you were a member of the Nebraska
Legislature during the 1960's. The purpose of the enclosed questionnaire is to determine how well the Program presented itself and how
successful it was in its methods and aims. As a legislator, you are
one of a small but influential group of opJnion leaders who also have
some control over efforts of this kind; therefore your opinions are
important. It is believed that governmental agencies wishing to
conduct similar programs in this or other states will benefit by
your responses to studies of this kind. The public's interest will
be served by your evaluation of this effort which attempted to
solve the societal problem of agricultural surpluses. Better
programs can then be constructed and pursued, emulating the Nebraska
Program's successes and avoiding its failures.
The questionnaire is strictly anonymous. If you sign your
name to any comments, it will be held in confidence. The answers
will be used to compile statistical totals. Since there are only a
few legislators, the value of the study will be increased if you will
give careful thought to each answer and return the form to me as soon
as possible. A similar questionnaire is being sent to selected
sections of the public.
Thank you for taking a moment from the numerous demands on
your time.
Sincerely,

Kent Murray
Ph.D. Candidate
Unive'rsity of Nebraska
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LEGISLATOR QUESTIONNAIRE * NO NAME PLEASE
ALL ANSWERS ARE COMPILED AS STATISTICS
1 *1 was a member of the Nebraska Legislature during the years _____
2 *1 supported the 1959-1967 State of Nebraska AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
INDUSTRIAL UTILIZATION RESEARCH PROGRAM (AGRESEARCH).
56%

44%

00%

00%

00%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
3 *1 supported the Nebraska Program: Vocally
33%
Supported
governor who ran on his record as a strong supporter of the
program 19%
Wrote newspaper letter or article 00%
Made
speeches in favor to constituents 00%
By votes in Legislature 33%
Other. (State) __-'oo-'-'%:...-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___
Did not support _-'O~O~%~_______
4 *While I was a legislator, my constituents asked me to
17%
83%
00%
the Nebraska Program.
Strongly Support/Support/Not Support
5 *My talks out in the state ran ~~3~8~%~-r~~6~<%~__77~00~%~~~~00~%~
Strongly/In Favor/Against/Strongly
the Nebraska Program.
In Favor
Against
6 *1 received most of my information on the Nebraska Program via:
Newspaper 60%
Radio 05%
TV 04%
Directly from Nebraska
Department of Agriculture personnel 60%
Lobpyists 15%
Indirectly from Biennial Reports or pamphlets and releases of
Department of Agriculture 25%
Constituents 15%
My own staff
10%
Other senators 25%
Other (State)
15%
--~~------------

7 *Over the period of time I was .in the Legislature, the information
I received about the Nebraska Program made my attitude toward the
Program: More Positive 72%
More Negative 28%
(The
attitude toward it I began with was: Positive 100%
Negative 00% .)
8 *Most of the information I received about utilization, utilization
research, new crops, and the 1959-1967 Nebraska Program was of an
objective educational and informational nature:
05%

84%

05%

05%

00%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strong1y Disagree
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9 *Most of the information I received about utilization, utilization research, new crops, and the Nebraska Program was political
and not objectively educational:
00%

16%

II%

58%

16%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
10 *What Nebraska Program projects do you recall? Growth stimulators 45%
The Nebraskit 60%
Corn starch paper 40%
Auto fuel from grain 90%
Wrapping and cooking films 50%
Industrial foams 30%
Soybean paint 15%
Milk Bars
15%
Castorbeans 60%
Safflower 60%
Guar 15%
Utilization of
tanned hides 15%
Insulation from straw 25%
11 *Besides developing New Uses for agricultural raw materials,
introducing New Crops, and attracting New Industry, the Nebraska
Program of 1959-1967 tried to educate Nebraskans to support
utilization research efforts equal to or greater than production
research in order to lower the agricultural surpluses. The
_
Program succeeded: Nebraskans will support increased utilization
research programs •
.05%

75%

15%

05%

00%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
12 *Leaving aside the question of whether the Nebraska Program
changed public attitudes, I agree that it at least made
Nebraskans and the national public more aware of utilization
research:
20%

75%

05%

00%

00%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
13 *It was hoped during the 1960's that the re-education of the
Nebraska public or a wider public to support utilization research,
and the demonstrated success of Nebraska Program-sponsored utilization research projects, could be used with whatever national
public help could be gained to pressure Congress, the USDA, and
the production-oriented colleges of agriculture to support and
undertake more utilizat'ion research. Was this pressure effective
with Congress?
05%

52%

19%

24%

00%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
with USDA?
05%

38%'

38%

19%

00%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
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with Colleges
05%

43%

33%

19%

00%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
14 *Leaving aside the question of whether the Program succeeded as a
pressure tactic, I agree that the Federal Government was at least
aware of the Nebraska Program.
10%

70%

10%

10%

00%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
15 *The current Nebraska Legislature will support utilization research
and education programs:
14%

64%

18%

05%

00%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
16 *What current Legislature support exists is a result of the
1959-1967 Nebraska Program.
00%

33%

33%

3,%

00%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
17 *The old 1959-1967 Nebraska Program was better with many, diverse
projects, top priority and $300,000 per year:
05%

33%

24%

33%

05%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
18 *The new reduced program is better with fewer projects, reduced
priority and only $68,000 per year:
00%

40%

25%

30%

05%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
19 *The old 1959-1967 Nebraska Program was given $300,000 per year.
This was adequate.
10%

52%

14%

24%

00%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
20 *A Nebraska legislator stated in 1972 that the Nebraska Legislature almost to a man would give utilization research and
education programs all the mone-y they needed and asked for. Do
you agree with this statement?
05%

05%

- 00%

59%

32%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
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21 *Shou1d the Nebraska Department of Economic Development be given
funds and encouragement to reactivate the dormant 1959-1967
Program utilization research projects?
09%

41%

27%

18%

05%

Strongly Agree!Agree!Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
22 *1 feel utilization research and education to reduce agricultural
surpluses is essential:
33%

57%

05%

05%

00%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
23 *Utilization research and education is more essential at this time
than production research and education:
43%

38%

05%

14%

00%

Strongly Agree/Agree/Undecided/Disagree/Strongly Disagree
·YOU ARE ENCOURAGED TO USE THE REST OF THIS PAGE AND THE BACK OF IT TO
MAKE COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS OR TO "LET OFF STEAM" ABOUT THE
NEBRASKA PROGRAM. YOU MAY SIGN YOUR NAME IF YOU WISH TO MAKE THIS
QUESTIONNAIRE AND THESE COMMENTS A MORE PERSONAL REPLY, BUT YOUR
SIGNATURE WILL BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE.
THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR TIME.
AS POSSIBLE.

PLEASE MAIL THIS FORM BACK AS SOON
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I think I can see Adult Education deriving great benefit
from the theorizing and research of the "change theorists"
now so active. I see our technology being enriched by
increased understanding of the process of individual, institutional, and social change, and especially of the phenomenon of resistance to change and strategies for helping with
change.
Finally I-see an enlargement of the definition of the
clientele of Adult Education away from a primary focus on
individuals qua individuals toward a concern also with institutions, communities, and even larger social systems. I see
us Adult Educators becoming increasingly concerned with
improving educative quality of total environments and
increasingly skillful in planning programs that will accomplish this end.
Malcolm S. Knowles
Professor and Philosopher of Adult Education
Adult Leadership
Fe bruary 1967
With the passage of LB-722 in 1959, the State of Nebraska
embarked on one of the most
programs of the past decade.

extensiv~

and challenging adult education

LB-722 established the Nebraska

Agricultural Products Industrial Utilization Research Program
(Nebraska Program) which in the

~ourse

of its ambitious life undertook

the re-education, first of Nebraska's production-oriented agricultural
citizens, and then of other agricultural states, the USDA and

Congress.

Seen as an adult education program, the Nebraska Program

clearly represented the kind of "enlargement of the definition of the
clientele of adult education" proposed above by Malcolm Knowles.
This was adult education moving "away from a primary focus on individuals qua individuals toward a concern.also with institutions,
communities and even" larger social systems."

It was education

functioning within and concerned with a total environment, an environment whose production-oriented values, and whose success in living up
to those values, had back-fired resulting in huge and embarrassing
agricultural surpluses which depressed the market value of agricultural commodities, reducing the agriculture worker's standard of
living and his status in the eyes of his fellow citizens.

Insofar as

the Nebraska Program attempted to change values and attitudes it also
functioned as a change agent, finding itself increasingly preoccupied
with "the phenomenon of resistance to change and strategies for
helping with change."

Resistance to change was rooted in generations

of emphasis on production and production research.

Supporters of the

Nebraska Program were convinced that utilization research was the
solution to agriculture's problems:

the Programs' educational

objective was thus a reordering of research priorities and an attenuation of the production ethic.
The size of its clientele and its role as change agent in a
total socio-economic environment were not the only things which
distinguished the Nebraska Program.

The Program was also distin-

guished by the fact that it was administered, not by a traditional
educational institution, but by an agency of a state government (the

Nebraska Department of Agriculture) and in fact saw the state's
educational institutions as part of its clientele:

production-

oriented like the state's citizens, resistant to change, committed to
maintaining the status quo vis-a-vis agricultural research.
The Program's name is misleading.

It sounded, not like an

educational program, but like a research and development program.

In

fact, the Nebraska Program was originally conceived as a research and
development program designed to find new uses for agricultural
products, and although Program administrators came to see the
Program's principal business as education, Nebraska citizens and
their representatives in the State Legislature never ceased to hope
that the Program would produce marketable products.

This misunder-

standing about Program goals was to create problems, particularly in
the area of program evaluation:

seen as an education program

designed to change attitudes and to reorder priorities in agricultural research, the Nebraska Program was a great success; seen as a
research and development program, it was disappointing (only one
product got to the marketing stage).
Although the agricultural surpluses which gave rise to the
Nebraska Program have gradually disappeared, the educative work of
the Program will be of interest to those in the field of adult
education who are engaged in programs of similar scope, or who are
involved in education programs conducted

by~governmental

agencies.

The Program's problems and omissions, no less than its scope and
daring, are instructive; in the judgment of this investigator, the
Nebraska Program provided an exciting laboratory for testing the
principles of adult education on a large population, and stands as a
model for programs of similar scope and intent.

